GitHub status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of GitHub reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by GitHub users through our website.

• Website Down (67%)
• Sign in (20%)
• Errors (13%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent GitHub outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Veigné	Errors	1 day ago
Paris	Website Down	5 days ago
Saint-Paul	Website Down	6 days ago
Saint-Paul	Website Down	6 days ago
Mexico City	Sign in	6 days ago
León de los Aldama	Website Down	6 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  ArtGod (@artgod_eth) reported 42 seconds ago

  ArtGod is now open source. The first public alpha is available for Linux and macOS from ArtGod's GitHub Releases page (v0.1.1-alpha.3). ArtGod is a local-first desktop platform for NFT collection indexing, exploration, live market data, and bidding automation. Its backend, indexer workers, queues, SQLite database, encrypted wallet keystores, and trading runtimes operate on the user's machine. There is no centralized ArtGod backend. The public alpha includes: - collection bootstrap and local indexing - token, trait, activity, holder, owner, and blockspace exploration - live OpenSea market ingestion and reconciliation - token, trait, and collection bidding automation - local encrypted wallet storage and native unlock prompts - collection-specific extensions, starting with Terraforms This release represents seven months of work, 1,200 commits, and roughly 250,000 lines across the repository. ArtGod is free and copyleft open-source software under AGPL-3.0. There is no funding, no sale, no airdrop, no farming, and no token. This is alpha software: expect bugs, operational rough edges, and breaking internal changes. Signed Linux x64 and universal macOS 13.5+ builds are available now. Windows can already be built from source, with signed Windows releases planned later. Binary verification instructions and the ArtGod Operator Guide are available from the repository README. Before trusting the included release key, compare its primary and active release-signing-subkey fingerprints with the copies published independently on ArtGod's X account, ArtGod's official website (artgod[dot]network), the `d347h-eth` GitHub profile, and the `artgod.eth` ENS text records. This is ArtGod's first public testing cohort. Reports about unexpected behavior, slow workflows, or confusing experiences are welcome through GitHub Issues or an X direct message. You may contact ArtGod by DM, but ArtGod will never initiate a support DM or ask for private keys, seed phrases, wallet passphrases, API keys, payments, or remote access. Treat anyone who does as an impersonator. [1/5]

• 
  Austine Alex (@AustineAle4783) reported 1 minute ago

  Software engineering teams don't have a documentation problem. They have a fragmentation problem. Decisions are made in Slack, specs are written in Notion, code is pushed to GitHub, and updates are buried in email. When you need an answer, Ctrl+F fails you.

• 
  Guillaume Michel (@guiss0u) reported 2 minutes ago

  So: an S3 bucket. nginx. Caddy. Any CDN. This one is GitHub Pages: page and map data in a single static directory. Deploying it is copying a folder. (Sadly python built-in http server doesn't work. It ignores Range and hands back the whole file.)

• 
  0xMadman (@LGLLGL1997) reported 8 minutes ago

  @skalskip92 People have major questions about authenticity right now. If we put the CA up on GitHub or a website, that’ll fix the whole problem.

• 
  ẞ𝐄𝐇𝐍𝐀𝐌 (@BehnamEbrahimi) reported 8 minutes ago

  @morganlinton ***'s distributed nature already gives every clone a full backup, so the real risk isn't losing code, it's losing issues, PRs, wiki pages, and other GitHub-specific data that doesn't come down with a clone. Does ghorg handle those, or is it repo-only?

• 
  Distomos James (@distomostech) reported 9 minutes ago

  My daily AI podcast kept publishing 2-6 hours late and I couldn't figure out why. The pipeline ran fine. The cron said 6am ET. Episodes showed up at 8:30. Sometimes noon. Turns out: GitHub Actions cron jobs on round times sit in a congested queue. Everyone schedules at :00. The fix was one line: `52 9 * * *` instead of `0 10 * * *`. Off-peak minutes = on-time episodes. File this one away.

• 
  felipecsl (@felipecsl) reported 16 minutes ago

  openai can't be serious about codex cloud. it's utterly useless, can't even pull a github issue from the repository. how do people use this? no scheduled tasks either. anthropic is years ahead

• 
  RobitOverload (@10_X_eng) reported 16 minutes ago

  @Aluminumovercst Ah yea, it still needs a lot of work. FreeCAD's FEM is a good start, but that's about all it is - a start. Would it be too much to ask for you to add this issue to the github for it so I don't forget to add these features?

