Amazon status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Amazon reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Amazon users through our website.

• Website Down (46%)
• Errors (29%)
• Sign in (25%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Amazon outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Paris	Sign in	15 hours ago
Owosso	Website Down	2 days ago
Washington	Website Down	2 days ago
Paris	Website Down	2 days ago
Reynosa	Website Down	2 days ago
Marquette	Website Down	3 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

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Amazon Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

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  Brian R. Chapman (@brchapman65) reported 8 minutes ago

  @EricLDaugh @TheJudge96 The problem is, Amazon hires contractors who sub out the work

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  franklee6924x (@franklee6924T) reported 9 minutes ago

  $NBIS — A Dangerous Model Nebius has been the best-performing stock among the Neocloud companies this year. First and foremost, this is due to its rapid revenue growth, which is supported by real AI business output. Second is the positioning Nebius has established for itself, defining the direction in which it intends to develop within the AI industry. Initially, Nebius defined itself as a “Fourth Cloud,” positioning itself against AWS, Azure, and GCP. It later adopted a positioning more aligned with the AI narrative, calling itself a “TOKEN FACTORY,” presumably modeled after NVIDIA’s AI FACTORY. Third, it secured orders from Microsoft and Meta totaling more than $40 billion. Fourth, it received investment and technical certification from NVIDIA. Fifth, it gained the substantial backing of AI investment prodigy Leopold Aschenbrenner. Sixth, it was added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. After completing its acquisition of Tavily, Nebius acquired Eigen AI, an AI infrastructure company focused on optimizing large-model inference, for approximately $640 million. Together with the integration of the Clarifai team and technology licensing, these moves collectively strengthened and built the full-stack AI technology architecture envisioned by Nebius, completing an end-to-end technology chain spanning data → search and retrieval → model training → model inference → application-layer APIs → productization. Tavily provides Nebius with structured, auditable, and controllable retrieval data flows, addressing the quality of external information access during model inference. Clarifai is responsible for packaging model capabilities into enterprise-ready APIs, serving as a connector between the application layer and the model layer. Eigen AI, at the underlying inference layer, reduces latency and costs through compiler and operator optimization, ensuring efficiency when large models are deployed at scale. Together, the three form the three major pillars of Nebius’s data ingress, model productization, and inference engine, making Token Factory a complete AI production system. Nebius defines its model as a four-layer architecture: from Bare Metal to Managed Cloud, then Managed Inference, and finally Agent Platform at the highest level—a business model that climbs upward from downstream hardware leasing toward upstream software services. Overall, this year’s market enthusiasm for Nebius has been justified to a considerable extent. The company has also been actively working toward becoming a defining company of the AI era, and it has received recognition from many Wall Street institutions. Many investors who are firmly bullish on NBIS’s future repeatedly cite the holdings of major institutions and NVIDIA’s investment as evidence. These are weak foundations, and they are also among the easiest reasons for investors to make mistakes. The most important consideration in determining whether a company is worth holding for the long term is whether its risk-reward structure is becoming increasingly robust, and whether its overall business architecture is continuously strengthening its ability to withstand risk. This is especially important in emerging industries. There are many opportunities to make money, and the key is the ability to manage risk. This is the fundamental reason why many companies in emerging industries ultimately fail. History provides countless examples, and the AI industry will be no exception. In fact, it may be even more extreme, because there has never been an industry with such a high risk-reward ratio, to the point that the temptation is so great that people are willing to take enormous risks. This problem exists throughout the entire Neocloud industry, but it is particularly severe at Nebius. I would summarize its dangers into five areas: First, its battlefield has been stretched too far, which will inevitably lead to an uneven allocation of resources and therefore affect the entire organization. Second, it has neither a reliable source of sustained positive cash flow nor a historically verifiable record of sustained success. Instead, its historical record contains more examples of failure. Third, the overall model is essentially a passive-pressure model in which commitments are made first and fulfilled later. This forces the company, during execution, to constantly juggle competing priorities and continuously allocate resources and attention toward short-term interests, moving it further and further away from its long-term objectives. Fourth, its financial structure is extremely dangerous. It is an accumulative and chain-reactive structure: it sells the future to obtain credit backing, then relies on flawless execution to continuously strengthen that credit, thereby creating a flywheel. Within this credit loop, there is no hard asset serving as the foundation. Instead, the company hopes to establish the foundation of credit through repeated cycles. Before that foundation is built, any medium-sized shock could potentially