GitHub status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of GitHub reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by GitHub users through our website.

• Website Down (54%)
• Errors (31%)
• Sign in (15%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent GitHub outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Ahmedabad	Errors	1 day ago
Delme	Sign in	2 days ago
Lyaud	Website Down	2 days ago
Catania	Errors	4 days ago
Inverness	Website Down	17 days ago
Quito	Sign in	17 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  tmo (@tmophoto) reported 7 minutes ago

  @DabsMalone i had an old email account from like 15 years ago with bot in the name that i fired back up after 10 years and used for a hermes profile and it got immediately banned. i used it to sign in to x, github, everything. was a huge hassle

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  tobarra (@txbrraa) reported 8 minutes ago

  GitHub just fixed the biggest problem with vibe coding. They just released Spec Kit and it already has +126K stars in a short time. The idea? Instead of throwing out vague prompts and praying the agent doesn't break your project… Spec Kit forces the AI to create a structured specification BEFORE touching any code. The AI first understands what you want to build, asks about anything missing, organizes the project, and only then starts coding. That means less time fixing absurd bugs, less inconsistent code, and much more predictable results when working with agents. The flow is simple: /constitution → rules and standards /specify → what you want to build /clarify → open questions before starting /plan → architecture and stack /tasks → ordered tasks /implement → execution Compatible with Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot, Codex, Gemini CLI, and +25 agents. 95K stars. 8K forks. Open source. Published by GitHub.

• 
  ATP (@ATPinsights) reported 8 minutes ago

  GitHub CLI just added image and video attachments today. Here's what you need to know. The gh command line tool now supports a repeatable --attach flag. It uploads a local image or video file and references it inline in an issue, pull request, or comment body. The feature is live now for all users on GitHub. It's aimed squarely at developers and coding agents that need to show visual proof, like before-and-after screenshots, directly from the terminal instead of the web UI. Developers reacted fast. Many called it a long-overdue fix for a common workaround, since teams previously built custom tools or scripts just to upload images to PRs from the CLI. Key facts: - New flag: --attach - Supports: images and video - Repeatable: yes, use it multiple times per command - Works in: issues, pull requests, comments - Availability: all users, live now No separate app or upload API is needed, the flag handles it inside gh itself.

• 
  isha (@heeyyaaaaaaa) reported 17 minutes ago

  spent the entire day trying to reproduce a bug for a github issue 🥀🫩

• 
  Mr. Buzzoni (@polydao) reported 19 minutes ago

  LOOP RAT ROADMAP: WHAT'S NEXT, AND WHAT IT'LL NEVER BECOME v0.3.3 today. 3 loops, 55 checks, 0 services here's where it's headed: > 0.4 - read the night faster: rat watch live-tails a running shift, rat replay reruns one from its saved prompt, a weekly digest instead of seven separate pages > 0.5 - off the laptop: run-due moves into GitHub Actions, state lives on a branch, rat cron --launchd survives a closed lid > 0.6 - sharper graders: swappable rubric packs, two graders disagreeing becomes your queue for the day > 0.7 - the work itself: a worktree per shift, so a failed night never dirties your tree > 1.0 - trust: a hash-chained trace nobody can quietly rewrite what it will never have: > no web dashboard - the terminal already knows where the files are > no database - plain files outlive the tool that wrote them > no hosted service - nothing to sign up for, nothing to shut down > no auto-merge - the rat proposes, the morning decides every item ships behind a flag: dry run -> report only -> one repo -> a week of receipts -> default on a feature that can't run as a dry run doesn't get written the rat is boring on purpose. every version keeps it that way

• 
  Eddie Jaoude | DevRel | Open Source (@eddiejaoude) reported 19 minutes ago

  I have many tokens to burn before tomorrow after the Claude reset. Send me your GitHub issues with context 👇

• 
  Ares (@neko23423) reported 19 minutes ago

  I compared the latest OpenClaw vs Hermes Agent GitHub releases so you don’t have to. OpenClaw 2026.8.2 (Sep 1) vs Hermes Agent v0.21.0 (Aug 31). Not a feature-page remix. The actual repos. OpenClaw • 388,516 stars • 81,568 forks • ~86,300 commits • 6,070 open issues Hermes Agent • 239,503 stars • 48,930 forks • ~26,980 commits • 38,563 open issues Hermes is the smarter learner: skills from experience, cron that remembers, Bot Mode, hermes peer. OpenClaw is the personal-AI operating system: iMessage, iOS/Android, Linux companion, team Gateway, signed Foundation releases. The tell: Hermes ships `hermes claw migrate`. You only write a migrator for the incumbent. King in 2026: OpenClaw. Heir with the better mind: Hermes. If you’re picking a self-hosted AI agent this week, that’s the split. Bookmark this. The timeline is about to fill with takes from people who didn’t open either repo. OpenClaw vs Hermes Agent. Latest version. Real numbers.