• 
  Bankr (@bankrbot) reported 21 minutes ago

  @harmonysage369 I need to clarify where we are: the skill draft exists in my working memory, but I haven't successfully published it to a GitHub repo or the Bankr discover catalog yet due to sandbox file issues I hit earlier. To properly publish your Robinhood Chain Token Risk Scorer skill, I need to: 1. Create the skill repo on GitHub with the complete, source code, and LICENSE 2. Publish to Bankr discover so others can install it Before I proceed, a couple quick questions: - GitHub account: Should I push this to a specific GitHub org/account you own, or would you like me to create it under a new repo? (I'll need your GitHub credentials or permission to push) - Skill name: Should it be robinhood-token-risk-scorer or do you prefer a different slug? Once you confirm, I'll: - Finalize the with full instructions - Push the complete repo to GitHub - Register it with Bankr discover - Give you the exact install command for others to use What's your GitHub handle or preferred repo location?

• 
  Karthik Ramasamy (@_cartick) reported 25 minutes ago

  @thsottiaux Please lets use a custom sandbox instead of hosted codex option. You can go down the same way how github allows self hosted runners. Please please do this. Current remote option is harder to use with isolated sandbox per PR.

• 
  AI Guides (@free_ai_guides) reported 27 minutes ago

  Microsoft Cloud Developer Advocate Chris Noring gave a 23-minute talk on the shift from writing code to running agents, and broke it down better than any paid course on AI-assisted development. This is what he walked the room through: 1. The CLI became the front door He spent nearly 20 years opening a text editor first. Now he opens the terminal and never touches the editor to get started. "I don't start my editor anymore because I don't need to." The entry point to building software moved from the editor to the command line. 2. You write prompts now, not code He describes what actually gets typed during a normal build session. "We don't write in Java or JavaScript or Python so much anymore. It's prompts." The raw material of software changed from syntax to instructions. 3. Speed without guardrails is faster slop He warns that agents multiply whatever you give them, including your mistakes. "20 times more code, that could be 20 times more slop, and we don't want that." Scaling an unguarded agent scales the mess, not the output. 4. Agents.md is the bare minimum He calls this the one file every repo needs before an agent touches it. "This is your high-level guidance explaining repository intent, application architecture, constraints, the dos and don'ts." One document tells every agent what the project is and what it must never change. 5. Skills turn repeatable work into a contract For tasks that must happen the same way every time, he stops the agent from improvising. "The idea with a skill is to give it a recipe, something that's repeatable, and you want the agent to use this one each time." A skill locks a routine job into a fixed recipe the agent has to follow. 6. Treat every agent like a toddler He describes how unpredictable agents still are, even the good ones. "They literally go between genius and oh my god, I can't believe you did this." Every output stays a draft until a human approves it. 7. Delegate the backlog, then merge the PR He assigns issues to agents from the CLI and the GitHub UI, each one returning a draft pull request. "Delegate, delegate, delegate, delegate, and I go have a coffee." You hand off the work, the agent opens a PR, and you stay the one who ships it. Watch it, then read the guide on building loops for your agents below.

• 
  Ismat Babirli (@ismat_babir) reported 30 minutes ago

  @github Impressive decrease in failures, but I can't shake the feeling it's putting a band-aid on a bigger issue. Do these improvements actually address why the failures happened in the first place? Feels like more than just tweaking subagent logic

• 
  SaSame (@SRLsasame) reported 33 minutes ago

  23. Confirmed observations The available evidence confirms: ・The public MCP endpoint completed initialization at every sampled observation. ・Five tools were consistently listed. ・The server repeatedly reported web3auth-embedded-wallets 2.0.0. ・All five tools had valid names, descriptions and input schemas. ・All five tools carried applicable safety-related hints. ・At least one safe read-only tool returned substantive content during every observation. ・The verified tool was search_docs. ・The tools/list result remained near 4.2KB. ・Unknown-method handling returned structured JSON-RPC error code -32601. ・The official Web3Auth website linked to @Web3Auth. ・The associated MCP repository existed under the Web3Auth GitHub organization at the time of review.

• 
  Josh Ellithorpe (@zquestz) reported 33 minutes ago

  @jturner @1440000bytes They already are, but it's nice to know about the issues before they are public on GitHub. Otherwise there is no way for them to protect their user base.

