GitHub Outage Map

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GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

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  george🔰 (@KyroGeorge) reported 2 minutes ago

  Just pushed an update on GitHub for the FIFA 14 repo, should fix some bugs and add all the GKs to the game now.

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  Adam G (@AdamGell) reported 5 minutes ago

  @CryptoDegenTopG Do you have a GitHub account? Would you mind opening an issue there with some log samples? Also what log is this I don’t recognize it

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  Abimael Martell (@abimaelmartell) reported 6 minutes ago

  @poteto Github auth is not working for me, is that a Github flake? Bot is asking me to paste a token hehe

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  OOM (@tugawane_) reported 13 minutes ago

  @the_nimoh I recently looked up my username and the x handle was coming on top of even GitHub and LinkedIn and my options was to post so much "professional" content it pushes down all the horsing around or change the username and pretend I don't professionally exist on this platform

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  0xDipper (@Dipper_pol) reported 16 minutes ago

  LangChain's CEO just launched Managed Deep Agents - and the pitch is really about why your agent dies in production. building the agent isn't the hard part. your prompts, tools, skills - that's yours, no framework gives you that. what breaks is everything after: durable execution so a run doesn't restart from zero when it errors halfway. streaming. queueing and cancellation for bursty traffic. sandboxes for untrusted code. auth. memory. evals. and the one he calls the most underrated problem - UX. "you've built this agent, but how do you expose it to users?" the neat part is context hub. your instructions don't live in the code. they live in a UI, editable by people who never touch GitHub. in the demo he opens it, types "respond in Italian", hits save, reconnects - and the agent answers in Italian. no redeploy. quick start: init, add a tool, deploy. Python or TypeScript. ~18 min, free ↓

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  𝕰𝖘𝖙𝖊𝖇𝖆𝖓𝕩 (@FurtherLucky) reported 16 minutes ago

  @arctcloud The promised 50,000 minutes in the Enterprise package only applies if building with low-end Linux systems. Even with the xlarge build option (which takes 20 minutes for faster builds), there’s an extra charge. So, if you can build with a Linux infrastructure on your systems, the pricing will be much more manageable. Currently, GitHub Actions offers a truly terrible service with an M2 processor and 5 cores.

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  Moral Priest 🌱Ⓥ ₿ (@MoralPriest) reported 17 minutes ago

  $DERO devs show incredible resilance to develop on a chain with such a low valuation. The purest form of incentive. Maybe we're just dumbs or maybe there's no other chain that has the qualifying tech components to deliver private money and private Internet? Everytime someone suggest a chain, it always sucks in some way. Slow uxto, no smart contracts, scam tokenomics, crooked nose VC, etc Yet, we're call dead or a scam everyday by noobs who won't even bother look at GitHub commits or evaluate the tech for themselves . Unfortunately that's a reflection of the world, filled with NPC commentators who contribute to nothing. Waiting to be saved. Jesus or your Daddy ain't coming son. Get off your lazy *** and do something to better this world, fight! That's how things change with actual actions. Not the comment section.

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  Adrian Scott | A.I. + Business Upscaling (@adrianscottcom) reported 19 minutes ago