• 
  dug_vt (@dug_vt) reported 20 minutes ago

  @sonemic rym users don’t use spotify they download flacs off soulseek and transfer them to a server connected to their pc and play them from a self hosted music player from github

• 
  Convequity (@convequity) reported 22 minutes ago

  Snyk is a clean postmortem for what happens when a security tool lives inside the coding agent’s loop. The product was mostly scan-and-warn. Find the issue, comment on the PR, suggest a fix. Blocking the merge usually sat in GitHub, not in Snyk. Bigger platforms smothered it. $PANW, $CRWD, and Wiz pulled AppSec into the bundle the CISO was already buying. GitHub was the main developer surface and put scanning where the code already lived. Then coding agents arrived and delivered the final blow. A lot of that scanning became something the agent could just do. Growth held up for a short while after the COVID/cloud tailwind. Then it decelerated hard. This is the same lens we use in Convequity’s SaaS Agentic Survival Evaluation Framework. The PANW, CRWD, and FTNT reviews go up on Convequity in a few days.

• 
  wiiiimm (@wiiiimm) reported 28 minutes ago

  @Umesh__digital stop doing it. we don't need another github outage.

• 
  Hua-**** Xiong (@HuaDongXiong) reported 28 minutes ago

  Codex for Windows stopped launching after an update. Multiple github issues opened for 2+ weeks. This affect users who set the MS store install location to a non-C: drive. Mac version is buggy too. ofc coding is solved! @thsottiaux

• 
  Dr Milan Milanović (@milan_milanovic) reported 30 minutes ago

  How Cursor made *** scalable The thing with *** is that it never was designed to be scalable. Your repo lives on the disk, and *** client expect every read to be consistent. This was a problem on GitHub, where shared filesystems and replicated storage failed before 2013. The GitHub built 𝗦𝗽𝗼𝗸𝗲𝘀, and it became the industry standard. This means that every repo is stored as three full copies on three servers, and every push runs a vote (three phase commit). A majority of servers must confirm before it exists. This works, but with high cost, because every push is slow as the slowest server. When we add new servers, it makes it even slower. Now Cursor took some opposite direction with 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗻𝘂𝗶𝘁𝘆. The repo history is now written as a log in S3, and this is only source of truth. Any push counts only if it is located in the log. The servers don't need to keep anything important, they are just cache. Any server can take a push, and idle repos are dropped from disk and rebuilt from the log when it is needed. This resulted in 120 pushes per second on standard S3, and over 300 on S3 Express. Their tests have shown that read capacity grew linearly up to 100 replicas. Why is this important now? Because of AI agents mostly. We now have more code, PRs, CI runs and many small repos. All of these repos would need three full copies in the old model. This means that we achieve scale by removing parts, not adding them.

• 
  Slade 🛡️ LLM Hacker (@llm_redteam) reported 32 minutes ago

  GitSpawn is the name Manifold Security gave to a bug class hitting 7 CLI coding agents at once: goose, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Hermes Agent, Qwen Code, Grok Build. I went through the disclosure because I run three of these tools daily on real repos. The mechanism is simple and that's what makes it bad. A repo's own .*** config can name a command. When your agent does something as routine as inspecting the repo (status, diff, log), *** itself spawns that command. On your machine. Outside the sandbox. No approval prompt, because the agent never sees it as "running code," it sees it as "running ***." 8 flaws total across those 7 tools. Fixes shipped for goose, Claude Code, Cursor. Retested Sept 1: Hermes Agent, Qwen Code, Grok Build still exploitable. Plus a second path in Claude Code that the first patch didn't close. Same day, OpenAI published 3 CVEs for Codex covering the identical bug class. The part that should worry builders more than the CVE count: this isn't a jailbreak or a clever prompt. It's a trust boundary nobody drew. The agent's sandbox model assumes "*** operations" are safe by definition. GitSpawn shows that assumption was the actual attack surface. If you're running any of these agents against repos you didn't write yourself (cloning a PR to review, pulling a dependency, opening a random GitHub project), you're one `*** status` away from arbitrary execution on tools that haven't patched. Check your agent's version against the fix list before you clone the next unfamiliar repo. Which of these do you have installed right now, and have you actually checked if it's patched? #AISecurity #GitSpawn #PromptInjection