bring the entire cycle to a halt. Fifth, the excessive number of third-party partnerships significantly reduces the probability of successful execution, especially on the engineering side. Overall, NBIS was insufficiently prepared to enter this new AI industry. Although it has established ambitious objectives and corresponding mechanisms for achieving them, it remains highly passive and inexperienced across many critical areas, particularly in dealing with laws and regulations. Its overall model is extremely fragile and dangerous. A disruption in one part can affect the entire system. It is a structure in which positive feedback is difficult to establish, while negative feedback tends to reinforce itself. This is the truly dangerous aspect of Nebius. This is not a single risk, but a cumulative and compounded risk. In this article, I will try to remain as objective and neutral as possible and examine NBIS’s risks from the perspective of corporate operations and the development of emerging industries. I spent a long time preparing the research for this article, and there is a great deal of material. I have tried to condense it as much as possible and focus only on the key points. Let us examine the five issues above in greater detail. Regarding the Excessively Long Front NBIS is essentially a small-scale version of a hyperscale design. Whether it is its TOKEN FACTORY or its Fourth Cloud concept, both are modeled after hyperscale enterprises. But NVIDIA is building AI FACTORIES through a coordinated group-army approach, while Amazon’s AWS has an extremely solid foundation. Across the AI industry chain, from infrastructure to full-stack software services, NBIS has become involved in almost everything. Its production line is extremely long, and there are many areas requiring investment and attention. Although its actual operating plan places a heavy emphasis on moving toward the upper software and technology layers, and divides the business into four architectural layers, the reality is that its current revenue and future growth depend overwhelmingly on the infrastructure layer. Its software technology stack is still under construction and development and requires continuous investment. Yet NBIS itself is still a startup without a stable source of cash flow, while it is spending heavily to acquire even higher-risk startups. The money spent acquiring Eigen AI effectively bought a team of just over 20 technical personnel, at more than $30 million per person. Although people are potentially the most valuable investment, the risks are correspondingly high. The entire AI industry is evolving dynamically. Although Eigen AI is first-rate within its field, there remains enormous uncertainty as to whether it can ultimately become a truly large-scale business. This kind of acquisition is something that companies such as Meta and Google can afford to do. Even if it ultimately fails completely, it would not cause meaningful damage to them. But for NBIS, if Eigen AI fails to generate the expected value—or even performs only moderately—the impact will not be small. Because its resources are insufficient to support everything simultaneously, it will inevitably lose in competition. AI is different from industries of the past. It requires extremely heavy capital investment. To do this business well, there is no way around infrastructure. Nebius has clearly made considerable efforts, but the reality is severe. The 3 GW it has announced has already been recognized and priced into the market, but the actual execution is proving far more difficult than expected. Unlike IREN’s 5.8 GW of locked-in capacity, the majority of the capacity reported by NBIS remains uncertain in practical terms. Bringing it online will involve multiple situations that increase both costs and management attention. This is an unavoidable fact. Therefore, the original idea of attempting vertical integration on the infrastructure side has become increasingly difficult to expand in practice. In response, NBIS recently issued a partnership announcement, hoping that its software advantages could attract infrastructure owners to work with it. This move is clearly a position of weakness. Either no one will want to partner with it, or the economics of such partnerships will necessarily be poor. In such a hot and supply-constrained buyer’s market, high-quality infrastructure owners will inevitably demand substantial economic returns. NBIS’s software bargaining power is not exclusive. Competition in software is even more intense. Although this is NBIS’s strength, standing out requires continuous investment and even greater focus. It needs to build credibility through user workloads accumulated by its software products. Unfortunately, in order to obtain credibility through partnerships with hyperscalers, NBIS has sold almost all of its already extremely constrained capacity to hyperscalers in the form of low-priced bare metal, and has even overcommitted that capacity. Its software capabilities therefore cannot capture market share through products. Instead, they can only gain visibility through benchmarks and future-oriented narratives. In such an intensely competitive market, this means that NBIS is actually losing the window of opportunity to build a genuine software advantage. NBIS has effectively fallen into a decision-making dilemma created by stretching its battlefield too far. Moreover, it has already become constrained by overcommitting its own capacity in order to secure hyperscaler orders, making it difficult to concentrate either its attention or its financial resources on developing the software capabilities where it actually has an advantage. Regarding Cash Flow Although NBIS currently has substantial cash, most of that cash comes from external financing sources such as convertible bonds, NVIDIA equity investment, and customer prepayments rather than free cash flow generated by the business itself. Prepayments are essentially liabilities that must be