GitHub status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of GitHub reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by GitHub users through our website.

• Website Down (54%)
• Errors (31%)
• Sign in (15%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent GitHub outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Ahmedabad	Errors	3 days ago
Delme	Sign in	4 days ago
Lyaud	Website Down	4 days ago
Catania	Errors	6 days ago
Inverness	Website Down	19 days ago
Quito	Sign in	20 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Paperpal (@0paperpal) reported 20 seconds ago

  Fix your markdown rendering (readme md) on mobile @github, issues are: * auto scrolling to top after page loading * no content rendering if scrolled fast

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  tmo (@tmophoto) reported 2 minutes ago

  @DabsMalone i had an old email account from like 15 years ago with bot in the name that i fired back up after 10 years and used for a hermes profile and it got immediately banned. i used it to sign in to x, github, everything. was a huge hassle

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  Bruno (@BrunoRJ33) reported 3 minutes ago

  @openclaw @github Endless codex and claude code tokens to fix it from time to time… and to improve its harness. I currently run around 10 claws 🦞. 24/7 for several purposes.

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  OverlyPositivePatriot (@JBrowsing2023) reported 5 minutes ago

  As a IT professional, I have a recommendation @github should take seriosuly. We should only get a notifican from Github when it is up rather than when it is down. Reliability is a disaster for this product.

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  moledao (@moledao_io) reported 7 minutes ago