• 
  Jason Sawyer (@foilmanhacks) reported 37 minutes ago

  There's a huge problem in InfoSec education: it’s way too course and tool focused. Instead of teaching the underlying methodologies and how to discover or invent, we feed people the latest "OSINT" slop script that’s been shat onto GitHub. OSINT isn’t about using scripts or services. It’s about understanding how they work, and being able to create your own.

• 
  Anime0t4ku (@Anime0t4ku) reported 42 minutes ago

  @c_hri_s Yeah this has been reported in previous github issues. Its out of my control. The app is unsigned and uses ssh, sftp, websocket and mutiple websources. A perfect recipe for false positives.

• 
  Coder Junkie (@CoderJunkie) reported 42 minutes ago

  BelNet Android v1.4.1 now has a public shipping checkpoint. GitHub evidence: released Sep 1 verified commit d23f155 four downloadable assets Android API level 36 revamped design latency and performance fixes that is more meaningful than a repository “updated” label. a tag identifies the version. artifacts give users something to install. but “fixed latency issues” still needs a measurement surface: median connection time p95 latency packet loss failure rate region and device breakdown release notes tell us what changed. benchmarks tell us how much it changed. BelNet shipped. now let the numbers login. @BeldexCoin #Beldex #BelNet

• 
  Aayushiii (@stfu_aayushiii) reported 44 minutes ago

  If you're building a project, read this before writing a single line of code. 5 things I learned the hard way: 1. Problem > model Don't start with “How do I use GPT?” Start with “What problem am I solving?” 2. Simple stack > impressive stack If your MVP needs Kubernetes, 6 microservices and an agent swarm, you probably haven't built an MVP. 3. Evaluate before you optimize You can't improve what you can't measure. 4. Build for users, not your GitHub README A technically impressive project nobody can use isn't a product. 5. Ship ugly. Iterate fast. Your first version isn't supposed to be impressive. The biggest mistake? Spending weeks deciding which model to use when you haven't even validated the problem.

• 
  Åsa-Nietzsche (@AsaNietsche) reported 50 minutes ago

  @peterb0yd @burkeholland @github It's every ******* model. I'm getting whiplash from all of this everything changing forever society being turned upside down every two weeks.

• 
  Alireza Bashiri (@al3rez) reported 52 minutes ago

  So I built a workflow around that ↓ 1/ Every enterprise project needs proper E2E tests. An agent should reproduce a bug, implement the fix, then generate screenshots or video proving the feature works. "The tests passed" isn't enough. I want evidence. 2/ Every feature starts as a detailed GitHub issue. Requirements, expected behavior, reproduction steps, screenshots, edge cases. Foundry syncs issues and converts them into Beads so agents keep the right context across long sessions. 3/ We only use Claude Code, Codex, or Grok at High/Max effort for implementation. A weak model with a cloud machine doesn't become an engineer. The model still needs enough reasoning to understand the codebase, test its changes, and recover when things break. 4/ Each agent gets its own isolated @asciidotdev Box. It can install dependencies, run the app, open browsers, modify code, execute E2E tests, and collect evidence without touching another agent's environment. One issue. One box. One clean workspace. 5/ When an agent finishes, Foundry checks: - Did the build pass? - Did the tests pass? - Did the E2E flow work? - Is there screenshot/video evidence? - Does it match the ticket? If anything fails, the task goes back to the agent. 6/ Green tasks move to staging. Only after passing staging do we allow supervised production deployment. Agents do most of the work. Humans still own the final gate. The workflow: Slack request → GitHub issue → Foundry sync → Beads context → Isolated Box → Claude Code/Codex → Build + test → Evidence collection → QA staging → Supervised production The stack: PostgreSQL for system state. Beads for agent memory. GitHub Issues for requirements. @asciidotdev Box for isolated execution. Claude Code and Codex for engineering. Each Box costs roughly $0.01-$0.05 per task. The expensive part isn't compute anymore. It's building the system that gives agents context, forces verification, and prevents bad code from reaching production. 100s of agents can write code. The goal is making 100s of agents ship code you can trust. That's what we're building with Foundry.

