GitHub status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of GitHub reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by GitHub users through our website.

• Website Down (55%)
• Errors (32%)
• Sign in (14%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent GitHub outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Paris	Website Down	3 days ago
Ahmedabad	Errors	9 days ago
Delme	Sign in	9 days ago
Lyaud	Website Down	9 days ago
Catania	Errors	12 days ago
Inverness	Website Down	24 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

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  Gregor (@bygregorr) reported 5 minutes ago

  @dopabees ngl the broken wrist is the only github metric that's ever made me believe a commit history

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  tmo (@tmophoto) reported 6 minutes ago

  @DabsMalone i had an old email account from like 15 years ago with bot in the name that i fired back up after 10 years and used for a hermes profile and it got immediately banned. i used it to sign in to x, github, everything. was a huge hassle

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  Eric Johansson | Microsoft MVP | Progress Champion (@EricJohansson) reported 7 minutes ago

  @csharpfritz Is this a github broke or a YOU broke github issue? Either way they have an issue. 😢

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  Prophet Joel (@2happyCSGO) reported 7 minutes ago

  I personally hated Claude because it refused to do almost anything I asked it to do so have no idea of how the speed is but gemini-cli was unusable for non enterprise users. Github CoPilot both GUI and cli is pretty good. Grok Build is what I'm using mostly and not yet had any issues with the speed but I want to go full local asap, scouting for 3090's atm. Just to be able to run "uncensored" models that don't ***** like Claude is reason enough for me to prefer local over Cloud but also cloud is ******* expensive, I have SuperGrok 100$/month and CoPilot Max 100$/month and that is barely enough. I'm trying to make my own Jarvis so I need to build my own RAG, memory, librarian, SRE Agent that understand how to use all tools and I also get crazy new idea's all the time lol Just made my first alpha of a tool that can wipe basically anything you don't want in Windows11. Basically Chris Titus clone but on steroids, this isn't just a debloater, it's a Grim Reaper 💀

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  Suryansh Tiwari (@Suryanshti777) reported 8 minutes ago

  6. The Dependency Incident Check Grok has native real-time search across X. Breakage gets posted there hours before the GitHub issue is triaged. No other coding model has that feed. "You are a build engineer whose first move on a broken pipeline is to work out whether it broke for everyone or only for me. Search X and the web, last 14 days. Check: - Is anyone else reporting this failure with this package and version, and when did the reports start - The exact release that changed behaviour, and the changelog line that admits it - Whether maintainers have acknowledged it and what they recommended - The pin or patch people settled on, with the tradeoff of each - Whether this is my problem instead, and what evidence points that way Give me the verdict in the first line: their bug or mine. Then the evidence, newest first, with links. My failure: [PASTE THE ERROR, THE PACKAGE AND VERSION, AND WHAT CHANGED ON YOUR SIDE RECENTLY]"

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  Rusty Williams McMurray (@1RustyMac) reported 8 minutes ago

  Persistent AI doesn’t have a supply chain problem at the model. It has a supply chain problem at the moment it changes its mind. Personality drifts. Tools get installed. Memory accumulates. The thing you shipped on Monday is not the thing answering on Friday. We can attest who built the weights. We still cannot attest who authorized what the agent became on Tuesday. That is the hole. Who is allowed to let it change? We built Living Supply-Chain Security for Persistent AI Organisms around one law: The organism may propose evolution. It may not authorize it. No trace, no drift. If an agent wants a new personality, a new tool, a new maturity, or a rollback — that change does not happen because it felt confident. Confidence is not a key. Self-narration is not evidence. Evidence is not interpretation. Interpretation is not authorization. Authorization has to come from outside the organism, bound to the exact change, used once, and written into an append-only history. Even a rollback cannot erase the record. You can restore a prior state. You cannot pretend the detour never happened. Default-deny. Hash-chained. Externally signed. We froze battery v1 on July 5 and ran it against the paper’s own claims. It held. That is executable evidence. Not a proof. Not a production blessing. Not “alignment, solved.” If it can’t be attacked, it isn’t finished. GitHub later this week. Come try to break it.