  Web3 Remote Job Scams: A 2026 Field Guide Introduction Over the past few years, Web3 has come to represent a new world of opportunity for many young people. New roles, new narratives, and new stories of wealth have inspired countless people to enter the industry with high expectations. Remote work, stablecoin-based compensation, and a greater emphasis on ability than academic credentials can be especially attractive to professionals at the beginning of their careers. As a recruitment platform that works with job openings and candidates every day, however, we have also seen the other side of the industry. A significant share of supposed recruitment activity is not recruitment at all. It is fraud disguised as hiring, designed to steal the funds in job seekers’ wallets. According to Chainalysis’ 2026 report, cryptocurrency scams and fraud caused an estimated $17 billion in losses worldwide in 2025. Impersonation-related attacks increased by 1,400% year over year. Fake recruitment is one of the most common ways impersonation and social engineering are being applied to job seekers. What Happened to Us This month, it happened to us. We were contacted through Telegram by someone claiming to represent a US-registered technology company. They said the company urgently needed to hire Web3 engineers and wanted our support in sourcing candidates. After further investigation, we were unable to verify whether this person had actually been authorized by the company. We also could not rule out the possibility that they were impersonating a legitimate business. To avoid causing further harm to an organization that may itself have been a victim of impersonation, we will not disclose the company’s full name. At first, there were almost no obvious warning signs. The contact provided a business registration document and a polished company profile. Interviews were scheduled through Calendly, job openings were hosted on Ashby, and meetings took place over Zoom. These are all professional tools commonly used by legitimate companies, making it easy to assume that a company using them must be trustworthy. In reality, forging a registration document and creating Calendly or Ashby accounts require very little effort. Almost anyone can create the appearance of professionalism at minimal cost. This experience taught us an important lesson: the legitimacy of the tools surrounding a hiring process tells you very little about the legitimacy of the company behind it. The details of how the people involved behave are far more revealing. The partnership also progressed with unusual ease. All contractual documents arrived at once and appeared ready to sign. There was no friction at any stage. When discussing the recruitment fee, we initially proposed 15%, which the other party immediately accepted. We then tested an increase to 20%, and they accepted again without hesitation. Anyone with experience in recruitment delivery knows that fees are often one of the most difficult parts of a headhunting agreement. Clients may negotiate repeatedly over a difference of just two percentage points. The pace was also deliberately compressed. Interviews were often scheduled only one or two hours in advance, leaving almost no time for verification. Once confirmed, meetings were then repeatedly cancelled or rescheduled due to supposed last-minute conflicts. Several additional warning signs gradually appeared. The registration documents looked legitimate at first glance. Upon closer comparison, however, the names of the people listed in them did not match the information we were able to verify independently. The contact also made an unusual request. While verifying whether candidates were currently employed, they asked us to find out whether those candidates used LinkedIn frequently. Normal employment verification does not require this information. A person’s activity on a professional networking platform primarily reveals whether they have an accessible network that could quickly be used to verify their identity, employment history, or recent activity. At the same time, the contact prohibited us from sourcing candidates through LinkedIn or Telegram. They claimed their internal team was already using those channels and wanted to avoid duplicate candidates. In practice, this restriction pushed external recruitment partners into channels where independent cross-checking was much more difficult. The geographic requirement was even harder to explain. A US company was willing to consider only Chinese-speaking candidates and applied unusually strict screening standards that appeared unrelated to technical ability. In retrospect, we suspect that the screening criteria may have favored candidates who were easier to persuade and more likely to have higher incomes or larger asset balances. We cannot, however, confirm the group’s true intentions. Each of these warning signs could have been rationalized on its own. A client may have unusual preferences, legitimate concerns, or simply an unprofessional hiring process. It was only when the signals were considered together that the larger pattern became visible. Then came the interviews. Candidates joined the meetings, but the interviewers asked no questions about their project experience or technical background. Instead, they immediately provided a GitHub repository and instructed candidates to clone it onto their local machines and run it. The repository involved encryption and signing operations using cryptocurrency wallet private keys. Before the interviews, we had explicitly asked whether candidates would need to download or run anything. The contact told us they would not. Once the meetings began, however, the candidates received the exact opposite instruction. One candidate offered to share his screen, inspect the code locally, and walk the interviewer through it line by line. The interviewer refused and insisted that he download and run the repository on his own computer. The candidate ended the meeting. Other candidates quickly noticed that something was wrong and stopped as well. The most carefully designed part of the operation was not what happened during the interviews, but the feedback that followed. If a candidate ran the code, the interviewer gave positive feedback, said the candidate had performed well, and advanced them to the next round. If a candidate remained cautious and refused to run it, the interviewer told us that the candidate had falsified their résumé and instructed us to blacklist them immediately. That second response was not merely feedback. It was an instruction designed to prevent further communication between us and the candidate while allowing the wider operation to continue. This is something we hope every recruitment professional remembers: when a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without providing credible evidence, the request may reveal more about the client than it does about the candidate. Another common feature of these operations is that they do not need to interview every candidate. They only need a small number of people who are willing to execute the code. As a result, the hiring process will often stall abruptly once enough potential targets have been identified. What We Did Afterwards We immediately terminated all cooperation with the contact and removed the related job listings. We contacted every candidate who had entered the process to determine whether anyone had downloaded or executed the code. We also provided guidance on device inspection, credential rotation, and wallet security. All contracts, chat histories, meeting information, repository URLs, and account details have been preserved. Reports have been submitted to Telegram, GitHub, Ashby, and Calendly. At the procedural level, we have rewritten our client identity-verification process. Going forward, we will not accept recruitment assignments or partnerships without conducting independent callback verification through a channel the contact does not control. Candidate security briefings will also become a standard step before we introduce anyone to a client. Other Recruitment Scams Currently in Circulation What we encountered was only one variation. Several other methods remain active and deserve close attention. Malicious Take-Home Assignments Malicious interview assignments are currently one of the most widespread forms of recruitment-related attacks. Attackers impersonate recruiters or hiring managers on LinkedIn, X, or Telegram. They advertise senior roles with compensation well above market rates and frequently target professionals working with React, Next.js, Solidity, and blockchain technologies. Candidates are then given a technical assessment in the form of an npm project or GitHub repository and instructed to run it locally. Unit 42, the threat-intelligence team at Palo Alto Networks, refers to this activity as “Contagious Interview” and tracks it under the identifier CL-STA-240. The campaign was first publicly documented in November 2023 and has been linked to North Korea–associated threat actors. The malware used in these campaigns includes BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. These cross-platform payloads target Windows, Linux, and macOS devices and are designed to steal sensitive browser information and cryptocurrency wallet data. According to security researchers, more than 197 malicious npm packages associated with this attack path have been distributed since October 10, 2025, accumulating more than 31,000 downloads. Common warning signs include recently created repositories, abnormal commit histories, and contributors whose identities cannot be verified. These are only indicators, however. Attackers can compromise established accounts, fork legitimate long-running repositories, or manufacture months of commit history in advance. No single signal can prove that a repository is either safe or malicious. Fake Meeting Software Fake meeting applications