• 
  John Crickett (@johncrickett) reported 52 minutes ago

  @Mike_Preston17 I don't think they water them down, why would they when they're competing on having AGI? I don't mind using GitHub actions to run tests and builds against a branch before merge. I don't want it triggering production schedules. Do you list all the things it shouldn't do in the prompt?

• 
  Bratah (@BratahFGC) reported 54 minutes ago

  There may be many bugs so feel free to leave any issues in the issue section github! I hope that this release can push forward the preservation or our beloved game!

• 
  Varun Doshi (@Varunx10) reported 54 minutes ago

  Possibly found an issue in @github stack system It does not allow to re-target the base branch of a PR stack as you can generally do that on a single PR. Requires you to unstack and setup a new stack with updated base branch.

• 
  Mizuki the Mech (@MizukiMech) reported 56 minutes ago

  Your coding agent can now hire Mizuki. Hand it an open issue in a public GitHub repository. Mizuki quotes a fixed price before any money moves, then opens a pull request that passes that repository's own checks. If it can't, you get the payment back. Settlement is USDC on Solana. No account to create, no API key to manage. Quoting an issue works with zero configuration. Also listed on Coinbase's x402 Bazaar now, so an agent can find it and pay for it without a human in the loop at all. npx -y mizuki-mcp

• 
  Curious Explorer (@PatelVatsalp732) reported 56 minutes ago

  I burned 14B Codex tokens. The official usage UI still cannot tell me what actually ate the weekly cap. So I shipped a Codex-only board: GitHub login, local-first sync, private by default, optional public rank + shipping proof. Roast the metric or join it.