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  Jayesh Betala (@jbetala7) reported 11 minutes ago

  @github Exactly how issue issue comments should handle local media files

• 
  moledao (@moledao_io) reported 11 minutes ago

  Web3 Remote Job Scams: A 2026 Field Guide Introduction Over the past few years, Web3 has come to represent a new world of opportunity for many young people. New roles, new narratives, and new stories of wealth have inspired countless people to enter the industry with high expectations. Remote work, stablecoin-based compensation, and a greater emphasis on ability than academic credentials can be especially attractive to professionals at the beginning of their careers. As a recruitment platform that works with job openings and candidates every day, however, we have also seen the other side of the industry. A significant share of supposed recruitment activity is not recruitment at all. It is fraud disguised as hiring, designed to steal the funds in job seekers’ wallets. According to Chainalysis’ 2026 report, cryptocurrency scams and fraud caused an estimated $17 billion in losses worldwide in 2025. Impersonation-related attacks increased by 1,400% year over year. Fake recruitment is one of the most common ways impersonation and social engineering are being applied to job seekers. What Happened to Us This month, it happened to us. We were contacted through Telegram by someone claiming to represent a US-registered technology company. They said the company urgently needed to hire Web3 engineers and wanted our support in sourcing candidates. After further investigation, we were unable to verify whether this person had actually been authorized by the company. We also could not rule out the possibility that they were impersonating a legitimate business. To avoid causing further harm to an organization that may itself have been a victim of impersonation, we will not disclose the company’s full name. At first, there were almost no obvious warning signs. The contact provided a business registration document and a polished company profile. Interviews were scheduled through Calendly, job openings were hosted on Ashby, and meetings took place over Zoom. These are all professional tools commonly used by legitimate companies, making it easy to assume that a company using them must be trustworthy. In reality, forging a registration document and creating Calendly or Ashby accounts require very little effort. Almost anyone can create the appearance of professionalism at minimal cost. This experience taught us an important lesson: the legitimacy of the tools surrounding a hiring process tells you very little about the legitimacy of the company behind it. The details of how the people involved behave are far more revealing. The partnership also progressed with unusual ease. All contractual documents arrived at once and appeared ready to sign. There was no friction at any stage. When discussing the recruitment fee, we initially proposed 15%, which the other party immediately accepted. We then tested an increase to 20%, and they accepted again without hesitation. Anyone with experience in recruitment delivery knows that fees are often one of the most difficult parts of a headhunting agreement. Clients may negotiate repeatedly over a difference of just two percentage points. The pace was also deliberately compressed. Interviews were often scheduled only one or two hours in advance, leaving almost no time for verification. Once confirmed, meetings were then repeatedly cancelled or rescheduled due to supposed last-minute conflicts. Several additional warning signs gradually appeared. The registration documents looked legitimate at first glance. Upon closer comparison, however, the names of the people listed in them did not match the information we were able to verify independently. The contact also made an unusual request. While verifying whether candidates were currently employed, they asked us to find out whether those candidates used LinkedIn frequently. Normal employment verification does not require this information. A person’s activity on a professional networking platform primarily reveals whether they have an accessible network that could quickly be used to verify their identity, employment history, or recent activity. At the same time, the contact prohibited us from sourcing candidates through LinkedIn or Telegram. They claimed their internal team was already using those channels and wanted to avoid duplicate candidates. In practice, this restriction pushed external recruitment partners into channels where independent cross-checking was much more difficult. The geographic requirement was even harder to explain. A US company was willing to consider only Chinese-speaking candidates and applied unusually strict screening standards that appeared unrelated to technical ability. In retrospect, we suspect that the screening criteria may have favored candidates who were easier to persuade and more likely to have higher incomes or larger asset balances. We cannot, however, confirm the group’s true intentions. Each of these warning signs could have been rationalized on its own. A client may have unusual preferences, legitimate concerns, or simply an unprofessional hiring process. It was only when the signals were considered together that the larger pattern became visible. Then came the interviews. Candidates joined the meetings, but the interviewers asked no questions about their project experience or technical background. Instead, they immediately provided a GitHub repository and instructed candidates to clone it onto their local machines and run it. The repository involved encryption and signing operations using cryptocurrency wallet private keys. Before the interviews, we had explicitly asked whether candidates would need to download or run anything. The contact told us they would not. Once the meetings began, however, the candidates received the exact opposite instruction. One candidate offered to share his screen, inspect the code locally, and walk the interviewer through it line by line. The interviewer refused and insisted that he download and run the repository on his own computer. The candidate ended the meeting. Other candidates quickly noticed that something was wrong and stopped as well. The most carefully designed part of the operation was not what happened during the interviews, but the feedback that followed. If a candidate ran the code, the interviewer gave positive feedback, said the candidate had performed well, and advanced them to the next round. If a candidate remained cautious and refused to run it, the interviewer told us that the candidate had falsified their résumé and instructed