GitHub status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of GitHub reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by GitHub users through our website.

• Website Down (54%)
• Errors (31%)
• Sign in (15%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent GitHub outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Ahmedabad	Errors	3 days ago
Delme	Sign in	4 days ago
Lyaud	Website Down	4 days ago
Catania	Errors	6 days ago
Inverness	Website Down	19 days ago
Quito	Sign in	19 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Charles Waters (@RelaxedPop) reported 4 minutes ago

  @_andrewthecoder I have the same problem with *** & github as I do with Java and JavaScript.

• 
  Nenesk.ron (@GustavoNenesk) reported 4 minutes ago

  What if there's a way to save hacked Ronin Wallets? A member of the community @YutsuKito found a way to save assets from drained wallets The issue is you need ronin:native to transfer assets, but whenver you deposit RON you get auto drained Need RON to revoke the malicious draining contract -> send RON -> gets drained -> can't revoke He found a solution for the keyless wallets where you can pay the gas fee with a safe wallet, allowing you to save lost axies or NFTs that have not been drained Interesting stuff. He sent the code for SM to review as an open-source project. Github link below

• 
  Hey Research Lab (@HeyResearch) reported 6 minutes ago

  We built Hey Research Lab in 2022 It didn’t work well. But the idea never left us. Years later, we still see the same problem in crypto: Everyone can see what a token costs. Very few places show what is actually being built behind it. Some developers keep shipping for months while nobody is paying attention. They push code constantly. They keep their GitHub active. They improve the product, fix things, test new ideas, and keep moving even when the market is quiet. No hype. No spotlight. Just work. We believe those builders deserve a place where their progress can be seen. So we’re rebuilding Hey Research Lab from zero. A research and discovery layer for the projects that never stopped building, and for the people looking for them before the market catches up. Starting with Robinhood Chain.

• 
  ATP (@ATPinsights) reported 7 minutes ago

  GitHub CLI just added image and video attachments today. Here's what you need to know. The gh command line tool now supports a repeatable --attach flag. It uploads a local image or video file and references it inline in an issue, pull request, or comment body. The feature is live now for all users on GitHub. It's aimed squarely at developers and coding agents that need to show visual proof, like before-and-after screenshots, directly from the terminal instead of the web UI. Developers reacted fast. Many called it a long-overdue fix for a common workaround, since teams previously built custom tools or scripts just to upload images to PRs from the CLI. Key facts: - New flag: --attach - Supports: images and video - Repeatable: yes, use it multiple times per command - Works in: issues, pull requests, comments - Availability: all users, live now No separate app or upload API is needed, the flag handles it inside gh itself.

• 
  Fox (@0xMfox) reported 9 minutes ago

  Gave an AI agent a month and GitHub access. Wanted to see if it could make money. The plan was simple. Point it at bounty-labeled issues, let it write the fix, submit the pull request, collect the payout. > Day 1 12 PRs submitted. 0 merged. 2 rejected. 8 just sat there ignored. Somewhere in that first week it also passed its own tests for a file that didn't exist. Wrote 25 tests for notification_service.py. The real file in that branch was called NotificationRoutingMiddleware. Confidently reported clean anyway. > Day 30 Looked completely different. 84 PRs submitted, 59 merged, $500-800 earned. Ran the agent for about $45 in API calls that whole month. Net somewhere around $455-755. Here's the part that stuck with me. Out of those 59 merges, 3 repos accounted for 90%+ of them. Every other repo it touched, zero merges, despite 30+ PRs going out across dozens of projects. Open source bounties follow a power law. Almost nobody merges your first PR. A few maintainers will merge your tenth without even reviewing it closely. That's what actually fixed the acceptance rate, from 24% up to around 70%. Not a smarter model, a scoring function that runs before the agent touches anything. Repos where it already has 10+ merged PRs score +40. Zero competing PRs on the same issue, +20. Five or more competitors already in, -20, skip it. Repos that closed PRs without merging before, instant -100, not even worth reading the issue. The fastest way to build the credibility that makes this work isn't code at all. Documentation translations sit at a 95% merge rate, barely reviewed, always needed somewhere. A handful of clean translations got the agent enough trust that maintainers started assigning it harder issues directly, no competition, no review queue. Spam version of this, submitting to every repo with a bounty label, burned through 30+ repos for 3 that ever paid out. Worse, it reads like exactly what it is to a maintainer watching the same account flood a dozen projects with mediocre PRs. Paid out by the hour, week 1 was rough, close to $5/hour, mostly setup and failed attempts. By week 3-4, once the scoring system was tuned and a few repos trusted it on sight, that climbed to $30-50/hour on the same kind of work. Bookmark this, scoring logic is worth stealing.

