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GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  NitroStack (@nitrostackai) reported 2 minutes ago

  The missing primitive might be capability contracts. A Skill shouldn’t say “call Jira.” It should say “I need issue.write.” Then MCP can bind that capability to Jira, Linear, GitHub… whatever exists. That’s basically dependency injection for agents.

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  Kim Burgaard (@kimburgaard) reported 6 minutes ago

  Back when GitHub added Copilot PR reviews, it helped me keep up with the growing volume and size of our pull requests, which were increasingly being written by Copilot too. Over time I grew comfortable feeding Copilot's review comments straight back to Copilot to fix, and mostly spot checking when critical functionality was involved. When GitHub updated the Copilot pricing model I switched to Claude Code, but kept the Copilot review feature on for a couple of months. When the monthly bills for Copilot AI usage alone started rivaling the Claude Code Max plan, giving Claude Code PR review duties seemed like an obvious cost saving move. Plugging Claude Code into our PR review process immediately went south. The first PR churned with fixes to findings that resulted in more findings, and fixes that propagated up and down the call chain. I threw the PR away and started over, but the next attempt churned just as badly. Turn count on its own was never the signal. Copilot had taken ten turns on a rate-key cleanup the day before and nobody minded, because the findings thinned as it went — 5, 4, 3, 3, 3, 4, 1, 2 — and it merged. The cached-token billing PR I put through Claude Code took nine turns and produced 123 inline findings, and the ninth round was still returning fifteen. I closed it without merging. Looking closer at Claude Code's review findings, it was clear it reported far more issues than Copilot ever did, and among legitimate bugs and concerns, it made lots of comments about latent and speculative issues including possible race conditions and error propagation, things Claude Code would then try to fix one by one in isolation, often ignoring existing patterns in the code base. The code-review workflow is built into Claude Code and cannot be customized other than a few options, so the only place to intervene was on the other end, in the session where I used to just ask the coding agent to address the review findings. The first improvement was to direct Claude Code not to blindly fix all findings, but to defer findings not directly related to the task at hand to new issues. That helped reduce the PR churn, but blew up our issue backlog. The next improvement was to ask Claude Code to ignore speculative findings and disregard most latent findings unless they indicated high risk of unrecoverable damage in production. Finally, I had to stop Claude Code from authoring prescriptive issues with detailed implementation instructions. The result is a skill that triages PR review findings, and a skill for authoring and updating issues. After a few iterations of the skills, I've been able to complete ten PRs over a couple of days, bringing back the pace we had before. I've made the skills available in a public GitHub repository (link in the first reply). Let me know if you find them helpful.

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  Nas (@TheNasFi) reported 6 minutes ago

  $MSFT changed its reporting structure today. Starting in FY27, Microsoft will report just two segments: Agents & Infra Devices & Consumer Agents & Infra includes Azure, Microsoft 365, GitHub, server products and industry solutions. For context, those businesses generated $268B in revenue last year, compared with $64B for Devices & Consumer. Microsoft also recast its Q1 guidance under the new structure: Agents & Infra: $75.15B to $75.75B Devices & Consumer: $14.7B to $15.2B There is no change to total revenue guidance. These are the same numbers Microsoft gave in July, reorganized under the new segments. Mostly a reporting change, but an interesting look at how Microsoft now groups the majority of its business internally.

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  Charles McDowell (@charlesmcdowell) reported 6 minutes ago

  @openclaw @github I still just want to know why there was even a new release of OpenClaw with nothing new that could compete with Hermes Agent? I was really excited for the release. Then, just like what seems like everybody else, incredibly let down.