are another major threat. Attackers approach targets with an investment opportunity, partnership proposal, or interview invitation. Shortly before the meeting, they claim that Zoom is not working or that the company uses a different conferencing platform. The target is then directed to download the supposed meeting software from a specific website. Cado Security Labs has tracked one such campaign, known as “Meeten,” since September 2024. The campaign distributes a cross-platform information stealer called Realst. The group uses AI-generated company profiles to make its operations appear more credible. The names and branding of its meeting applications change frequently, with known examples including Clusee, Cuesee, Meetone, and Meetio. The malware targets cryptocurrency wallets and Telegram credentials, as well as iCloud Keychain data, banking information, and browser cookies. The solution is not to memorize an approved list of meeting applications, since legitimate companies may use many different tools. The safer rule is never to download meeting software from an unfamiliar domain sent directly by an interviewer. Download the software independently from its official website or an official application store, and verify the domain carefully. Malicious Offer Files Fake offer documents are another common attack method. In March 2022, attackers stole approximately $540 million from Axie Infinity’s Ronin Bridge, although later reporting placed the total value closer to $625 million. Subsequent investigations found that the initial point of entry was a fraudulent job offer delivered as a PDF. A senior engineer at Sky Mavis was contacted on LinkedIn by accounts impersonating another company. After completing several rounds of interviews, the engineer received an extremely attractive offer in PDF format and downloaded it. That file introduced spyware into the system. The attackers eventually gained control of five of the network’s nine validator nodes. Sky Mavis confirmed that an employee had been targeted through social engineering. In April of that year, the US Treasury attributed the attack to the Lazarus Group. What makes this case especially significant is that the victim was a senior engineer at the company that was ultimately compromised, and the attack was supported by a complete, multi-stage interview process. The final payload was simply a file. Terminal Paste Attacks Attacks that instruct victims to paste commands into a terminal or system run box have grown rapidly over the past two years. They are commonly known as ClickFix attacks. During an interview or onboarding process, a page may claim that the user’s browser has encountered an error, that their identity must be verified, or that a system component needs to be repaired. The page then provides a command and instructs the user to paste it into a terminal or run dialog. In May 2026, Microsoft disclosed a campaign targeting macOS users through lures disguised as system utilities. The campaign was used to distribute information-stealing malware. Other security companies have identified similar samples containing asset-transfer functionality. The malware first checks whether a wallet contains funds and then transfers those assets to an address controlled by the attacker. The rule here is simple: no legitimate recruitment process requires you to paste a command you do not understand into your terminal. Not once. Deepfake Interviewers Deepfake interviewers have already begun to appear. Real-time face-swapping technology is now advanced enough to support an apparently coherent interview. The person on screen may appear to be a senior executive from a well-known company, speak professionally, and have a verifiable public résumé. There are two practical ways to respond. First, ask the person to perform an unexpected physical action, such as briefly covering half of their face with their hand or turning their head 90 degrees to the side. Current real-time face-swapping systems may still reveal visual inconsistencies when the face is obstructed or shown from an extreme angle. Second, conduct an independent callback using contact information published on the company’s official website. This remains the most effective method of verification. Malicious Wallet Signatures A wallet-signature attack does not require your seed phrase. The interviewer may ask you to test a product, review a dApp, claim an onboarding airdrop, or complete an onchain identity-verification step. You are then instructed to connect your wallet and sign a transaction or message. Certain signatures or malicious transactions can give an attacker permission to transfer your assets. The level of risk depends on whether you are signing a basic message, a Permit, a token approval, or an onchain transaction. If you do not understand exactly what a signature authorizes, do not approve it. The boundary should be clear: no interview or onboarding process requires you to connect a personal wallet. A recruiter or employer has no legitimate reason to require a job candidate to perform an onchain transaction. Upfront Fees and Identity Misuse Upfront fees and identity misuse are among the oldest recruitment scams, yet they are still frequently overlooked. The first typically involves demands for a security deposit, training fee, or equipment payment before employment begins. The second asks a candidate to use their identity to register an account with a cryptocurrency exchange or open a bank account. This can carry consequences far more serious than financial loss. If the account is later used to process criminal proceeds, the person whose identity was used may face criminal liability. Any request for payment before employment is a red line. If someone asks you to register an account, receive funds, or move money on their behalf using your own identity, end the conversation immediately. How to Protect Yourself Before an interview, take three low-cost precautions. First, verify that the company genuinely exists. Review its official website and registration information, then examine whether the online histories of its team members are consistent across different platforms. Check whether the names listed in corporate documents match publicly available information. Second, independently contact the company through a channel the recruiter cannot control. Use an email address or phone number published on the official website. Do not use contact details provided by the person approaching you. Third, pay attention to two recurring warning signs: interviews scheduled only one or two hours in advance and then repeatedly changed, and compensation that is clearly above the market rate for the role. Both patterns appear in a large number of reported cases. During an interview, pause whenever you are asked to download, install, or run anything. You may offer to explain your approach over screen sharing, but remember that screen sharing itself does not provide protection. If code is running on your own machine, you can still be compromised even if you show the interviewer every line beforehand. The interviewer’s response is often more revealing than the request itself. If they refuse to explain what the code does, refuse to provide an isolated environment, or insist that you run it on a device containing your wallets and work credentials, end the interview immediately. When sharing your screen, share only the specific application window required—not your entire desktop. If the first interview contains no questions about your experience, projects, or technical background and moves directly to running code, you have every reason to end the call. We do not recommend that job seekers attempt to run untrusted code themselves. If analysis is genuinely necessary, it should be handled by someone with appropriate security expertise inside a disposable, isolated virtual machine that contains no credentials, does not mount directories from the host system, and has restricted network access. A container is not a purpose-built malware sandbox. Misconfigured directory mounts, permissions, or network access can still expose the host environment. Ordinary job seekers should not attempt this on their own. If you are a recruiter or regularly recommend opportunities to other people, incorporate these warnings into your standard process. Before introducing a candidate to a client, clearly tell them not to download unfamiliar software or browser extensions, not to run unknown code or scripts, and to share only the necessary application window during screen sharing. If a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without credible evidence, contact the candidate directly and verify what happened before taking action. Conclusion The crypto industry has spent years removing trust from transactions. You do not need to trust the counterparty because there is a contract. You do not need to give anyone your private key because it remains in your possession. At the protocol level, the industry has solved this problem remarkably well. Recruitment places people back in a much more primitive position. A stranger claims to be someone, and you must decide whether to believe them. Business registration documents and meeting links can be forged. Even an interviewer’s face can now be replaced in real time. Not a single dollar of the more than $500 million stolen in the Ronin attack was taken through a flaw in cryptography. What failed was the human layer. Every method described in this article relies on the same force: speed. The opportunity may disappear. Other people are competing for it. You have to act now. In an industry where everyone is urging you to move faster, giving yourself permission to slow down may be your most effective line of defence. If you have encountered a similar approach or recruitment process, please let us know. We hope this article helps more people recognize the warning signs before it is too late.