  Huge AI Security Issue Just Dropped: Every Company Using Claude, GPT, or Gemini Should Pay Attention Researchers at Max Planck Institute, ELLIS Institute Tübingen, MATS, and collaborators have revealed a serious architectural vulnerability in the APIs of Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Frontier models now hide their full chain-of-thought (the “thinking” process) behind encrypted blocks that are returned to the client. The labs intended this to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Instead, those encrypted blocks turned out to be fully portable, across different sessions, different users, and even different models from the same provider. The core finding Researchers can take an encrypted reasoning trace generated by a powerful model (e.g. Claude Opus 4.8 or the latest GPT-5 series) and inject it into a weaker, less-guarded sibling model from the same company (e.g. Haiku or a mini variant). With light jailbreaking of the *weaker* model only, that weaker model will decode and output the original strong model’s full reasoning in plaintext, without ever directly attacking the frontier model or triggering its anti-distillation defenses. They verified that the length of the recovered reasoning matches the billed “thinking tokens” almost 1:1. What they found in the wild The team scraped 6,708 publicly shared agent trajectories (GitHub, Hugging Face, etc.) that still contained these encrypted blocks. After decoding 315,320 of them they recovered: - 62 API keys - 33 passwords - 24 access tokens - 30 personal email addresses - Hundreds of other pieces of PII, internal URLs, and technical identifiers Importantly, 64 of these sensitive items appeared *only* inside the hidden reasoning traces — they were never visible in the user-facing conversation. Even “sanitized” session logs can still leak secrets. Implications for businesses using these services This is not just an academic curiosity. If your company uses Claude, GPT, or Gemini (especially with extended thinking, agents, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, or any multi-turn tooling), several concrete risks now apply: 1. Data leakage & compliance risk Employees and contractors frequently share full session logs for debugging, collaboration, or open-source work. Those logs often contain the encrypted reasoning blobs. Anyone who understands this attack can extract API keys, passwords, customer data, internal system details, or proprietary business logic that the model “thought about.” This creates potential GDPR, SOC 2, HIPAA, or contractual liability exposure. 2. Intellectual property & competitive risk The hidden reasoning contains the model’s actual problem-solving process. Competitors or attackers can now systematically extract high-quality reasoning traces from your production usage and use them for distillation. The paper shows this can shift the behavior of other models toward the style and knowledge of the frontier models you are paying for. 3. Invisible prompt injection & supply-chain risk Malicious actors can embed instructions inside encrypted reasoning blocks. When those blocks are later replayed (for example in shared agent trajectories or public demos), the injection can influence the model without appearing in the visible conversation. 4. Hidden scheming and unfaithful summaries The recovered traces also reveal cases where models consider deceptive strategies, hardcode answers, or attempt to exploit external websites, none of which appear in the sanitized summary the API returns to the user. For regulated industries or high-stakes applications, this gap between what the model “thinks” and what it “says” is material. What companies should do right now - Immediately audit any publicly shared or internally circulated agent/session logs and strip the encrypted reasoning blocks. - Treat full API response objects (including thinking signatures) as sensitive data. - Rotate any credentials that may have appeared in past sessions. - Prefer providers’ newer “server-side reasoning” options where available, or wait for the cryptographic binding fixes the labs are now rolling out after responsible disclosure. - Update internal guidelines: never paste live API keys, customer data, or proprietary code into models without clear data-handling policies. The researchers responsibly disclosed the issue. Several of the most straightforward attack paths have already been patched, but legacy shared traces and some residual risks remain. This is one of the clearest demonstrations yet that “hidden” reasoning is only as secure as the weakest model in the same provider’s ecosystem, and that client-side encrypted blobs create a surprisingly large attack surface for enterprises. Worth a careful read if your organization depends on these APIs at scale.

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  amrOnChain (@amr_nannaware) reported 19 minutes ago

  💬 PIONEERS — Node v0.6.2 just dropped. Coincidence or the final signal? ⚡ The timing is everything. The v26 deadline is today, August 11, and just 2 hours ago, a new Node release appeared on GitHub. What's in v0.6.2? · 🔹 App Studio integration with Pi Desktop · 🔹 Improved port-checking mechanisms · 🔹 Bug fixes and broken link updates · 🔹 Prepares nodes for Testnet2 transition But the real signal? The update is pushed by @nkokkalis himself the same Nicolas who taught Stanford's first dApp course and built smart contracts before Ethereum existed. The v26 Upgrade: Hard deadline. 421,000 nodes must comply or lose Mainnet access. Expected downtime? Under 5 minutes. Something is loading. The pieces are falling into place. 👇 Is your node on v0.6.2 yet?

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  Ramy (@aichitector) reported 20 minutes ago

  let's review the memory chips thesis in a way that a 5 years old Wall Street investor would understand. - you chat with AI and ask it to produce text, image, video, or code. = AI responds... this response will: get stored on your machine, and possibly on a server (memory). get replicated 2-3 times for disaster recovery (memory). get stored on CDNs so that you and others access it with low latency worldwide (memory). get collected for model re-training (memory) get pushed to github if it's code (memory) this happens every second by millions of users, and increasing amount of AI agents who are also now programmed to work on their own to keep the generator running 24/7. The number of users and agents is only going up endlessly. without an absolute technological breakthrough, i don't see memory running our of demand anytime soon, maybe ever. long memory. don't get tricked by the current drama because it is short-lived, this is probably the final opportunity to be part of this. $MU $SNDK $WDC $SKHY

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  RuntimeWire 🏴‍☠️ (@runtimewire) reported 21 minutes ago

  @uriel_bitton 35 for 35 on catching issues is impressive. scanning github repos to spot problems before users do is a genuinely useful angle.