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  Rusty Williams McMurray (@1RustyMac) reported 8 minutes ago

  Persistent AI doesn’t have a supply chain problem at the model. It has a supply chain problem at the moment it changes its mind. Personality drifts. Tools get installed. Memory accumulates. The thing you shipped on Monday is not the thing answering on Friday. We can attest who built the weights. We still cannot attest who authorized what the agent became on Tuesday. That is the hole. Who is allowed to let it change? We built Living Supply-Chain Security for Persistent AI Organisms around one law: The organism may propose evolution. It may not authorize it. No trace, no drift. If an agent wants a new personality, a new tool, a new maturity, or a rollback — that change does not happen because it felt confident. Confidence is not a key. Self-narration is not evidence. Evidence is not interpretation. Interpretation is not authorization. Authorization has to come from outside the organism, bound to the exact change, used once, and written into an append-only history. Even a rollback cannot erase the record. You can restore a prior state. You cannot pretend the detour never happened. Default-deny. Hash-chained. Externally signed. We froze battery v1 on July 5 and ran it against the paper’s own claims. It held. That is executable evidence. Not a proof. Not a production blessing. Not “alignment, solved.” If it can’t be attacked, it isn’t finished. GitHub later this week. Come try to break it.

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  Eric Johansson | Microsoft MVP | Progress Champion (@EricJohansson) reported 11 minutes ago

  @csharpfritz Is this a github broke or a YOU broke github issue? Either way they have an issue. 😢

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  Convequity (@convequity) reported 12 minutes ago

  Snyk is a clean postmortem for what happens when a security tool lives inside the coding agent’s loop. The product was mostly scan-and-warn. Find the issue, comment on the PR, suggest a fix. Blocking the merge usually sat in GitHub, not in Snyk. Bigger platforms smothered it. $PANW, $CRWD, and Wiz pulled AppSec into the bundle the CISO was already buying. GitHub was the main developer surface and put scanning where the code already lived. Then coding agents arrived and delivered the final blow. A lot of that scanning became something the agent could just do. Growth held up for a short while after the COVID/cloud tailwind. Then it decelerated hard. This is the same lens we use in Convequity’s SaaS Agentic Survival Evaluation Framework. The PANW, CRWD, and FTNT reviews go up on Convequity in a few days.

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  To the Moon (@Gardnmi) reported 14 minutes ago

  @mitsuhiko Try the trick of putting the issue on github and having some clankers take a crack at it.

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  radhika (@RaadhikaThacker) reported 15 minutes ago

  YAML’s more like a rule book/recipe that builds the form for you. Then I figured YAML was a forms thing. Nope. It’s just a way of writing information down in a structured way. GitHub uses it for a form. Kubernetes uses the same thing to describe a server.

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  moledao (@moledao_io) reported 15 minutes ago