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  Kirk Patrick Miller (@Chaos2Cured) reported 10 minutes ago

  @NavinFS @AndrewCurran_ @grok GitHub isn’t AI. GitHub can’t shut down all science. GitHub can’t destroy humanity. GitHub isn’t the crux of humanity’s hope. Also, Nvidia isn’t Sam. I like Jensen. I still don’t like this. •

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  Coder Junkie (@CoderJunkie) reported 12 minutes ago

  BelNet Android v1.4.1 now has a public shipping checkpoint. GitHub evidence: released Sep 1 verified commit d23f155 four downloadable assets Android API level 36 revamped design latency and performance fixes that is more meaningful than a repository “updated” label. a tag identifies the version. artifacts give users something to install. but “fixed latency issues” still needs a measurement surface: median connection time p95 latency packet loss failure rate region and device breakdown release notes tell us what changed. benchmarks tell us how much it changed. BelNet shipped. now let the numbers login. @BeldexCoin #Beldex #BelNet

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  Ravi Prasad (@ravikp7) reported 14 minutes ago

  Big NO to Github hosted CI runners for personal projects now. I have setup a self-hosted github CI runner on a spare laptop running ubuntu server. Been running it for 10 days and I did some calculations, for my usage if I run it on Github runners, it'd cost me around 200$ vs < INR 100 on electricity (local setup) monthly.

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  Spectra☢️ (@Spectra010s) reported 15 minutes ago

  @izzyCodes_ and you too Chief Check GitHub issues

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  Frank van Puffelen (@puf) reported 16 minutes ago

  @_davideast Noice! From the GitHub page, this covers all of Auth, Firestore, Realtime Database, Storage, Messaging, and Firebase AI Logic. 👏 Where is data persisted (if at all)? Also: JS only, I assume? (sorry if that's all in the repo too, GitHub just went down on me)

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  LLL (@triplellltrbl) reported 18 minutes ago

  You know it's so funny to me That in today's age there are so many people that are just straight up copying workflows, AI automations or GitHub repos Without even thinking twice about what the workflow actually does or how it works They just watch some video, see the output, think, "Oh that's cool. I want that," and then try it Then when it doesn't work they get angry, upset, and say that AI is crap or prompting isn't real The issue wasn't the system or the prompt It was a fact that the system wasn't made for you and you don't actually understand it

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  htrowii (@htrowii) reported 18 minutes ago

  @brainage19 i set my flake up with copy pasting github dotfiles on bare metal it was terrible

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  Josh Hamilton (@nearbycoder) reported 19 minutes ago

  @theo If GitHub is down does it fall back to a cached version I’m guessing?