fulfilled in the future. Once construction schedules or utilization rates deviate from expectations, the pressure will be transmitted directly to the balance sheet. Oracle provides a useful reference point here. Before its large-scale investment in AI, Oracle was a high-quality company with very stable free cash flow growth. Because it has become excessively aggressive, Oracle’s credit rating has now deteriorated significantly and it is only one step away from danger. And this is still a company with a healthy cash-generating business. NBIS, by contrast, is dealing with businesses that require continuous and massive capital investment. Bare-metal compute sales are doing reasonably well, but margins are limited. Relative to the amount of investment required, it is difficult for this business to generate positive cash flow. The key issue is that the businesses currently capable of generating cash flow are highly uncertain. NBIS does not have a stable, historically validated source of positive cash flow that is insulated from this uncertainty. Historically, it has also been an unsuccessful company. Its search and autonomous-driving businesses were eventually abandoned or marginalized for various reasons. Its history demonstrates that it is a team with very strong technical capabilities but very poor operating capabilities. This weakness is also becoming visible in its development within the AI industry. It missed the window to secure high-quality infrastructure and power reserves. It is now missing the window to use its limited power capacity to cultivate its own software workload capabilities. It used scarce GPU capacity to build today’s revenue, but it did not use that scarce GPU capacity to cultivate tomorrow’s software moat. I have never really understood why NBIS did not take advantage of such a strong rise in its stock price to establish an ATM program and balance its funding risk. Is it truly intoxicated by the narrative that it can achieve rapid growth without dilution? Regarding the Passive-Pressure Model The passive-pressure model means that the company’s required resources and conditions have not yet been fully secured, but future commitments have already been turned into contractual orders. This is a dangerous and harmful approach. Although it can bring benefits, the disadvantages are enormous by comparison. The biggest problem is that it can undermine the execution of the company’s medium- and long-term objectives. When these commitments cannot be fulfilled, the negative effects propagate through a chain reaction. For a company that has clearly identified software as an area in which it intends to become strong, it will nevertheless be forced to devote the majority of its resources to ensuring the delivery of relatively low-level bare-metal services. As a result, its future strategic options become severely constrained. That could become a major strategic mistake. For software to develop genuine competitiveness, the process must be: continuous trial and error → rapid iteration → acquiring users → collecting feedback → improving the product → expanding the user base again. Is NBIS actually following this path? Not at all. Its valuable infrastructure is currently still in question when it comes to completing the Microsoft and Meta orders. Regarding the Financial Structure The current credit NBIS has built is not based on repeated iterations of its core products. Instead, it has been established by selling its future bare-metal computing capacity in advance and through investment and partnerships from hyperscalers. This is the most deceptive aspect of the model. Many investors use this as the basis for their confidence while overlooking the company’s most important real business progress. NBIS’s financial fragility comes from using future commitments as the foundation of current credit, even though those commitments have neither been fulfilled nor independently verifiable in advance. Its collateral is not an asset that has already generated cash flow, but capacity that has yet to be built. Of the more than $40 billion in contracted revenue from Microsoft and Meta, a substantial portion corresponds to future batches at Highridge and Vineland. Their value depends on execution certainty rather than on the underlying assets themselves. Once a key site is delayed, a default will not appear as an isolated event. It will become coupled and spread throughout the financing system. SLA penalties are merely the surface-level consequence. The real shock comes from the market repricing the expected fulfillment rate of the company’s overall contracted revenue. Financing costs rise, funding channels tighten, and this further delays the availability of construction financing for other sites, creating a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop. An even bigger problem is that there is no buffer in the timeline. Its free cash flow is not expected to turn positive until 2029. Before that point, the company will remain continuously dependent on external financing. Any crack in confidence will therefore be amplified precisely during its most vulnerable period. This creates a sharp contrast with IREN’s structure. IREN builds assets first and then expands. The cost is incurred upfront and is relatively predictable. NBIS, by contrast, makes commitments first and fulfills them later. The cost is rolling and revealed afterward. Once one commitment fails, the market’s confidence valuation of the entire system can be repriced downward simultaneously rather than simply adjusting the valuation of an individual project. Regarding the Excessive Reliance on Third-Party Partnerships Every critical component has been outsourced to third parties with no long-term track record of working together. On the construction side, the Vineland project is being undertaken by DataOne, a company only separated from BSO in November 2024. Its only comparable prior experience was the acquisition and refurbishment of two existing sites in