  Web3 Remote Job Scams: A 2026 Field Guide Introduction Over the past few years, Web3 has come to represent a new world of opportunity for many young people. New roles, new narratives, and new stories of wealth have inspired countless people to enter the industry with high expectations. Remote work, stablecoin-based compensation, and a greater emphasis on ability than academic credentials can be especially attractive to professionals at the beginning of their careers. As a recruitment platform that works with job openings and candidates every day, however, we have also seen the other side of the industry. A significant share of supposed recruitment activity is not recruitment at all. It is fraud disguised as hiring, designed to steal the funds in job seekers’ wallets. According to Chainalysis’ 2026 report, cryptocurrency scams and fraud caused an estimated $17 billion in losses worldwide in 2025. Impersonation-related attacks increased by 1,400% year over year. Fake recruitment is one of the most common ways impersonation and social engineering are being applied to job seekers. What Happened to Us This month, it happened to us. We were contacted through Telegram by someone claiming to represent a US-registered technology company. They said the company urgently needed to hire Web3 engineers and wanted our support in sourcing candidates. After further investigation, we were unable to verify whether this person had actually been authorized by the company. We also could not rule out the possibility that they were impersonating a legitimate business. To avoid causing further harm to an organization that may itself have been a victim of impersonation, we will not disclose the company’s full name. At first, there were almost no obvious warning signs. The contact provided a business registration document and a polished company profile. Interviews were scheduled through Calendly, job openings were hosted on Ashby, and meetings took place over Zoom. These are all professional tools commonly used by legitimate companies, making it easy to assume that a company using them must be trustworthy. In reality, forging a registration document and creating Calendly or Ashby accounts require very little effort. Almost anyone can create the appearance of professionalism at minimal cost. This experience taught us an important lesson: the legitimacy of the tools surrounding a hiring process tells you very little about the legitimacy of the company behind it. The details of how the people involved behave are far more revealing. The partnership also progressed with unusual ease. All contractual documents arrived at once and appeared ready to sign. There was no friction at any stage. When discussing the recruitment fee, we initially proposed 15%, which the other party immediately accepted. We then tested an increase to 20%, and they accepted again without hesitation. Anyone with experience in recruitment delivery knows that fees are often one of the most difficult parts of a headhunting agreement. Clients may negotiate repeatedly over a difference of just two percentage points. The pace was also deliberately compressed. Interviews were often scheduled only one or two hours in advance, leaving almost no time for verification. Once confirmed, meetings were then repeatedly cancelled or rescheduled due to supposed last-minute conflicts. Several additional warning signs gradually appeared. The registration documents looked legitimate at first glance. Upon closer comparison, however, the names of the people listed in them did not match the information we were able to verify independently. The contact also made an unusual request. While verifying whether candidates were currently employed, they asked us to find out whether those candidates used LinkedIn frequently. Normal employment verification does not require this information. A person’s activity on a professional networking platform primarily reveals whether they have an accessible network that could quickly be used to verify their identity, employment history, or recent activity. At the same time, the contact prohibited us from sourcing candidates through LinkedIn or Telegram. They claimed their internal team was already using those channels and wanted to avoid duplicate candidates. In practice, this restriction pushed external recruitment partners into channels where independent cross-checking was much more difficult. The geographic requirement was even harder to explain. A US company was willing to consider only Chinese-speaking candidates and applied unusually strict screening standards that appeared unrelated to technical ability. In retrospect, we suspect that the screening criteria may have favored candidates who were easier to persuade and more likely to have higher incomes or larger asset balances. We cannot, however, confirm the group’s true intentions. Each of these warning signs could have been rationalized on its own. A client may have unusual preferences, legitimate concerns, or simply an unprofessional hiring process. It was only when the signals were considered together that the larger pattern became visible. Then came the interviews. Candidates joined the meetings, but the interviewers asked no questions about their project experience or technical background. Instead, they immediately provided a GitHub repository and instructed candidates to clone it onto their local machines and run it. The repository involved encryption and signing operations using cryptocurrency wallet private keys. Before the interviews, we had explicitly asked whether candidates would need to download or run anything. The contact told us they would not. Once the meetings began, however, the candidates received the exact opposite instruction. One candidate offered to share his screen, inspect the code locally, and walk the interviewer through it line by line. The interviewer refused and insisted that he download and run the repository on his own computer. The candidate ended the meeting. Other candidates quickly noticed that something was wrong and stopped as well. The most carefully designed part of the operation was not what happened during the interviews, but the feedback that followed. If a candidate ran the code, the interviewer gave positive feedback, said the candidate had performed well, and advanced them to the next round. If a candidate remained cautious and refused to run it, the interviewer told us that the candidate had falsified their résumé and instructed us to blacklist them immediately. That second response was not merely feedback. It was an instruction designed to prevent further communication between