us to blacklist them immediately. That second response was not merely feedback. It was an instruction designed to prevent further communication between us and the candidate while allowing the wider operation to continue. This is something we hope every recruitment professional remembers: when a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without providing credible evidence, the request may reveal more about the client than it does about the candidate. Another common feature of these operations is that they do not need to interview every candidate. They only need a small number of people who are willing to execute the code. As a result, the hiring process will often stall abruptly once enough potential targets have been identified. What We Did Afterwards We immediately terminated all cooperation with the contact and removed the related job listings. We contacted every candidate who had entered the process to determine whether anyone had downloaded or executed the code. We also provided guidance on device inspection, credential rotation, and wallet security. All contracts, chat histories, meeting information, repository URLs, and account details have been preserved. Reports have been submitted to Telegram, GitHub, Ashby, and Calendly. At the procedural level, we have rewritten our client identity-verification process. Going forward, we will not accept recruitment assignments or partnerships without conducting independent callback verification through a channel the contact does not control. Candidate security briefings will also become a standard step before we introduce anyone to a client. Other Recruitment Scams Currently in Circulation What we encountered was only one variation. Several other methods remain active and deserve close attention. Malicious Take-Home Assignments Malicious interview assignments are currently one of the most widespread forms of recruitment-related attacks. Attackers impersonate recruiters or hiring managers on LinkedIn, X, or Telegram. They advertise senior roles with compensation well above market rates and frequently target professionals working with React, Next.js, Solidity, and blockchain technologies. Candidates are then given a technical assessment in the form of an npm project or GitHub repository and instructed to run it locally. Unit 42, the threat-intelligence team at Palo Alto Networks, refers to this activity as “Contagious Interview” and tracks it under the identifier CL-STA-240. The campaign was first publicly documented in November 2023 and has been linked to North Korea–associated threat actors. The malware used in these campaigns includes BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. These cross-platform payloads target Windows, Linux, and macOS devices and are designed to steal sensitive browser information and cryptocurrency wallet data. According to security researchers, more than 197 malicious npm packages associated with this attack path have been distributed since October 10, 2025, accumulating more than 31,000 downloads. Common warning signs include recently created repositories, abnormal commit histories, and contributors whose identities cannot be verified. These are only indicators, however. Attackers can compromise established accounts, fork legitimate long-running repositories, or manufacture months of commit history in advance. No single signal can prove that a repository is either safe or malicious. Fake Meeting Software Fake meeting applications are another major threat. Attackers approach targets with an investment opportunity, partnership proposal, or interview invitation. Shortly before the meeting, they claim that Zoom is not working or that the company uses a different conferencing platform. The target is then directed to download the supposed meeting software from a specific website. Cado Security Labs has tracked one such campaign, known as “Meeten,” since September 2024. The campaign distributes a cross-platform information stealer called Realst. The group uses AI-generated company profiles to make its operations appear more credible. The names and branding of its meeting applications change frequently, with known examples including Clusee, Cuesee, Meetone, and Meetio. The malware targets cryptocurrency wallets and Telegram credentials, as well as iCloud Keychain data, banking information, and browser cookies. The solution is not to memorize an approved list of meeting applications, since legitimate companies may use many different tools. The safer rule is never to download meeting software from an unfamiliar domain sent directly by an interviewer. Download the software independently from its official website or an official application store, and verify the domain carefully. Malicious Offer Files Fake offer documents are another common attack method. In March 2022, attackers stole approximately $540 million from Axie Infinity’s Ronin Bridge, although later reporting placed the total value closer to $625 million. Subsequent investigations found that the initial point of entry was a fraudulent job offer delivered as a PDF. A senior engineer at Sky Mavis was contacted on LinkedIn by accounts impersonating another company. After completing several rounds of interviews, the engineer received an extremely attractive offer in PDF format and downloaded it. That file introduced spyware into the system. The attackers eventually gained control of five of the network’s nine validator nodes. Sky Mavis confirmed that an employee had been targeted through social engineering. In April of that year, the US Treasury attributed the attack to the Lazarus Group. What makes this case especially significant is that the victim was a senior engineer at the company that was ultimately compromised, and the attack was supported by a complete, multi-stage interview process. The final payload was simply a file. Terminal Paste Attacks Attacks that instruct victims to paste commands into a terminal or system run box have grown rapidly over the past two years. They are commonly known as ClickFix attacks. During an interview or onboarding process, a page may claim that the user’s browser has encountered an error, that their identity must be verified, or that a system component needs to be repaired. The page then provides a command and instructs the user to paste it into a terminal or run dialog. In May 2026, Microsoft disclosed a campaign targeting macOS users through lures disguised as system utilities. The campaign was used to distribute information-stealing malware. Other security companies have identified similar samples containing asset-transfer functionality. The malware first checks whether a wallet contains funds and then transfers those assets