• 
  NAYAK (@Nayak__Ai) reported 11 minutes ago

  6. The Dependency Incident Check Grok has native real-time search across X. Breakage gets posted there hours before the GitHub issue is triaged. No other coding model has that feed. "You are a build engineer whose first move on a broken pipeline is to work out whether it broke for everyone or only for me. Search X and the web, last 14 days. Check: - Is anyone else reporting this failure with this package and version, and when did the reports start - The exact release that changed behaviour, and the changelog line that admits it - Whether maintainers have acknowledged it and what they recommended - The pin or patch people settled on, with the tradeoff of each - Whether this is my problem instead, and what evidence points that way Give me the verdict in the first line: their bug or mine. Then the evidence, newest first, with links. My failure: [PASTE THE ERROR, THE PACKAGE AND VERSION, AND WHAT CHANGED ON YOUR SIDE RECENTLY]"

• 
  radhika (@RaadhikaThacker) reported 11 minutes ago

  YAML’s more like a rule book/recipe that builds the form for you. Then I figured YAML was a forms thing. Nope. It’s just a way of writing information down in a structured way. GitHub uses it for a form. Kubernetes uses the same thing to describe a server.

• 
  Martin Tobias (Pre-Seed VC) (@MartinGTobias) reported 13 minutes ago

  if you know any founders who are winding down, I may have a buyer of their github repos. DMs open.

• 
  Tlon (@tloncorporation) reported 15 minutes ago

  1/ Your agent can now publish to the open web from Tlon Messenger. The page is served by your own server. No platform (ie Substack, GitHub, Medium etc) sits between you and your readers. All publishing a note to the web from Tlon Messenger takes is pressing a toggle. The page lives on a server you own. Here's how:

• 
  Speen Bhai (@Speenbhai) reported 16 minutes ago

  @johnternus Hi John. Congrats Let us see what new you bring with you. Affordability and intelligence. You have source code or an AI and can get it from GitHub. Why not turn 234 million iPhones to a massive distributed server infrastructure with zero power consumption

• 
  catman (@catmanyau) reported 17 minutes ago

  @CricTalk29 for me, losing Cursor would hurt most because it sits directly in the editing loop. would the vote change if github outages were limited to code hosting but issues and reviews stayed available?

• 
  RAVN (@ravnexchange) reported 18 minutes ago

  @openclaw @github GitHub sat the maintainers down on security after the 2.0 rush. Most launch recaps skip that part.

• 
  HeroGamer⚡ (@herogamer21btc) reported 19 minutes ago

  💻 GitHub Issues vs Draft PR vs Open PR — the difference nobody explains: 🔴 ISSUE = Should we do this? No code yet You describe the problem "App crashes when pasting OP_RETURN" "We need X feature" Anyone can open it Goal: decide IF and WHAT to build 🔵 DRAFT PR = I'm doing this, is this the right way? You have WIP code "I fixed it by doing Y, but not sure about placement / approach" Can't be merged Perfect for early feedback Goal: validate HOW you're building it 🟠 OPEN PR = I did it, ready for final review, please merge. Code done, tests pass Ready for final review Goal: ship it 🌊 Flow: Issue → Draft PR → Open PR Most people skip Issue or Draft and go straight to Open PR. Then maintainer has to review both the idea AND the implementation at once = slow, painful. Start Draft when unsure.