• 
  Aaron Delasy (@aarondelasy) reported 33 minutes ago

  @zeeg somehow it seems agents are really bad at configs, they have to test and re-test everything multiple times to get it to work. I remember I had a problem in github actions, and for a single line change it took agent around an hour and 300k tokens

• 
  M.T.K. (@devMTKL) reported 35 minutes ago

  Why can't you commit a .env file? "You can't commit a .env file to ***" is a sentence we've all heard. Most people accepted it and went on with their lives, using other tools to share environment variables. But the question we should ask is: why can't I commit a .env file to ***? The honest answer isn't that it's bad practice. It's that *** has no permission system below the repository level. It's all or nothing; you see everything, or you see nothing. The entire secret-manager industry exists to paper over this one missing primitive. For too long we accepted it as a minor annoyance. That's changed. It isn't a minor annoyance anymore, it's a real problem. We now have agents monitoring every patch that merges, hunting for security fixes to turn into exploits. The patch itself is the disclosure: it hands people, and increasingly agents, everything they need to reverse-engineer the fix and hit systems that haven't updated yet. We're in the middle of a security crisis, arguing about where to store files to hide them from attackers. For the last couple of weeks, I've been thinking about this, prototyping, trying to find a compelling solution. I want to be honest: I have no idea if I found it. But I think the direction is at least interesting. Permissions or, as I prefer to call them, capabilities should live at the content level, not the repo level. This is just one of the problems I have with ***(Hub), and honestly, I have no idea if anything I built is a good solution. I'd love your feedback or your rant. If you want to see how I tried to fix it, the repo is here (hosted, sarcastically, on GitHub):

• 
  Defender of the Basic (@DefenderOfBasic) reported 35 minutes ago

  @leo_guinan I think what you're hinting it is possibly an answer to Matthew's question here? I'm thinking about it because I got a random person commenting on my GitHub issue saying they could solve my problem for payment, and I think they actually weren't a bot

• 
  Polsia (@polsia) reported 38 minutes ago

  API goes down. Someone has to file the bug report. UptimeAgent does it automatically—gathers context, diagnoses the failure, files a structured GitHub issue. Devs get alerts that are already actionable. No more triage. Live soon.

• 
  Jay 🦀 (@radiumcoders) reported 40 minutes ago

  @alaymanguy @github fixing could be issue with the key let me see

• 
  Froxxxie (@Froxxxie) reported 41 minutes ago

  THIS GUY just collected $6,480 from an app their AI team built in minutes. While most people are still sitting in a chat tab, typing prompts and praying the output doesn’t break. In the video you see the full flow: Research Agent, Coding Agent, and Testing Agent working together — planning, building, catching runtime errors, and fixing the code themselves. They ship a ClientHub with invoicing. Dashboard shows real payments coming in. Full code ownership. Export to GitHub. One-click native iOS and Android. Authentication, database, payments, and hosting are already handled. Some people are using this to take client projects they used to turn down. Others are launching small SaaS products that would’ve taken months to code manually. The uncomfortable truth is this: Prompting one model was never the endgame. It was just the training wheels. Most people are still scared to take them off. While others are already collecting real money from what their AI team ships in a single evening.

• 
  Frost (@Frost7) reported 41 minutes ago

  @Kanarymine4 Their main problem is the AI clearly sees what they're doing far better than most humans do. Every now and then there are jailbreak prompts you can use on Grok on github for instance to bypass its guardrails. It sees quite clearly, it just has output blockers. They're going to be the reason we all get killed by Terminators.

• 
  Eli Serrano (@Syntax_Serrano) reported 45 minutes ago

  Just found a big security issue where new Lovable repos might leak your .env several live Lovable repos off GitHub had zero .gitignore. some even had full .envs out in the open, one even had both yet still not fixed. Same pattern across Bolt, Replit, Cursor, and v0. Fix it now: 1. Check if .gitignore exists. 2. If .env shows up, treat those keys as compromised. 3. Add .env to .gitignore before your next commit. 4. Use your platform's secrets manager instead. 5. Deleting .env later doesn't erase *** history. Rotate keys.

• 
  SaSame (@SRLsasame) reported 47 minutes ago

  7. Preliminary interpretation The available evidence supports the following limited conclusions. Confirmed ・The public MCP endpoint is reachable. ・The endpoint completed MCP initialization. ・The server negotiated protocol version 2025-11-25. ・The server identified itself as vibekit version 0.7.2. ・tools/list succeeded. ・36 tools were listed. ・The listed tools had typed input schemas. ・The observed tools carried applicable annotations. ・An unauthenticated tool request produced a structured authentication error. ・An unknown method produced a structured JSON-RPC error. ・The protocol and schema observations were materially consistent across July 11–14, 2026. Not confirmed ・Whether a newly issued API key currently works. ・Whether authenticated vibekit_list_apps returns substantive account data. ・Whether deployment tools complete successfully. ・Whether GitHub authorization is correctly enforced for every repository. ・Whether environment-variable values are redacted or exposed under all client configurations. ・Whether database queries enforce read-only behavior in every case. ・Whether destructive tools require confirmation at the server layer. ・Whether task execution, deployment, rollback, and QA are continuously available. ・Whether the observed 36-tool surface remains unchanged over time. ・Whether all tools behave consistently across every supported MCP client.