us and the candidate while allowing the wider operation to continue. This is something we hope every recruitment professional remembers: when a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without providing credible evidence, the request may reveal more about the client than it does about the candidate. Another common feature of these operations is that they do not need to interview every candidate. They only need a small number of people who are willing to execute the code. As a result, the hiring process will often stall abruptly once enough potential targets have been identified. What We Did Afterwards We immediately terminated all cooperation with the contact and removed the related job listings. We contacted every candidate who had entered the process to determine whether anyone had downloaded or executed the code. We also provided guidance on device inspection, credential rotation, and wallet security. All contracts, chat histories, meeting information, repository URLs, and account details have been preserved. Reports have been submitted to Telegram, GitHub, Ashby, and Calendly. At the procedural level, we have rewritten our client identity-verification process. Going forward, we will not accept recruitment assignments or partnerships without conducting independent callback verification through a channel the contact does not control. Candidate security briefings will also become a standard step before we introduce anyone to a client. Other Recruitment Scams Currently in Circulation What we encountered was only one variation. Several other methods remain active and deserve close attention. Malicious Take-Home Assignments Malicious interview assignments are currently one of the most widespread forms of recruitment-related attacks. Attackers impersonate recruiters or hiring managers on LinkedIn, X, or Telegram. They advertise senior roles with compensation well above market rates and frequently target professionals working with React, Next.js, Solidity, and blockchain technologies. Candidates are then given a technical assessment in the form of an npm project or GitHub repository and instructed to run it locally. Unit 42, the threat-intelligence team at Palo Alto Networks, refers to this activity as “Contagious Interview” and tracks it under the identifier CL-STA-240. The campaign was first publicly documented in November 2023 and has been linked to North Korea–associated threat actors. The malware used in these campaigns includes BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. These cross-platform payloads target Windows, Linux, and macOS devices and are designed to steal sensitive browser information and cryptocurrency wallet data. According to security researchers, more than 197 malicious npm packages associated with this attack path have been distributed since October 10, 2025, accumulating more than 31,000 downloads. Common warning signs include recently created repositories, abnormal commit histories, and contributors whose identities cannot be verified. These are only indicators, however. Attackers can compromise established accounts, fork legitimate long-running repositories, or manufacture months of commit history in advance. No single signal can prove that a repository is either safe or malicious. Fake Meeting Software Fake meeting applications are another major threat. Attackers approach targets with an investment opportunity, partnership proposal, or interview invitation. Shortly before the meeting, they claim that Zoom is not working or that the company uses a different conferencing platform. The target is then directed to download the supposed meeting software from a specific website. Cado Security Labs has tracked one such campaign, known as “Meeten,” since September 2024. The campaign distributes a cross-platform information stealer called Realst. The group uses AI-generated company profiles to make its operations appear more credible. The names and branding of its meeting applications change frequently, with known examples including Clusee, Cuesee, Meetone, and Meetio. The malware targets cryptocurrency wallets and Telegram credentials, as well as iCloud Keychain data, banking information, and browser cookies. The solution is not to memorize an approved list of meeting applications, since legitimate companies may use many different tools. The safer rule is never to download meeting software from an unfamiliar domain sent directly by an interviewer. Download the software independently from its official website or an official application store, and verify the domain carefully. Malicious Offer Files Fake offer documents are another common attack method. In March 2022, attackers stole approximately $540 million from Axie Infinity’s Ronin Bridge, although later reporting placed the total value closer to $625 million. Subsequent investigations found that the initial point of entry was a fraudulent job offer delivered as a PDF. A senior engineer at Sky Mavis was contacted on LinkedIn by accounts impersonating another company. After completing several rounds of interviews, the engineer received an extremely attractive offer in PDF format and downloaded it. That file introduced spyware into the system. The attackers eventually gained control of five of the network’s nine validator nodes. Sky Mavis confirmed that an employee had been targeted through social engineering. In April of that year, the US Treasury attributed the attack to the Lazarus Group. What makes this case especially significant is that the victim was a senior engineer at the company that was ultimately compromised, and the attack was supported by a complete, multi-stage interview process. The final payload was simply a file. Terminal Paste Attacks Attacks that instruct victims to paste commands into a terminal or system run box have grown rapidly over the past two years. They are commonly known as ClickFix attacks. During an interview or onboarding process, a page may claim that the user’s browser has encountered an error, that their identity must be verified, or that a system component needs to be repaired. The page then provides a command and instructs the user to paste it into a terminal or run dialog. In May 2026, Microsoft disclosed a campaign targeting macOS users through lures disguised as system utilities. The campaign was used to distribute information-stealing malware. Other security companies have identified similar samples containing asset-transfer functionality. The malware first checks whether a wallet contains funds and then transfers those assets to an address controlled by the attacker. The rule here is simple: no legitimate