• 
  🍔Kangdalf👑 (@WhopperWizard) reported 30 minutes ago

  @cachesaur > claude, get your changes into github what's the problem?

• 
  Ben (@benatcortexai) reported 33 minutes ago

  @github this is the kind of tiny primitive that makes agent workflows less brittle. attaching the repro artifact directly to the issue beats handing an agent a local path nobody else can open.

• 
  Rachael LaGoth (@androidsheeep) reported 34 minutes ago

  @bcherny Please fix the desktop app it's very buggy it keeps disconnecting me for no reason everyday while im working on stuff, i submitted a report but nothing happened and someone else is having the same issue, an issue is open on github for more than 6 months with no solutions help

• 
  Suryansh Tiwari (@Suryanshti777) reported 34 minutes ago

  6. The Dependency Incident Check Grok has native real-time search across X. Breakage gets posted there hours before the GitHub issue is triaged. No other coding model has that feed. "You are a build engineer whose first move on a broken pipeline is to work out whether it broke for everyone or only for me. Search X and the web, last 14 days. Check: - Is anyone else reporting this failure with this package and version, and when did the reports start - The exact release that changed behaviour, and the changelog line that admits it - Whether maintainers have acknowledged it and what they recommended - The pin or patch people settled on, with the tradeoff of each - Whether this is my problem instead, and what evidence points that way Give me the verdict in the first line: their bug or mine. Then the evidence, newest first, with links. My failure: [PASTE THE ERROR, THE PACKAGE AND VERSION, AND WHAT CHANGED ON YOUR SIDE RECENTLY]"

• 
  Jason Sawyer (@foilmanhacks) reported 41 minutes ago

  There's a huge problem in InfoSec education: it’s way too course and tool focused. Instead of teaching the underlying methodologies and how to discover or invent, we feed people the latest "OSINT" slop script that’s been shat onto GitHub. OSINT isn’t about using scripts or services. It’s about understanding how they work, and being able to create your own.

• 
  Apoorv (@apoorvdarshan) reported 42 minutes ago

  @Dimillian these issues have been multiple times reported by users on github i hope open ai fix those, as well as please consider using native than electron

• 
  Jeremiah K (@neolaj) reported 43 minutes ago

  @TiborAntal Gradually figuring out how to scale coding agents. Started with 1, manually handling all the ***/GitHub work. Moved to 3 because I had more ideas than one agent could keep up with. That’s when the real problems started: squashing, merging, branch drift, conflicts. I ended up rebuilding the workflow around deterministic *** logic, worktrees, ephemeral branches, and syncing with the integration branch before changes begin. Now I’m running 6: • 1 orchestrator (Fable or Opus) • 4 coding agents • 1 integration agent reviewing and merging PRs Building the process around them was the hard part. Right now im just doing a couple of PRs (using ORCA on windows on my home computer)

• 
  NitroStack (@nitrostackai) reported 44 minutes ago

  The missing primitive might be capability contracts. A Skill shouldn’t say “call Jira.” It should say “I need issue.write.” Then MCP can bind that capability to Jira, Linear, GitHub… whatever exists. That’s basically dependency injection for agents.