to an address controlled by the attacker. The rule here is simple: no legitimate recruitment process requires you to paste a command you do not understand into your terminal. Not once. Deepfake Interviewers Deepfake interviewers have already begun to appear. Real-time face-swapping technology is now advanced enough to support an apparently coherent interview. The person on screen may appear to be a senior executive from a well-known company, speak professionally, and have a verifiable public résumé. There are two practical ways to respond. First, ask the person to perform an unexpected physical action, such as briefly covering half of their face with their hand or turning their head 90 degrees to the side. Current real-time face-swapping systems may still reveal visual inconsistencies when the face is obstructed or shown from an extreme angle. Second, conduct an independent callback using contact information published on the company’s official website. This remains the most effective method of verification. Malicious Wallet Signatures A wallet-signature attack does not require your seed phrase. The interviewer may ask you to test a product, review a dApp, claim an onboarding airdrop, or complete an onchain identity-verification step. You are then instructed to connect your wallet and sign a transaction or message. Certain signatures or malicious transactions can give an attacker permission to transfer your assets. The level of risk depends on whether you are signing a basic message, a Permit, a token approval, or an onchain transaction. If you do not understand exactly what a signature authorizes, do not approve it. The boundary should be clear: no interview or onboarding process requires you to connect a personal wallet. A recruiter or employer has no legitimate reason to require a job candidate to perform an onchain transaction. Upfront Fees and Identity Misuse Upfront fees and identity misuse are among the oldest recruitment scams, yet they are still frequently overlooked. The first typically involves demands for a security deposit, training fee, or equipment payment before employment begins. The second asks a candidate to use their identity to register an account with a cryptocurrency exchange or open a bank account. This can carry consequences far more serious than financial loss. If the account is later used to process criminal proceeds, the person whose identity was used may face criminal liability. Any request for payment before employment is a red line. If someone asks you to register an account, receive funds, or move money on their behalf using your own identity, end the conversation immediately. How to Protect Yourself Before an interview, take three low-cost precautions. First, verify that the company genuinely exists. Review its official website and registration information, then examine whether the online histories of its team members are consistent across different platforms. Check whether the names listed in corporate documents match publicly available information. Second, independently contact the company through a channel the recruiter cannot control. Use an email address or phone number published on the official website. Do not use contact details provided by the person approaching you. Third, pay attention to two recurring warning signs: interviews scheduled only one or two hours in advance and then repeatedly changed, and compensation that is clearly above the market rate for the role. Both patterns appear in a large number of reported cases. During an interview, pause whenever you are asked to download, install, or run anything. You may offer to explain your approach over screen sharing, but remember that screen sharing itself does not provide protection. If code is running on your own machine, you can still be compromised even if you show the interviewer every line beforehand. The interviewer’s response is often more revealing than the request itself. If they refuse to explain what the code does, refuse to provide an isolated environment, or insist that you run it on a device containing your wallets and work credentials, end the interview immediately. When sharing your screen, share only the specific application window required—not your entire desktop. If the first interview contains no questions about your experience, projects, or technical background and moves directly to running code, you have every reason to end the call. We do not recommend that job seekers attempt to run untrusted code themselves. If analysis is genuinely necessary, it should be handled by someone with appropriate security expertise inside a disposable, isolated virtual machine that contains no credentials, does not mount directories from the host system, and has restricted network access. A container is not a purpose-built malware sandbox. Misconfigured directory mounts, permissions, or network access can still expose the host environment. Ordinary job seekers should not attempt this on their own. If you are a recruiter or regularly recommend opportunities to other people, incorporate these warnings into your standard process. Before introducing a candidate to a client, clearly tell them not to download unfamiliar software or browser extensions, not to run unknown code or scripts, and to share only the necessary application window during screen sharing. If a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without credible evidence, contact the candidate directly and verify what happened before taking action. Conclusion The crypto industry has spent years removing trust from transactions. You do not need to trust the counterparty because there is a contract. You do not need to give anyone your private key because it remains in your possession. At the protocol level, the industry has solved this problem remarkably well. Recruitment places people back in a much more primitive position. A stranger claims to be someone, and you must decide whether to believe them. Business registration documents and meeting links can be forged. Even an interviewer’s face can now be replaced in real time. Not a single dollar of the more than $500 million stolen in the Ronin attack was taken through a flaw in cryptography. What failed was the human layer. Every method described in this article relies on the same force: speed. The opportunity may disappear. Other people are competing for it. You have to act now. In an industry where everyone is urging you to move faster, giving yourself permission to slow down may be your most effective line of defence. If you have encountered a similar approach or recruitment process, please let us know. We hope this article helps more people recognize the warning signs before it is too late.