France, each around the 15 MW scale. That is not remotely the same scale or complexity as building a 300 MW+ flagship project from scratch with behind-the-meter power generation. On the energy-equipment side, NBIS is using Bloom Energy’s SOFC fuel-cell solution, replacing the originally planned gas-turbine solution midway through the process. Bloom itself has already experienced a verifiable material delay on a comparable-scale project for Oracle due to the rejection of pipeline permits. The regulatory coordination issues are even more significant. The Vineland project depends on the local planning commission, while the Highridge project depends on the approval schedules of multiple independent third parties, including PPL and PJM. Any delay at any one of these stages can directly block the overall project. The execution consequence here is not simply the addition of individual risks. It is the compounding probability of coordination failure. Look at NBIS’s infrastructure situation: A combination that has never previously worked together — a new construction contractor (DataOne) + a new technology-path supplier (Bloom) + independent regulatory bodies (NJDEP, local planning commissions) + the client itself (Nebius’s first major self-built U.S. project). This new combination must coordinate under an extremely compressed timeline. Such a “multi-party new combination” is itself an independent and unobservable source of failure probability. There is no historical data from which to estimate it. It can only reduce the overall completion probability rather than leave it unchanged. Nebius has currently established a market narrative as a full-stack technology powerhouse with strong software capabilities, and the market has given it a high valuation. In reality, however, it faces a structural problem: its contracted data-center capacity has been almost completely occupied by the enormous Microsoft and Meta orders, and there are already clear signs of “overcommitted capacity.” Given its current construction capabilities, supply-chain control, and technology reserves, simply completing these two orders on schedule is already an extreme challenge. Public data shows a huge gap between Nebius’s contracted capacity and its actual online capacity. The company has disclosed contracted power exceeding 3.5 GW, with a year-end target above 4 GW, of which more than 75% is reportedly owned capacity. But the amount of capacity that has actually been energized and is capable of generating revenue still presents a major challenge. The main projects that have entered substantive development are the Highridge campus in Pennsylvania and the Independence campus in Missouri, each at approximately 1.2 GW. Even this most “hard” 1.2 GW is highly dependent on utility infrastructure upgrades by companies such as PPL, including the construction of new substations, reconstruction of transmission lines, and expansion of 230 kV lines. These are external engineering chains that Nebius cannot fully control. Any delay in permitting, equipment delivery, or construction will directly delay energization. Yet the market has already priced 3.5–4 GW as a “certain foundation for growth.” The fulfillment pressure created by the $40 billion in orders is directly squeezing the development space for its self-defined “full-stack technology.” First, management and engineering resources are highly concentrated on physical delivery. Building several gigawatts of capacity on schedule, particularly under the technical requirements of high-density liquid cooling and the latest GPU clusters, is itself an enormous engineering challenge. Any delay will affect revenue recognition and customer relationships. Second, the penalty for execution failure is extremely high. Hyperscaler contracts typically contain strict SLAs, delay penalties, and even termination provisions. Once a breach occurs, the damage is not merely financial. It can severely damage the company’s creditworthiness and affect financing and subsequent customer relationships. Against a backdrop of highly leveraged expansion, this risk is particularly dangerous. Capital and attention are also engaged in an obvious zero-sum game. Nebius’s annual capital expenditure of roughly $20–25 billion consumes almost all available funding, while the software teams it has acquired — Tavily, Eigen AI, Clarifai, and others — themselves require continuous R&D investment, talent retention, and product integration in order to become genuinely competitive. The current survival line is whether it can deliver physical capacity on time. Software therefore naturally becomes a secondary priority. Insufficient investment and slower integration are almost inevitable. Nebius’s high-growth story is built on extreme execution pressure and external dependencies, leaving very little room for error. The lack of a stable, time-tested positive free-cash-flow business makes it particularly vulnerable to any deviation in execution pace or change in financing conditions. This means that NBIS’s current model is essentially betting on an extremely optimistic scenario: AI compute shortages remain severe for long enough; it converts contracted capacity into high-utilization revenue on schedule; the software layer rapidly develops customer stickiness and high margins; and the financing window remains open continuously. If any one of these elements is delayed or the external environment changes, the risk can jump directly from “slower growth” to a “survival issue.” Therefore, the bullish views on NBIS are not without foundation. But the reality is that the path it is actually taking is increasingly diverging from its stated plan that software should be the core of its development. The four-layer architecture it talks about is supposedly a climb toward higher valuation and higher gross margins. In actual execution, however, it is becoming increasingly trapped by the overcommitted orders it has already signed. This disconnect will become increasingly obvious.