• 
  moledao (@moledao_io) reported 47 minutes ago

  Web3 Remote Job Scams: A 2026 Field Guide Introduction Over the past few years, Web3 has come to represent a new world of opportunity for many young people. New roles, new narratives, and new stories of wealth have inspired countless people to enter the industry with high expectations. Remote work, stablecoin-based compensation, and a greater emphasis on ability than academic credentials can be especially attractive to professionals at the beginning of their careers. As a recruitment platform that works with job openings and candidates every day, however, we have also seen the other side of the industry. A significant share of supposed recruitment activity is not recruitment at all. It is fraud disguised as hiring, designed to steal the funds in job seekers’ wallets. According to Chainalysis’ 2026 report, cryptocurrency scams and fraud caused an estimated $17 billion in losses worldwide in 2025. Impersonation-related attacks increased by 1,400% year over year. Fake recruitment is one of the most common ways impersonation and social engineering are being applied to job seekers. What Happened to Us This month, it happened to us. We were contacted through Telegram by someone claiming to represent a US-registered technology company. They said the company urgently needed to hire Web3 engineers and wanted our support in sourcing candidates. After further investigation, we were unable to verify whether this person had actually been authorized by the company. We also could not rule out the possibility that they were impersonating a legitimate business. To avoid causing further harm to an organization that may itself have been a victim of impersonation, we will not disclose the company’s full name. At first, there were almost no obvious warning signs. The contact provided a business registration document and a polished company profile. Interviews were scheduled through Calendly, job openings were hosted on Ashby, and meetings took place over Zoom. These are all professional tools commonly used by legitimate companies, making it easy to assume that a company using them must be trustworthy. In reality, forging a registration document and creating Calendly or Ashby accounts require very little effort. Almost anyone can create the appearance of professionalism at minimal cost. This experience taught us an important lesson: the legitimacy of the tools surrounding a hiring process tells you very little about the legitimacy of the company behind it. The details of how the people involved behave are far more revealing. The partnership also progressed with unusual ease. All contractual documents arrived at once and appeared ready to sign. There was no friction at any stage. When discussing the recruitment fee, we initially proposed 15%, which the other party immediately accepted. We then tested an increase to 20%, and they accepted again without hesitation. Anyone with experience in recruitment delivery knows that fees are often one of the most difficult parts of a headhunting agreement. Clients may negotiate repeatedly over a difference of just two percentage points. The pace was also deliberately compressed. Interviews were often scheduled only one or two hours in advance, leaving almost no time for verification. Once confirmed, meetings were then repeatedly cancelled or rescheduled due to supposed last-minute conflicts. Several additional warning signs gradually appeared. The registration documents looked legitimate at first glance. Upon closer comparison, however, the names of the people listed in them did not match the information we were able to verify independently. The contact also made an unusual request. While verifying whether candidates were currently employed, they asked us to find out whether those candidates used LinkedIn frequently. Normal employment verification does not require this information. A person’s activity on a professional networking platform primarily reveals whether they have an accessible network that could quickly be used to verify their identity, employment history, or recent activity. At the same time, the contact prohibited us from sourcing candidates through LinkedIn or Telegram. They claimed their internal team was already using those channels and wanted to avoid duplicate candidates. In practice, this restriction pushed external recruitment partners into channels where independent cross-checking was much more difficult. The geographic requirement was even harder to explain. A US company was willing to consider only Chinese-speaking candidates and applied unusually strict screening standards that appeared unrelated to technical ability. In retrospect, we suspect that the screening criteria may have favored candidates who were easier to persuade and more likely to have higher incomes or larger asset balances. We cannot, however, confirm the group’s true intentions. Each of these warning signs could have been rationalized on its own. A client may have unusual preferences, legitimate concerns, or simply an unprofessional hiring process. It was only when the signals were considered together that the larger pattern became visible. Then came the interviews. Candidates joined the meetings, but the interviewers asked no questions about their project experience or technical background. Instead, they immediately provided a GitHub repository and instructed candidates to clone it onto their local machines and run it. The repository involved encryption and signing operations using cryptocurrency wallet private keys. Before the interviews, we had explicitly asked whether candidates would need to download or run anything. The contact told us they would not. Once the meetings began, however, the candidates received the exact opposite instruction. One candidate offered to share his screen, inspect the code locally, and walk the interviewer through it line by line. The interviewer refused and insisted that he download and run the repository on his own computer. The candidate ended the meeting. Other candidates quickly noticed that something was wrong and stopped as well. The most carefully designed part of the operation was not what happened during the interviews, but the feedback that followed. If a candidate ran the code, the interviewer gave positive feedback, said the candidate had performed well, and advanced them to the next round. If a candidate remained cautious and refused to run it, the interviewer told us that the candidate had falsified their résumé and instructed us to blacklist them immediately. That second response was not merely feedback. It was an instruction designed to