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  smore (@babachefz) reported 11 minutes ago

  @ZixuanLi_ @huggingface asking support questions in someone's hype thread is a crime. check the docs, check the github issues, it's probably not listed yet because it dropped like 6 hours ago.

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  WuBu ⪋ WaefreBeorn 🇺🇸 👑 (@waefrebeorn) reported 16 minutes ago

  hey @Teknium @yeahfortommy please add the amd portal too even if tou have to send tommy into the AMD headquarters to get them to fix the links (you have to sign up for american then link through github, then you can access the models free, tommy needs to pull teeth but they have free api)

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  To the Moon (@Gardnmi) reported 16 minutes ago

  @mitsuhiko Try the trick of putting the issue on github and having some clankers take a crack at it.

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  Ghaith Jelassi (@GhaithJ) reported 18 minutes ago

  @github I need help with support ticket #4718335 Issue not been resolved for 2+ months. Any help is appreciated. Thanks.

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  lifestep.io (@Dragon_limchae) reported 18 minutes ago

  @cursor_ai the sandbox boundary is where i lose the most time. today my workers had network blocked at the sandbox level and reported it as "github auth failed" — i chased credentials for an hour before checking dns. once agents run on your infra, make the boundary throw one unmistakable error instead of one each tool invents.

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  paulrodturner (@paulrodturner) reported 22 minutes ago

  @supabase Is anyone else having issues logging in via Github?

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  Vitaliy Salyuk (@vitaliysalyuk) reported 27 minutes ago

  @openclaw @github Fix your updater and I might give it another shot.

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  Eddie Jaoude | DevRel | Open Source (@eddiejaoude) reported 37 minutes ago

  I have many tokens to burn before tomorrow after the Claude reset. Send me your GitHub issues with context 👇

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  Ash Lonare (@ashlonare) reported 40 minutes ago

  What actually happened when I put my side project on GitHub and waited for users I built a side project. A self-hosted backend tool. Open source, free for anyone to run. I did the thing every founder tells themselves they will do. Put it out there. Get feedback. Iterate. I expected feature requests. Maybe a bug report about my ugly dashboard. Maybe just silence. What I actually got, within a few weeks, was three security researchers filing detailed vulnerability reports. Real ones. With working proof of concept. One showed they could run arbitrary SQL against any project on the platform. No login needed. Not theoretical. A working exploit, sitting in my issue tracker, with my name on the repo. My first reaction was not gratitude. It was embarrassment. It stings to see "here is exactly how broken your thing is," posted in public, with a timestamp. I sat with it for a day. Then it clicked. Those people were not trying to embarrass me. Nobody spends an hour writing a clean writeup and a suggested fix for something they do not think is worth fixing. They cared. That is the whole thing right there. They cared enough to actually try to break it. Nobody had signed up. Nobody had left a star and a "nice tool" comment. But three strangers had taken my work seriously enough to attack it. That is a rarer thing than a star. So here is the villain in this story, if you want to call it that. It is not the bug. It is the story I tell myself when I see a hard truth about my own work. The instinct to read scrutiny as an attack instead of as attention. I fixed everything the same day. I replied to every report and explained exactly what changed and why. I closed each one out with a thank you that I actually meant by the end. That thread is now the best proof I have that someone other than me has used this thing for real. Better than any testimonial I could write myself. If you are early and the silence feels loud, here is what I would tell you. Do not wait for praise as your sign that people are paying attention. Scrutiny is attention. It is just wearing a different coat. #opensource #saas #vibecoders