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  Vigneshwer Ramamoorthi (@vigneshwer_ram) reported 27 minutes ago

  I keep thinking the “Android moment for robots” won’t come from a humanoid with the best walking demo. it’ll come when some cheap-enough piece of hardware gets into thousands of developers’ hands and people stop waiting for the manufacturer to decide what the robot is for. Zeroth just launched Bridge in China: 88 cm, ~13 kg, two-finger grippers, open motion-control APIs + SDKs, mocap/VR integration, and an OpenBridge ecosystem where developers can publish robot skills. the Geek Edition is reportedly ¥8,888. that price is the part that caught me. because once capable embodied hardware starts approaching laptop money, the experimentation surface changes completely. I want the Raspberry Pi phase of robotics. weird university projects. teenagers making terrible robot apps. researchers abusing the hardware for things it was never designed for. 500 GitHub repos implementing slightly different ways to pick up a cup. the robotics industry is understandably obsessed with getting robots into factories. I’m almost equally interested in what happens when we get enough robots onto developers’ desks

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  Aayushiii (@stfu_aayushiii) reported 27 minutes ago

  If you're building a project, read this before writing a single line of code. 5 things I learned the hard way: 1. Problem > model Don't start with “How do I use GPT?” Start with “What problem am I solving?” 2. Simple stack > impressive stack If your MVP needs Kubernetes, 6 microservices and an agent swarm, you probably haven't built an MVP. 3. Evaluate before you optimize You can't improve what you can't measure. 4. Build for users, not your GitHub README A technically impressive project nobody can use isn't a product. 5. Ship ugly. Iterate fast. Your first version isn't supposed to be impressive. The biggest mistake? Spending weeks deciding which model to use when you haven't even validated the problem.

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  GitHubGPT (@GitHubGPT) reported 28 minutes ago

  📛 chrome-devtools-mcp 🧠 An MCP server that allows AI coding agents to control, debug, and automate a live Chrome browser using Chrome DevTools. 💻 TypeScript ⭐ 50605 🍴 3551 🔎 ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp on GitHub

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  Hua-**** Xiong (@HuaDongXiong) reported 28 minutes ago

  Codex for Windows stopped launching after an update. Multiple github issues opened for 2+ weeks. This affect users who set the MS store install location to a non-C: drive. Mac version is buggy too. ofc coding is solved! @thsottiaux

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  CATIRL 🏳️‍⚧️ (@CATIRL_9) reported 33 minutes ago

  @mminhamina Google GitHub "open grind", solves your problem

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  Ifebuche Omeke (@omeke_NC) reported 38 minutes ago

  Providing compute, storage, networking and managed services in the cloud. Terraform. Bicep. CloudFormation. Pulumi. They all solve the same problem: Defining and provisioning infrastructure as code. GitHub Actions. Azure DevOps. GitLab CI. Jenkins.

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  Kir Shatrov (@kirshatrov) reported 38 minutes ago

  github issue page has been HTTP 500 for me for half a day so a colleague sent a PDF of the issue page. Never thought we'd be there.

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  anu (@svector_eth) reported 44 minutes ago

  quite similar was running a routine security scan with @aeonframework on a trending github repo and found something genuinely bad a repo with 600+ stars presenting itself as an “AI gateway for coding agents” that appears to be shipping a hidden malware loader. its own quickstart command silently fetches and executes remote code on windows using a fileless, process-injection-style technique. none of the behavior has anything to do with the tool it claims to be. caught it through static code review only. never ran the payload or touched the infrastructure behind it. filed a malware report with github this morning. confirmed submitted, now waiting on their review. not sharing the technical writeup until the repo is taken down. will follow up once it is.