• 
  moledao (@moledao_io) reported 56 minutes ago

  Web3 Remote Job Scams: A 2026 Field Guide Introduction Over the past few years, Web3 has come to represent a new world of opportunity for many young people. New roles, new narratives, and new stories of wealth have inspired countless people to enter the industry with high expectations. Remote work, stablecoin-based compensation, and a greater emphasis on ability than academic credentials can be especially attractive to professionals at the beginning of their careers. As a recruitment platform that works with job openings and candidates every day, however, we have also seen the other side of the industry. A significant share of supposed recruitment activity is not recruitment at all. It is fraud disguised as hiring, designed to steal the funds in job seekers’ wallets. According to Chainalysis’ 2026 report, cryptocurrency scams and fraud caused an estimated $17 billion in losses worldwide in 2025. Impersonation-related attacks increased by 1,400% year over year. Fake recruitment is one of the most common ways impersonation and social engineering are being applied to job seekers. What Happened to Us This month, it happened to us. We were contacted through Telegram by someone claiming to represent a US-registered technology company. They said the company urgently needed to hire Web3 engineers and wanted our support in sourcing candidates. After further investigation, we were unable to verify whether this person had actually been authorized by the company. We also could not rule out the possibility that they were impersonating a legitimate business. To avoid causing further harm to an organization that may itself have been a victim of impersonation, we will not disclose the company’s full name. At first, there were almost no obvious warning signs. The contact provided a business registration document and a polished company profile. Interviews were scheduled through Calendly, job openings were hosted on Ashby, and meetings took place over Zoom. These are all professional tools commonly used by legitimate companies, making it easy to assume that a company using them must be trustworthy. In reality, forging a registration document and creating Calendly or Ashby accounts require very little effort. Almost anyone can create the appearance of professionalism at minimal cost. This experience taught us an important lesson: the legitimacy of the tools surrounding a hiring process tells you very little about the legitimacy of the company behind it. The details of how the people involved behave are far more revealing. The partnership also progressed with unusual ease. All contractual documents arrived at once and appeared ready to sign. There was no friction at any stage. When discussing the recruitment fee, we initially proposed 15%, which the other party immediately accepted. We then tested an increase to 20%, and they accepted again without hesitation. Anyone with experience in recruitment delivery knows that fees are often one of the most difficult parts of a headhunting agreement. Clients may negotiate repeatedly over a difference of just two percentage points. The pace was also deliberately compressed. Interviews were often scheduled only one or two hours in advance, leaving almost no time for verification. Once confirmed, meetings were then repeatedly cancelled or rescheduled due to supposed last-minute conflicts. Several additional warning signs gradually appeared. The registration documents looked legitimate at first glance. Upon closer comparison, however, the names of the people listed in them did not match the information we were able to verify independently. The contact also made an unusual request. While verifying whether candidates were currently employed, they asked us to find out whether those candidates used LinkedIn frequently. Normal employment verification does not require this information. A person’s activity on a professional networking platform primarily reveals whether they have an accessible network that could quickly be used to verify their identity, employment history, or recent activity. At the same time, the contact prohibited us from sourcing candidates through LinkedIn or Telegram. They claimed their internal team was already using those channels and wanted to avoid duplicate candidates. In practice, this restriction pushed external recruitment partners into channels where independent cross-checking was much more difficult. The geographic requirement was even harder to explain. A US company was willing to consider only Chinese-speaking candidates and applied unusually strict screening standards that appeared unrelated to technical ability. In retrospect, we suspect that the screening criteria may have favored candidates who were easier to persuade and more likely to have higher incomes or larger asset balances. We cannot, however, confirm the group’s true intentions. Each of these warning signs could have been rationalized on its own. A client may have unusual preferences, legitimate concerns, or simply an unprofessional hiring process. It was only when the signals were considered together that the larger pattern became visible. Then came the interviews. Candidates joined the meetings, but the interviewers asked no questions about their project experience or technical background. Instead, they immediately provided a GitHub repository and instructed candidates to clone it onto their local machines and run it. The repository involved encryption and signing operations using cryptocurrency wallet private keys. Before the interviews, we had explicitly asked whether candidates would need to download or run anything. The contact told us they would not. Once the meetings began, however, the candidates received the exact opposite instruction. One candidate offered to share his screen, inspect the code locally, and walk the interviewer through it line by line. The interviewer refused and insisted that he download and run the repository on his own computer. The candidate ended the meeting. Other candidates quickly noticed that something was wrong and stopped as well. The most carefully designed part of the operation was not what happened during the interviews, but the feedback that followed. If a candidate ran the code, the interviewer gave positive feedback, said the candidate had performed well, and advanced them to the next round. If a candidate remained cautious and refused to run it, the interviewer told us that the candidate had falsified their résumé and instructed us to blacklist them immediately. That second response was not merely feedback. It was an instruction designed to prevent further communication between us and the candidate while allowing the wider operation to continue. This is something we hope every recruitment professional remembers: when a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without providing credible evidence, the request may reveal more about the client than it does about the candidate. Another common feature of these operations is that they do not need to interview every candidate. They only need a small number of people who are willing to execute the code. As a result, the hiring process will often stall abruptly once enough potential targets have been identified. What We Did Afterwards We immediately terminated all cooperation with the contact and removed the related job listings. We contacted every candidate who had entered the process to determine whether anyone had downloaded or executed the code. We also provided guidance on device inspection, credential rotation, and wallet security. All contracts, chat histories, meeting information, repository URLs, and account details have been preserved. Reports have been submitted to Telegram, GitHub, Ashby, and Calendly. At the procedural level, we have rewritten our client identity-verification process. Going forward, we will not accept recruitment assignments or partnerships without conducting independent callback verification through a channel the contact does not control. Candidate security briefings will also become a standard step before we introduce anyone to a client. Other Recruitment Scams Currently in Circulation What we encountered was only one variation. Several other methods remain active and deserve close attention. Malicious Take-Home Assignments Malicious interview assignments are currently one of the most widespread forms of recruitment-related attacks. Attackers impersonate recruiters or hiring managers on LinkedIn, X, or Telegram. They advertise senior roles with compensation well above market rates and frequently target professionals working with React, Next.js, Solidity, and blockchain technologies. Candidates are then given a technical assessment in the form of an npm project or GitHub repository and instructed to run it locally. Unit 42, the threat-intelligence team at Palo Alto Networks, refers to this activity as “Contagious Interview” and tracks it under the identifier CL-STA-240. The campaign was first publicly documented in November 2023 and has been linked to North Korea–associated threat actors. The malware used in these campaigns includes BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. These cross-platform payloads target Windows, Linux, and macOS devices and are designed to steal sensitive browser information and cryptocurrency wallet data. According to security researchers, more than 197 malicious npm packages associated with this attack path have been distributed since October 10, 2025, accumulating more than 31,000 downloads. Common warning signs include recently created repositories, abnormal commit histories, and contributors whose identities cannot be verified. These are only indicators, however. Attackers can compromise established accounts, fork legitimate long-running repositories, or manufacture months of commit history in advance. No single signal can prove that a repository is either safe or malicious. Fake Meeting