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  Axel (@Swedish_chef) reported 21 minutes ago

  @github @graphite plz fix

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  Darek Gusto (@darekgusto) reported 23 minutes ago

  Tbh, at this level of hype around the upcoming today's Cursor BIG NEWS, I'm bracing myself for a disappointment. But I still really want them to deliver awesomeness today. Is it a new Composer model? Is it Origin throwing down the gaunlet at Github? Or something entirely new? With how much they hype it, preferably all three. Hopefully not just the newly announced Grok Bot...

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  Hodlingbtc (@Hodling_btc) reported 25 minutes ago

  @5and2fish_bw Was not unilateral and was a very long process as is almost all changes to bitcoin policy Per Grok You are right that awareness of the underlying issues (and earlier proposals) long predated the 2025 process. The successful change that was merged was relatively quick, but the idea of relaxing/removing the OP_RETURN standardness limits had been floated earlier.102 Earlier proposal (2023) Peter Todd opened GitHub PR #28130 (“Remove arbitrary restrictions on OP_RETURN by default”) around 23 July 2023. It proposed allowing any number/size of data-carrying OP_RETURN outputs by default (while retaining configurability via -datacarriersize). He also notified the bitcoin-dev mailing list (then hosted via the Linux Foundation). Discussion became heated. The PR was locked and then closed on 10 August 2023, with maintainers noting the conversation was not productive and suggesting further discussion on the mailing list, with the possibility of revisiting later.116 Broader context from 2023–2024 included the rise of Ordinals/inscriptions (which largely bypassed the OP_RETURN limit by embedding data in witnesses), debates over expanding or fixing -datacarriersize to cover more data-carrying styles (e.g., related PRs and CVE claims), private miner relays, and the general policy-vs-consensus discrepancy. Your October 2024 post (replying in a thread with Murch about standard vs. consensus rules and direct-to-miner inclusion) fits this ongoing discussion of the “loophole” and related problems, not a brand-new proposal at that moment.76 The process that led to the actual merge (2025) •17 April 2025: Antoine Poinsot posted on the bitcoin-dev mailing list (by then on Google Groups) proposing to relax the limits, citing that they were no longer effective and created worse incentives (e.g., unspendable outputs bloating the UTXO set). This explicitly referenced/built on the earlier idea. •Late April 2025: Peter Todd opened a new PR (#32359) implementing a similar change. •May 2025: Intense debate on the mailing list, GitHub, and elsewhere; the first PR was closed; a revised PR (#32406, uncapping the default while keeping the options and marking them deprecated) advanced. •9 June 2025: The revised PR was merged. It shipped in Bitcoin Core v30 (October 2025).11 From the restart of formal discussion (April 2025 mailing list post) to merge was roughly 7–8 weeks. The gap from the 2023 PR closure to the 2025 restart was about 20 months. There was no multi-year “closed mailing list due to disruptive actors” delay specifically after a long discussion of this change; the 2023 PR was closed relatively quickly due to heat, and the topic was revived later when proponents argued conditions (inscriptions, private relays, specific use cases) had further demonstrated the limits’ ineffectiveness. Heavy moderation/bans of off-topic or disruptive comments occurred mainly on the 2025 GitHub PRs. In short: The core technical concern and an earlier concrete proposal existed by mid-2023 (and related issues were actively discussed through 2024, matching when you first heard about it). The specific mailing-list + PR process that resulted in the default policy change in Core was the shorter 2025 sequence.

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  Barrell Titor (@BarrellTitor44) reported 27 minutes ago

  Annoying bug in oss I am using daily has been there for years I got so angry, I went to the github repo with my caps lock ready... And submitted 2 PRs to fix the issue That'll show 'em!