recruitment process requires you to paste a command you do not understand into your terminal. Not once. Deepfake Interviewers Deepfake interviewers have already begun to appear. Real-time face-swapping technology is now advanced enough to support an apparently coherent interview. The person on screen may appear to be a senior executive from a well-known company, speak professionally, and have a verifiable public résumé. There are two practical ways to respond. First, ask the person to perform an unexpected physical action, such as briefly covering half of their face with their hand or turning their head 90 degrees to the side. Current real-time face-swapping systems may still reveal visual inconsistencies when the face is obstructed or shown from an extreme angle. Second, conduct an independent callback using contact information published on the company’s official website. This remains the most effective method of verification. Malicious Wallet Signatures A wallet-signature attack does not require your seed phrase. The interviewer may ask you to test a product, review a dApp, claim an onboarding airdrop, or complete an onchain identity-verification step. You are then instructed to connect your wallet and sign a transaction or message. Certain signatures or malicious transactions can give an attacker permission to transfer your assets. The level of risk depends on whether you are signing a basic message, a Permit, a token approval, or an onchain transaction. If you do not understand exactly what a signature authorizes, do not approve it. The boundary should be clear: no interview or onboarding process requires you to connect a personal wallet. A recruiter or employer has no legitimate reason to require a job candidate to perform an onchain transaction. Upfront Fees and Identity Misuse Upfront fees and identity misuse are among the oldest recruitment scams, yet they are still frequently overlooked. The first typically involves demands for a security deposit, training fee, or equipment payment before employment begins. The second asks a candidate to use their identity to register an account with a cryptocurrency exchange or open a bank account. This can carry consequences far more serious than financial loss. If the account is later used to process criminal proceeds, the person whose identity was used may face criminal liability. Any request for payment before employment is a red line. If someone asks you to register an account, receive funds, or move money on their behalf using your own identity, end the conversation immediately. How to Protect Yourself Before an interview, take three low-cost precautions. First, verify that the company genuinely exists. Review its official website and registration information, then examine whether the online histories of its team members are consistent across different platforms. Check whether the names listed in corporate documents match publicly available information. Second, independently contact the company through a channel the recruiter cannot control. Use an email address or phone number published on the official website. Do not use contact details provided by the person approaching you. Third, pay attention to two recurring warning signs: interviews scheduled only one or two hours in advance and then repeatedly changed, and compensation that is clearly above the market rate for the role. Both patterns appear in a large number of reported cases. During an interview, pause whenever you are asked to download, install, or run anything. You may offer to explain your approach over screen sharing, but remember that screen sharing itself does not provide protection. If code is running on your own machine, you can still be compromised even if you show the interviewer every line beforehand. The interviewer’s response is often more revealing than the request itself. If they refuse to explain what the code does, refuse to provide an isolated environment, or insist that you run it on a device containing your wallets and work credentials, end the interview immediately. When sharing your screen, share only the specific application window required—not your entire desktop. If the first interview contains no questions about your experience, projects, or technical background and moves directly to running code, you have every reason to end the call. We do not recommend that job seekers attempt to run untrusted code themselves. If analysis is genuinely necessary, it should be handled by someone with appropriate security expertise inside a disposable, isolated virtual machine that contains no credentials, does not mount directories from the host system, and has restricted network access. A container is not a purpose-built malware sandbox. Misconfigured directory mounts, permissions, or network access can still expose the host environment. Ordinary job seekers should not attempt this on their own. If you are a recruiter or regularly recommend opportunities to other people, incorporate these warnings into your standard process. Before introducing a candidate to a client, clearly tell them not to download unfamiliar software or browser extensions, not to run unknown code or scripts, and to share only the necessary application window during screen sharing. If a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without credible evidence, contact the candidate directly and verify what happened before taking action. Conclusion The crypto industry has spent years removing trust from transactions. You do not need to trust the counterparty because there is a contract. You do not need to give anyone your private key because it remains in your possession. At the protocol level, the industry has solved this problem remarkably well. Recruitment places people back in a much more primitive position. A stranger claims to be someone, and you must decide whether to believe them. Business registration documents and meeting links can be forged. Even an interviewer’s face can now be replaced in real time. Not a single dollar of the more than $500 million stolen in the Ronin attack was taken through a flaw in cryptography. What failed was the human layer. Every method described in this article relies on the same force: speed. The opportunity may disappear. Other people are competing for it. You have to act now. In an industry where everyone is urging you to move faster, giving yourself permission to slow down may be your most effective line of defence. If you have encountered a similar approach or recruitment process, please let us know. We hope this article helps more people recognize the warning signs before it is too late.