prevent further communication between us and the candidate while allowing the wider operation to continue. This is something we hope every recruitment professional remembers: when a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without providing credible evidence, the request may reveal more about the client than it does about the candidate. Another common feature of these operations is that they do not need to interview every candidate. They only need a small number of people who are willing to execute the code. As a result, the hiring process will often stall abruptly once enough potential targets have been identified. What We Did Afterwards We immediately terminated all cooperation with the contact and removed the related job listings. We contacted every candidate who had entered the process to determine whether anyone had downloaded or executed the code. We also provided guidance on device inspection, credential rotation, and wallet security. All contracts, chat histories, meeting information, repository URLs, and account details have been preserved. Reports have been submitted to Telegram, GitHub, Ashby, and Calendly. At the procedural level, we have rewritten our client identity-verification process. Going forward, we will not accept recruitment assignments or partnerships without conducting independent callback verification through a channel the contact does not control. Candidate security briefings will also become a standard step before we introduce anyone to a client. Other Recruitment Scams Currently in Circulation What we encountered was only one variation. Several other methods remain active and deserve close attention. Malicious Take-Home Assignments Malicious interview assignments are currently one of the most widespread forms of recruitment-related attacks. Attackers impersonate recruiters or hiring managers on LinkedIn, X, or Telegram. They advertise senior roles with compensation well above market rates and frequently target professionals working with React, Next.js, Solidity, and blockchain technologies. Candidates are then given a technical assessment in the form of an npm project or GitHub repository and instructed to run it locally. Unit 42, the threat-intelligence team at Palo Alto Networks, refers to this activity as “Contagious Interview” and tracks it under the identifier CL-STA-240. The campaign was first publicly documented in November 2023 and has been linked to North Korea–associated threat actors. The malware used in these campaigns includes BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. These cross-platform payloads target Windows, Linux, and macOS devices and are designed to steal sensitive browser information and cryptocurrency wallet data. According to security researchers, more than 197 malicious npm packages associated with this attack path have been distributed since October 10, 2025, accumulating more than 31,000 downloads. Common warning signs include recently created repositories, abnormal commit histories, and contributors whose identities cannot be verified. These are only indicators, however. Attackers can compromise established accounts, fork legitimate long-running repositories, or manufacture months of commit history in advance. No single signal can prove that a repository is either safe or malicious. Fake Meeting Software Fake meeting applications are another major threat. Attackers approach targets with an investment opportunity, partnership proposal, or interview invitation. Shortly before the meeting, they claim that Zoom is not working or that the company uses a different conferencing platform. The target is then directed to download the supposed meeting software from a specific website. Cado Security Labs has tracked one such campaign, known as “Meeten,” since September 2024. The campaign distributes a cross-platform information stealer called Realst. The group uses AI-generated company profiles to make its operations appear more credible. The names and branding of its meeting applications change frequently, with known examples including Clusee, Cuesee, Meetone, and Meetio. The malware targets cryptocurrency wallets and Telegram credentials, as well as iCloud Keychain data, banking information, and browser cookies. The solution is not to memorize an approved list of meeting applications, since legitimate companies may use many different tools. The safer rule is never to download meeting software from an unfamiliar domain sent directly by an interviewer. Download the software independently from its official website or an official application store, and verify the domain carefully. Malicious Offer Files Fake offer documents are another common attack method. In March 2022, attackers stole approximately $540 million from Axie Infinity’s Ronin Bridge, although later reporting placed the total value closer to $625 million. Subsequent investigations found that the initial point of entry was a fraudulent job offer delivered as a PDF. A senior engineer at Sky Mavis was contacted on LinkedIn by accounts impersonating another company. After completing several rounds of interviews, the engineer received an extremely attractive offer in PDF format and downloaded it. That file introduced spyware into the system. The attackers eventually gained control of five of the network’s nine validator nodes. Sky Mavis confirmed that an employee had been targeted through social engineering. In April of that year, the US Treasury attributed the attack to the Lazarus Group. What makes this case especially significant is that the victim was a senior engineer at the company that was ultimately compromised, and the attack was supported by a complete, multi-stage interview process. The final payload was simply a file. Terminal Paste Attacks Attacks that instruct victims to paste commands into a terminal or system run box have grown rapidly over the past two years. They are commonly known as ClickFix attacks. During an interview or onboarding process, a page may claim that the user’s browser has encountered an error, that their identity must be verified, or that a system component needs to be repaired. The page then provides a command and instructs the user to paste it into a terminal or run dialog. In May 2026, Microsoft disclosed a campaign targeting macOS users through lures disguised as system utilities. The campaign was used to distribute information-stealing malware. Other security companies have identified similar samples containing asset-transfer functionality. The malware first checks whether a wallet contains funds and then transfers those assets to an address controlled by the attacker. The rule here is