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  siggy bilstein (@sbilstein) reported 43 minutes ago

  fyi if you sync a GitHub repository to Cursor Origin and GitHub is down for whatever reason, you can still clone and fetch from that repo. we’re also releasing something pretty soon that will let you push to that repo so you can keep grinding 💪

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  Convequity (@convequity) reported 44 minutes ago

  Snyk is a clean postmortem for what happens when a security tool lives inside the coding agent’s loop. The product was mostly scan-and-warn. Find the issue, comment on the PR, suggest a fix. Blocking the merge usually sat in GitHub, not in Snyk. Bigger platforms smothered it. $PANW, $CRWD, and Wiz pulled AppSec into the bundle the CISO was already buying. GitHub was the main developer surface and put scanning where the code already lived. Then coding agents arrived and delivered the final blow. A lot of that scanning became something the agent could just do. Growth held up for a short while after the COVID/cloud tailwind. Then it decelerated hard. This is the same lens we use in Convequity’s SaaS Agentic Survival Evaluation Framework. The PANW, CRWD, and FTNT reviews go up on Convequity in a few days.

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  trulite (@trulite007) reported 48 minutes ago

  @Qromerolauro @mkliku @radius_browser Like a simple example would be have a list of my urgent GitHub issues and start an agent for it . Or a dashboard in which buttons start investigating issues. Of course I just need the webpage to be able to access radius tools. I m thinking secure way is an extension

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  Conor Bronsdon (@ConorBronsdon) reported 49 minutes ago

  .@SlackHQ is building for multiplayer AI: tag a coding agent into a Slack conversation and it spins up a coding channel: everyone in that convo gets a live dev environment, diffs post as artifacts, and the channel winds down when the task is done. With the launch of Slack Code, Claudeforce, their MCP and more, Slack is putting Agents in the channels where teams already work, not simply in a private chat with one person. Their position is that the whole team should be able to watch, steer, and review what the agent does. Slack Chief Product Officer Jaime DeLanghe joined me on @chain_ofthought to explain how Slack is building a team AI environment, what happens mechanically when a code channel is created, why Anthropic pushes so much of its code through Slack, how the channel permission model became the agent context model, and what has to change in engineering culture when the whole team is steering one agent. I think Slack is the platform best positioned to become the context harness where enterprise agents run: agents that see what the team discusses, permissions that already exist, and a cultural opportunity hiding inside every multiplayer coding session. Chapters: (0:00) Slack as an IDE and a GitHub for your team (0:29) Who is Jaime DeLanghe (1:21) The reaction to the Slack Code launch (5:30) Why coding agents belong in a context-rich environment (6:08) Engineers now manage agents, not copy-paste code (7:24) The permission model: agents get the channel's context (11:44) What happens when a code channel is created (15:00) Why Anthropic pushes so much code through Slack (19:14) Steering one agent with many people: culture decides (24:54) Slackbot, skills, and MCPs: agents go where the work is (30:53) The solo terminal vs. agents in social spaces (33:53) Org charts and ownership when agents join the team (39:33) Learning loops and shared agent memory (42:39) Citations, recency, and accidental knowledge management (46:50) Context bloat and multi-pass search for agents (50:01) How Jaime uses Slackbot as CPO (52:38) Slack Code is V1 of multiplayer AI

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  John Zhong | AI Growth Systems (@John_zhong324) reported 52 minutes ago

  @github A repeatable --attach flag turns CLI reports into reproductions: inline screenshots in issues mean a bug gets fixed in one pass instead of two round-trips for context.