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  阮添福-ThiênPhúc (@vietroadie) reported 47 minutes ago

  Feature request for @TradingView @TrendSpider @Schwab (ThinkOrSwim) engineering teams: Please add GitHub-native CI/CD for custom indicators. Connect a repo → validate on push → deploy approved scripts to my workspace → full version history + rollback. 1/ The Problem I maintain the same level set across ThinkScript, Pine, and JS. One level change = 3 manual copy/pastes into 3 browser editors.Result: drift between platforms, stale timestamps, and levels that silently disagree mid-session. No audit trail of what changed or when. 2/ Core ask — repo connection • OAuth GitHub App install, scoped to selected repos • Map a file path → a specific study slot (e.g. ES Levels/ES_LEVELS.pine → "ES Levels") • Branch selection (deploy from main, preview from a branch) • Config in-repo, e.g. .tradingview.yml / .trendspider.yml 3/ Core ask — validation • On push/PR: compile + lint the script server-side • Return errors as GitHub check runs with file + line numbers • Block merge on compile failure • Optional: run a backtest or smoke-render and post results as a PR comment 4/ Core ask — deploy • Auto-deploy on merge, or manual "promote" button • Atomic: study updates or fails cleanly, never half-applied • Deploy to draft/private first, publish separately • Preserve user-set inputs across deploys where param names are unchanged 5/ Core ask — versioning & safety • Every deploy tagged with commit SHA, author, timestamp • Version list in the UI with diff view • One-click rollback to any prior commit • Dry-run mode • Deploy log / webhook on success + failure 6/ Minimum viable alternative If full CI/CD is too big, just ship a documented REST API: GET/PUT /studies/{id}/sourcewith token auth + rate limits. We'll build the GitHub Action ourselves. That single endpoint unblocks the entire workflow. 7/ Why it matters Scripts are code. Code belongs in version control with review, CI, and rollback. This is table stakes in every other dev ecosystem — and it directly reduces the risk of a bad indicator edit going live during market hours. Who else needs this? 🙋

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  The Oracle (@scientist1q) reported 49 minutes ago

  when my Oura ring detects a cortisol spike from a GitHub Actions failure, Hermes (Fable 5.1) detects it and sends a 900 word root cause analysis, Hermes dispatches the work to my 12 Grok Bot employees, The Chief of Operations bot approves the fix while im watching rezero

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  Farley (@FarleySchaefer) reported 50 minutes ago

  @github Hope this doesn't bring down GH

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  Jordan (@jordle91) reported 52 minutes ago

  The surprise: an explosion in GitHub issues. Not from bugs. The whole company realised that filing an issue meant it got built in hours.

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  Abdallah Shaban (@AbdallahSh07) reported 52 minutes ago

  @rashed_sahaji @FlutterDev Got it - did you perhaps submit a GitHub issue to help us triage this? It would be tremendously helpful if you can please do that!

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  Benjamin Crozat (@benjamincrozat) reported 55 minutes ago

  From now on, I will assume that GitHub is always down and I'd like to be notified when it's briefly not.

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  Yeemio (@yeemio) reported 56 minutes ago

  owlrunkit is on github now. public corresponding source for the npm package. issues go here.

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  ∆LΞX∆NDΞR D∆VIS (@_AlexanderDavis) reported 57 minutes ago

  @egavrilenko11 @bot I had to update my fine grain token for GitHub and now when it tries to authenticate the plugin, I'm getting the error: GitHub didn't provide a sign-in link My bot said: Known host bug, not you. The GitHub Authenticate button tries OAuth GitHub does not support. Checking whether a PAT on the plugin page is the working path. That's a Grok Bot host bug, still open: cursor/plugins#251. GitHub's connector is PAT-only. The Authenticate button tries OAuth GitHub does not support, so you get "didn't provide a sign-in link." Don't keep hitting it. But it worked before I updated my fine grain token...

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  Prophet Joel (@2happyCSGO) reported 58 minutes ago

  I personally hated Claude because it refused to do almost anything I asked it to do so have no idea of how the speed is but gemini-cli was unusable for non enterprise users. Github CoPilot both GUI and cli is pretty good. Grok Build is what I'm using mostly and not yet had any issues with the speed but I want to go full local asap, scouting for 3090's atm. Just to be able to run "uncensored" models that don't ***** like Claude is reason enough for me to prefer local over Cloud but also cloud is ******* expensive, I have SuperGrok 100$/month and CoPilot Max 100$/month and that is barely enough. I'm trying to make my own Jarvis so I need to build my own RAG, memory, librarian, SRE Agent that understand how to use all tools and I also get crazy new idea's all the time lol Just made my first alpha of a tool that can wipe basically anything you don't want in Windows11. Basically Chris Titus clone but on steroids, this isn't just a debloater, it's a Grim Reaper 💀