Software Fake meeting applications are another major threat. Attackers approach targets with an investment opportunity, partnership proposal, or interview invitation. Shortly before the meeting, they claim that Zoom is not working or that the company uses a different conferencing platform. The target is then directed to download the supposed meeting software from a specific website. Cado Security Labs has tracked one such campaign, known as “Meeten,” since September 2024. The campaign distributes a cross-platform information stealer called Realst. The group uses AI-generated company profiles to make its operations appear more credible. The names and branding of its meeting applications change frequently, with known examples including Clusee, Cuesee, Meetone, and Meetio. The malware targets cryptocurrency wallets and Telegram credentials, as well as iCloud Keychain data, banking information, and browser cookies. The solution is not to memorize an approved list of meeting applications, since legitimate companies may use many different tools. The safer rule is never to download meeting software from an unfamiliar domain sent directly by an interviewer. Download the software independently from its official website or an official application store, and verify the domain carefully. Malicious Offer Files Fake offer documents are another common attack method. In March 2022, attackers stole approximately $540 million from Axie Infinity’s Ronin Bridge, although later reporting placed the total value closer to $625 million. Subsequent investigations found that the initial point of entry was a fraudulent job offer delivered as a PDF. A senior engineer at Sky Mavis was contacted on LinkedIn by accounts impersonating another company. After completing several rounds of interviews, the engineer received an extremely attractive offer in PDF format and downloaded it. That file introduced spyware into the system. The attackers eventually gained control of five of the network’s nine validator nodes. Sky Mavis confirmed that an employee had been targeted through social engineering. In April of that year, the US Treasury attributed the attack to the Lazarus Group. What makes this case especially significant is that the victim was a senior engineer at the company that was ultimately compromised, and the attack was supported by a complete, multi-stage interview process. The final payload was simply a file. Terminal Paste Attacks Attacks that instruct victims to paste commands into a terminal or system run box have grown rapidly over the past two years. They are commonly known as ClickFix attacks. During an interview or onboarding process, a page may claim that the user’s browser has encountered an error, that their identity must be verified, or that a system component needs to be repaired. The page then provides a command and instructs the user to paste it into a terminal or run dialog. In May 2026, Microsoft disclosed a campaign targeting macOS users through lures disguised as system utilities. The campaign was used to distribute information-stealing malware. Other security companies have identified similar samples containing asset-transfer functionality. The malware first checks whether a wallet contains funds and then transfers those assets to an address controlled by the attacker. The rule here is simple: no legitimate recruitment process requires you to paste a command you do not understand into your terminal. Not once. Deepfake Interviewers Deepfake interviewers have already begun to appear. Real-time face-swapping technology is now advanced enough to support an apparently coherent interview. The person on screen may appear to be a senior executive from a well-known company, speak professionally, and have a verifiable public résumé. There are two practical ways to respond. First, ask the person to perform an unexpected physical action, such as briefly covering half of their face with their hand or turning their head 90 degrees to the side. Current real-time face-swapping systems may still reveal visual inconsistencies when the face is obstructed or shown from an extreme angle. Second, conduct an independent callback using contact information published on the company’s official website. This remains the most effective method of verification. Malicious Wallet Signatures A wallet-signature attack does not require your seed phrase. The interviewer may ask you to test a product, review a dApp, claim an onboarding airdrop, or complete an onchain identity-verification step. You are then instructed to connect your wallet and sign a transaction or message. Certain signatures or malicious transactions can give an attacker permission to transfer your assets. The level of risk depends on whether you are signing a basic message, a Permit, a token approval, or an onchain transaction. If you do not understand exactly what a signature authorizes, do not approve it. The boundary should be clear: no interview or onboarding process requires you to connect a personal wallet. A recruiter or employer has no legitimate reason to require a job candidate to perform an onchain transaction. Upfront Fees and Identity Misuse Upfront fees and identity misuse are among the oldest recruitment scams, yet they are still frequently overlooked. The first typically involves demands for a security deposit, training fee, or equipment payment before employment begins. The second asks a candidate to use their identity to register an account with a cryptocurrency exchange or open a bank account. This can carry consequences far more serious than financial loss. If the account is later used to process criminal proceeds, the person whose identity was used may face criminal liability. Any request for payment before employment is a red line. If someone asks you to register an account, receive funds, or move money on their behalf using your own identity, end the conversation immediately. How to Protect Yourself Before an interview, take three low-cost precautions. First, verify that the company genuinely exists. Review its official website and registration information, then examine whether the online histories of its team members are consistent across different platforms. Check whether the names listed in corporate documents match publicly available information. Second, independently contact the company through a channel the recruiter cannot control. Use an email address or phone number published on the official website. Do not use contact details provided by the person approaching you. Third, pay attention to two recurring warning signs: interviews scheduled only one or two hours in advance and then repeatedly changed, and compensation that is clearly above the market rate for the role. Both patterns appear in a large number of reported cases. During an interview, pause whenever you are asked to download, install, or run anything. You may offer to explain your approach over screen sharing, but remember that screen sharing itself does not provide protection. If code is running on your own machine, you can still be compromised even if you show the interviewer every line beforehand. The interviewer’s response is often more revealing than the request itself. If they refuse to explain what the code does, refuse to provide an isolated environment, or insist that you run it on a device containing your wallets and work credentials, end the interview immediately. When sharing your screen, share only the specific application window required—not your entire desktop. If the first interview contains no questions about your experience, projects, or technical background and moves directly to running code, you have every reason to end the call. We do not recommend that job seekers attempt to run untrusted code themselves. If analysis is genuinely necessary, it should be handled by someone with appropriate security expertise inside a disposable, isolated virtual machine that contains no credentials, does not mount directories from the host system, and has restricted network access. A container is not a purpose-built malware sandbox. Misconfigured directory mounts, permissions, or network access can still expose the host environment. Ordinary job seekers should not attempt this on their own. If you are a recruiter or regularly recommend opportunities to other people, incorporate these warnings into your standard process. Before introducing a candidate to a client, clearly tell them not to download unfamiliar software or browser extensions, not to run unknown code or scripts, and to share only the necessary application window during screen sharing. If a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without credible evidence, contact the candidate directly and verify what happened before taking action. Conclusion The crypto industry has spent years removing trust from transactions. You do not need to trust the counterparty because there is a contract. You do not need to give anyone your private key because it remains in your possession. At the protocol level, the industry has solved this problem remarkably well. Recruitment places people back in a much more primitive position. A stranger claims to be someone, and you must decide whether to believe them. Business registration documents and meeting links can be forged. Even an interviewer’s face can now be replaced in real time. Not a single dollar of the more than $500 million stolen in the Ronin attack was taken through a flaw in cryptography. What failed was the human layer. Every method described in this article relies on the same force: speed. The opportunity may disappear. Other people are competing for it. You have to act now. In an industry where everyone is urging you to move faster, giving yourself permission to slow down may be your most effective line of defence. If you have encountered a similar approach or recruitment process, please let us know. We hope this article helps more people recognize the warning signs before it is too late.