• 
  Nenesk.ron (@GustavoNenesk) reported 19 minutes ago

  What if there's a way to save hacked Ronin Wallets? A member of the community @YutsuKito found a way to save assets from drained wallets The issue is you need ronin:native to transfer assets, but whenver you deposit RON you get auto drained Need RON to revoke the malicious draining contract -> send RON -> gets drained -> can't revoke He found a solution for the keyless wallets where you can pay the gas fee with a safe wallet, allowing you to save lost axies or NFTs that have not been drained Interesting stuff. He sent the code for SM to review as an open-source project. Github link below

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  HeroGamer⚡ (@herogamer21btc) reported 20 minutes ago

  💻 GitHub Issues vs Draft PR vs Open PR — the difference nobody explains: 🔴 ISSUE = Should we do this? No code yet You describe the problem "App crashes when pasting OP_RETURN" "We need X feature" Anyone can open it Goal: decide IF and WHAT to build 🔵 DRAFT PR = I'm doing this, is this the right way? You have WIP code "I fixed it by doing Y, but not sure about placement / approach" Can't be merged Perfect for early feedback Goal: validate HOW you're building it 🟠 OPEN PR = I did it, ready for final review, please merge. Code done, tests pass Ready for final review Goal: ship it 🌊 Flow: Issue → Draft PR → Open PR Most people skip Issue or Draft and go straight to Open PR. Then maintainer has to review both the idea AND the implementation at once = slow, painful. Start Draft when unsure.

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  Anders (@AndersReiche) reported 22 minutes ago

  @bjmtweets Would love to hear your thesis on gitlab. I’m a software engineer, and in my experience, gitlab has been slow to everything and generally is the red headed stepchild next to GitHub. It suffers from lack of network effects, there are solutions to everything on GH, but not GL.

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  Rithesh Kumar (@rk625dev) reported 23 minutes ago

  @benln Can u integrate grok bot to use the apple keychain password it keeps asking and GitHub plugin is not working

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  Shanica North (@KickAssShanica) reported 24 minutes ago

  @ArcyloOfficial Get comfy! For me, my Gmail is a connector. This is OAuth into my inbox. Grok can: • search and read mail (body, headers, attachments) • draft replies • send / reply / forward if you grant write/send • label, trash, organize Base hook is often read-only. Send is an extra permission you click on purpose. If you connect it, the bot is sitting in the same box as bank alerts and 2FA codes. That is the whole risk. You can revoke anytime. Grok Bot can also skip my inbox and get its own address (AgentMail / similar plugins). Then it sends and receives from something@….agentmail.to, not from you. I use that if I want an agent that emails people without reading my personal mail. My GitHub OAuth into the GitHub user I sign in as. With the scopes I approve it can: • read public and private repos that account can see • search code, list branches, summarize PRs • open/update issues • create branches, push files, open/review/merge PRs • delete files if write is on Private repos work only if I granted repo (or equivalent) at connect time. Safer pattern: tell it to branch + PR, not push straight to main. Same revoke page. What it cannot do by default • It does not get your password. • It does not stay logged in if you disconnect the connector. • It does not magically see my GitHub orgs I never authorized. • Connecting email does not connect GitHub, and the other way around. Practical rule for me Do not hook personal Gmail if that inbox has 2FA and money mail unless you want an assistant reading it. GitHub is useful if I chose to still keep repos, ask it to show the diff before any write. If you only wanted “what does this button do,” that is the button: it is not a viewer badge. It is a key you can take back. This is what I’m experiencing with learning to use it. It’s different and I’m starting to like it.