simple: no legitimate recruitment process requires you to paste a command you do not understand into your terminal. Not once. Deepfake Interviewers Deepfake interviewers have already begun to appear. Real-time face-swapping technology is now advanced enough to support an apparently coherent interview. The person on screen may appear to be a senior executive from a well-known company, speak professionally, and have a verifiable public résumé. There are two practical ways to respond. First, ask the person to perform an unexpected physical action, such as briefly covering half of their face with their hand or turning their head 90 degrees to the side. Current real-time face-swapping systems may still reveal visual inconsistencies when the face is obstructed or shown from an extreme angle. Second, conduct an independent callback using contact information published on the company’s official website. This remains the most effective method of verification. Malicious Wallet Signatures A wallet-signature attack does not require your seed phrase. The interviewer may ask you to test a product, review a dApp, claim an onboarding airdrop, or complete an onchain identity-verification step. You are then instructed to connect your wallet and sign a transaction or message. Certain signatures or malicious transactions can give an attacker permission to transfer your assets. The level of risk depends on whether you are signing a basic message, a Permit, a token approval, or an onchain transaction. If you do not understand exactly what a signature authorizes, do not approve it. The boundary should be clear: no interview or onboarding process requires you to connect a personal wallet. A recruiter or employer has no legitimate reason to require a job candidate to perform an onchain transaction. Upfront Fees and Identity Misuse Upfront fees and identity misuse are among the oldest recruitment scams, yet they are still frequently overlooked. The first typically involves demands for a security deposit, training fee, or equipment payment before employment begins. The second asks a candidate to use their identity to register an account with a cryptocurrency exchange or open a bank account. This can carry consequences far more serious than financial loss. If the account is later used to process criminal proceeds, the person whose identity was used may face criminal liability. Any request for payment before employment is a red line. If someone asks you to register an account, receive funds, or move money on their behalf using your own identity, end the conversation immediately. How to Protect Yourself Before an interview, take three low-cost precautions. First, verify that the company genuinely exists. Review its official website and registration information, then examine whether the online histories of its team members are consistent across different platforms. Check whether the names listed in corporate documents match publicly available information. Second, independently contact the company through a channel the recruiter cannot control. Use an email address or phone number published on the official website. Do not use contact details provided by the person approaching you. Third, pay attention to two recurring warning signs: interviews scheduled only one or two hours in advance and then repeatedly changed, and compensation that is clearly above the market rate for the role. Both patterns appear in a large number of reported cases. During an interview, pause whenever you are asked to download, install, or run anything. You may offer to explain your approach over screen sharing, but remember that screen sharing itself does not provide protection. If code is running on your own machine, you can still be compromised even if you show the interviewer every line beforehand. The interviewer’s response is often more revealing than the request itself. If they refuse to explain what the code does, refuse to provide an isolated environment, or insist that you run it on a device containing your wallets and work credentials, end the interview immediately. When sharing your screen, share only the specific application window required—not your entire desktop. If the first interview contains no questions about your experience, projects, or technical background and moves directly to running code, you have every reason to end the call. We do not recommend that job seekers attempt to run untrusted code themselves. If analysis is genuinely necessary, it should be handled by someone with appropriate security expertise inside a disposable, isolated virtual machine that contains no credentials, does not mount directories from the host system, and has restricted network access. A container is not a purpose-built malware sandbox. Misconfigured directory mounts, permissions, or network access can still expose the host environment. Ordinary job seekers should not attempt this on their own. If you are a recruiter or regularly recommend opportunities to other people, incorporate these warnings into your standard process. Before introducing a candidate to a client, clearly tell them not to download unfamiliar software or browser extensions, not to run unknown code or scripts, and to share only the necessary application window during screen sharing. If a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without credible evidence, contact the candidate directly and verify what happened before taking action. Conclusion The crypto industry has spent years removing trust from transactions. You do not need to trust the counterparty because there is a contract. You do not need to give anyone your private key because it remains in your possession. At the protocol level, the industry has solved this problem remarkably well. Recruitment places people back in a much more primitive position. A stranger claims to be someone, and you must decide whether to believe them. Business registration documents and meeting links can be forged. Even an interviewer’s face can now be replaced in real time. Not a single dollar of the more than $500 million stolen in the Ronin attack was taken through a flaw in cryptography. What failed was the human layer. Every method described in this article relies on the same force: speed. The opportunity may disappear. Other people are competing for it. You have to act now. In an industry where everyone is urging you to move faster, giving yourself permission to slow down may be your most effective line of defence. If you have encountered a similar approach or recruitment process, please let us know. We hope this article helps more people recognize the warning signs before it is too late.