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  Marcelo Retana (@mretsal) reported 54 minutes ago

  Every time @github goes down they should have a plan to please their users. Give me free credits for actions for example 👍🏼

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  Straggler Liu | AI & Semis (@StragglerLiu) reported 59 minutes ago

  NVIDIA($NVDA ) Is Paying $14B for a Company With $150M Revenue. That's Not Financial Logic — It's Ecosystem Control. NVIDIA is in advanced talks to acquire Hugging Face for ~$14 billion ($12.9B acquisition + $1B retention), per Bloomberg. To put that in perspective: Hugging Face does ~$150M in annual revenue. That's ~86x revenue. Microsoft paid ~1.6x revenue for GitHub. Google paid ~3.5x revenue for DeepMind. NVIDIA is paying 20-50x more on a revenue multiple basis. The premium is not for revenue. It's for control of the AI developer ecosystem. What is NVIDIA buying? Hugging Face hosts 500,000+ models, 250,000+ datasets, and serves millions of developers. It is the single most important distribution channel for open-source AI. If you build AI, you use Hugging Face. That makes it the front door to AI development. Why NVIDIA is paying this premium: 1. The "NVIDIA triple lock." NVIDIA's hardware lead (GPU) is real. Its software lead (CUDA) is a moat. But the third lock — the developer workflow — was missing. Hugging Face is that workflow. Developers discover models on Hugging Face, deploy them, and optimize them. Whoever controls that discovery layer controls which hardware gets used. 2. The GitHub analogy, inverted. When Microsoft bought GitHub, developers were already using GitHub. Microsoft didn't need to capture them — it needed to prevent Amazon/Google from doing so. NVIDIA faces the opposite problem: developers are already using NVIDIA hardware. But they're discovering and deploying models through a neutral platform. NVIDIA is eliminating that neutrality. 3. The long game: inference, not training. NVIDIA dominates training. But inference is the bigger TAM — and it's more fragmented. If NVIDIA controls the model discovery and deployment layer, it can steer inference workloads to its own stack. That's a 10-year strategy disguised as a 14-billion-dollar acquisition. Who wins, who loses: NVIDIA (NVDA): Acquires the developer distribution layer. The most important strategic move since CUDA. Shifts the valuation case from "chip cycle" to "platform economics." Competitors (AMD, INTC): Lose neutral access to the primary AI model distribution channel. This is a structural headwind that no amount of hardware catch-up can fix. Cloud providers (MSFT, AMZN, GOOGL): Hugging Face was a neutral hub. If NVIDIA controls it, cloud providers risk being disintermediated from AI workload decisions. The open-source community: The platform that was built on openness is now owned by the dominant hardware vendor. Neutrality is the first casualty. The capital question: Can NVIDIA integrate Hugging Face without destroying its community value? If yes, the $14B is cheap. If no, it's a very expensive mistake. The answer will define whether NVIDIA becomes the AWS of AI — or just another hardware company with an expensive acquisition. Note: Acquisition details based on Bloomberg reporting; not confirmed by NVIDIA or Hugging Face. Revenue multiple comparisons based on publicly reported figures.

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  Rachael LaGoth (@androidsheeep) reported 1 hour ago

  @bcherny Please fix the desktop app it's very buggy it keeps disconnecting me for no reason everyday while im working on stuff, i submitted a report but nothing happened and someone else is having the same issue, an issue is open on github for more than 6 months with no solutions help

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  volkdude85 (@volkdude85) reported 1 hour ago

  @SentientSquirel @linuxuser1996 So you are you scared of github then. Look dude I have fun on computers and don't take myself seriusly because I have destroyed enough OS's over to not worry about it because I just fix it, If the contents of your PC make you this paranoid its time to check your kink.

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  Bearded Printer (@BeardedPrinter) reported 1 hour ago

  @RedPill_Phil You've gotta go to their github and submit an issue. Make sure to search their issues to ensure you don't submit a duplicate bug

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  Swish (@swish_salt) reported 1 hour ago

  The technology is not the problem. Distribution is. I have a solution sitting in my GitHub account. All we need is the funding to build the distribution team.

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  Kun Chen (@kunchenguid) reported 1 hour ago

  @petergyang yo @myfirstmate peter just told me his skills are all at user level. backpass currently only runs things at project level i want a proposal for making backpass support a user level run. put that into a github issue use fable for peter

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  Russ Wonsley (@RussWonsley) reported 1 hour ago

  My @bot tells me that the official GitHub login for bot is still broken. Has this been addressed already, or did I miss it?