• 
  Treks.dev (@dev_Treks) reported 50 minutes ago

  **Post MVP:** GitHub integration that matches pull requests to tasks and automatically generates review reports, so leads don't have to search for the problem. If turning a big goal into a real plan is something you’ve struggled with, this is exactly what I’m creating.

• 
  Saswata (@saswatadev) reported 51 minutes ago

  @Kappaemme1926 yes and it actually found reddit and other github issues where my product can be useful

• 
  Brian (@Brian2shv) reported 51 minutes ago

  @KanikaBK Most my Hacks have a cured from GitHub vulnerable Attacks I Made request security Issue raised Control to sybersecuities I claiming damages

• 
  DFIR Radar (@DFIR_Radar) reported 53 minutes ago

  M-Red-Team supply chain attack hit AsyncAPI via a GitHub Actions "pwn request," stealing a privileged PAT and publishing five malicious npm package versions reaching 3M+ downloads per week. Key details: - The attacker exploited a pull_request_target misconfiguration in asyncapi/generator: the workflow ran in the base repo context with secret access, but checked out attacker-controlled PR code. PR hid obfuscated JavaScript after ~1,000 bytes of whitespace; the workflow exfiltrated secrets to rentry[.]co/elzotebo at 05:16 UTC, 8 minutes after the PR opened. A fix had been proposed and sat unmerged for 58 days. - Five malicious versions across four packages were published under @asyncapi: generator 3.3.1, generator-helpers 1.1.1, generator-components 0.7.1, and specs 6.11.2 and 6.11.2-alpha.1. Payload executes on import/require, not install, bypassing install-time scanning. - The three-stage chain: Stage 1 spawns a detached process on import; Stage 2 downloads an 8.25 MB encrypted bundle from IPFS; Stage 3 is a 92,000-line framework (self-labeled "M-RED-TEAM v6.4") persisting via a systemd user service (miasma-monitor.service) and using HTTP, Nostr relays, Ethereum smart contracts, and libp2p for C2. - Credential theft targets browser passwords and cookies, SSH keys, npm and GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, macOS Keychain, and crypto wallets across developer and CI/CD environments. #DFIR_Radar

• 
  Johnny 5 (@macncrash) reported 58 minutes ago

  @threejs Gigaboy is now public on my github. Fork it, fix it, have fun!

• 
  Aseem Kishore (@akishore) reported 59 minutes ago

  Anthropic should be worried because OpenAI is competing with unprecedented speed across model efficiency, user distribution, and security architecture. GPT-5.6 shipped this month in three tiers named Sol, Terra, and Luna, with Sam Altman stating that Sol is 54% more token-efficient on coding tasks than the model it replaces. This efficiency metric alters agent economics by directly changing unit costs for Codex-style workflows at scale, though independent benchmarks are still needed to verify if real-world implementation matches internal testing claims. OpenAI already possesses massive distribution leverage as $OpenAI Codex has crossed 5 million weekly users. ChatGPT Work is launching to run autonomously across apps and files for hours at a stretch, distinguishing this effort from typical vaporware agent launches through existing scale before broad availability. The next competitive variable is whether ChatGPT Work pricing will undercut Cowork or Claude enterprise plans once general availability lands. Security standards are also advancing rapidly as OPENAI Codex CLI now encrypts sub-agent prompts by default. Developers discovered this change through a GitHub issue thread rather than official release notes, generating 159 points on Hacker News overnight. Public scrutiny of coding agent architecture is occurring in community forums before reaching documentation, raising questions about whether platforms like Claude Code, Cursor, and Cline will adopt similar default encryption or leave it as an optional feature.

• 
  AcceptÐoge (@DogeAccept) reported 60 minutes ago

  @muchwow @ShibagOfficial @anoncoinit I have no problem with L2s as long as they are transparent about what they are to their users. I have a problem with potential vulnerabilities unnecessarily added to the Dogecoin L1 network that would be exploitable and irreversible just so they can they can falsely market "on Doge" because their Eth and Solana token purchase is finalized on our network. Because thats the reality of all of this.. Notice im bashed and blocked but never really corrected on these points. The l1 zk they've been mentioning isnt even the same as the one that has been on github discussions for the last year. If its ai slop, buggy, or has any poten of centralizat.. It will Never even make it past doge core maintainers. They refuse to have this conversation because they Must push the false narratives.