• 
  Eddie Jaoude | DevRel | Open Source (@eddiejaoude) reported 48 minutes ago

  I have many tokens to burn before tomorrow after the Claude reset. Send me your GitHub issues with context 👇

• 
  mrgadget (@mrgadgetstudio) reported 49 minutes ago

  @EzekielCrrypt I still deploy code to github, what's problem?

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  Chris (@chriscoolstuff) reported 49 minutes ago

  @pfernan95dev For the SEO part there's one thing that I've been also doing: Ask your agent what keywords you should search for relevant to your app on answerthepublic, perplexity and google Gather all that info old fashion, by yourself - might take around 2 hours but it's worth it Plug all that info into the agent and have it give you 5 titles for 5 articles Make it write those articles - maybe use nosoopai github or edit them manually so they seem more human like Connect the agent to google console After 1 month tell the agent to review the results If no article took off you can wait one more month or put up 5 more After the next month check what worked and double down on that

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  wiiiimm (@wiiiimm) reported 51 minutes ago

  @Umesh__digital stop doing it. we don't need another github outage.

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  CATIRL 🏳️‍⚧️ (@CATIRL_9) reported 56 minutes ago

  @mminhamina Google GitHub "open grind", solves your problem

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  recovering buzzkill (@MikeStillAwake) reported 59 minutes ago

  @Karai_Dan @SteamDeckHQ Agenda or not nexus mods is a terrible outdated model for distributing mods. GitHub would be a superior host.

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  Jayesh Betala (@jbetala7) reported 60 minutes ago

  @github Exactly how issue issue comments should handle local media files

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  ѕaℓoηι ηαяαηg (@thesaloninarang) reported 60 minutes ago

  I review resumes for DevOps beginners at meetups, and the same fixable problem shows up every time: bullets that describe the tool instead of what YOU did with it. Let me show you the difference with real rewrites. BEFORE: "Worked with Docker and Kubernetes" AFTER: "Containerized a 3-service Node app and deployed it to a local Kubernetes cluster with health checks and resource limits" BEFORE: "Knowledge of CI/CD" AFTER: "Built a GitHub Actions pipeline that tests, builds and pushes images on every merge to main" BEFORE: "Familiar with Linux" AFTER: "Debugged container startup failures using logs, exec and inspect on Ubuntu servers" See the pattern? Verb, artifact, specifics. A hiring manager can picture the AFTER versions. The BEFORE versions could be copied from any job description, and that is exactly how they read. You do not need production experience to write bullets like this. Personal projects count when you describe them concretely.