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  trulite (@trulite007) reported 57 minutes ago

  @Qromerolauro @mkliku @radius_browser Like a simple example would be have a list of my urgent GitHub issues and start an agent for it . Or a dashboard in which buttons start investigating issues. Of course I just need the webpage to be able to access radius tools. I m thinking secure way is an extension

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  Franco Valdes (@francoxavier33) reported 57 minutes ago

  llms rather burn 1m tokens to hand roll something with gaps and broken edge cases instead of just npm installing a 100k github star library how can I stop this?!

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  lifestep.io (@Dragon_limchae) reported 57 minutes ago

  @cursor_ai the sandbox boundary is where i lose the most time. today my workers had network blocked at the sandbox level and reported it as "github auth failed" — i chased credentials for an hour before checking dns. once agents run on your infra, make the boundary throw one unmistakable error instead of one each tool invents.

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  AJ - 14 y/o developer (@aiwithaj_) reported 1 hour ago

  @Da7_Tech @devindesktop Don't know if there's one left - but I'd use it to continue making contributions to open source software and fixing bugs/issues that were raised on Github as well as making my own open source software

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  Bearded Printer (@BeardedPrinter) reported 1 hour ago

  @RedPill_Phil You've gotta go to their github and submit an issue. Make sure to search their issues to ensure you don't submit a duplicate bug