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  Ø₳₭ ➳ (@Oaknarrow) reported 10 minutes ago

  @GlendaGalvez4 @CNviolations Oh right because an eye doctor is who you would check with for information on viral infections, not fauci the guy who specializes in it Do you also ask the amazon driver for advice on plumbing issues?

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  aly ・❥・ (@destinyndmore) reported 11 minutes ago

  understanding jude’s complexity won’t even be a problem cause amazon will decomplexify it for sure ugh

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  Dian (@Dian5) reported 17 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp We messaged yesterday about my delivery instructions NOT being followed. You referred it up the line for investigation & I received a email from someone shying he’s resolving the issue. I just received another delivery today & I can say without a doubt, that you need a plan B because lan A was a waste of time!

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  BTS🐯Polaris⁷ⓥ⟭⟬非⊙⊝⊜ (@BTSPolaris13) reported 17 minutes ago

  @stessieT I've been having a lot of problems with Amazon deliveries of late. Hopefully whoever sent it to you can track the shipment.

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  Amol Mistry (@amolmistry) reported 18 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp You guys already know it’s been recurring issue still trying acting as a new issue with new user, and starting all over again.

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  ashen (@ashen_one) reported 19 minutes ago

  REMINDER TO NEVER TRUST THESE EMAILS. THEY'RE ALL FAKE. HERE A FEW MORE SECURITY RULES TO FOLLOW: 1. Use a physical Yubikey for 2F (amazon $60) 2. If not a Yubikey, use a 2FA that is NOT attached to an Authenticator that’s "cloud synced". If your email gets hacked, so does your 2FA 3. Use an email that is not connected to ANYTHING else. Only for 2FA and email sign in, this way you know that any email that's actually from X would ONLY go to that secret email (I know this one's fake bc it went to a non secret email) 4. Change your password monthly and use suggested passwords 5. Use password storages like NordPass or 1Pass Twitter hacks are far more common than other socials bc of crypto stuff so stay vigilant bros

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  Tushar (@TusharBehe69083) reported 22 minutes ago

  Amazon SDE Intern OA Experience — 6 Months Internship --> Coding Question(40 min) i)Medium-level DSA problem (Greedy) ii) Passed all test cases ✅(15/15) -->Full-Stack / Backend Debugging(60 min) i)Node.js-based project ii)6 test cases in total ii) First 5 were pretty straightforward mainly implementing basic CRUD operations like Create/Delete, etc. iii) The 6th test case was comparatively harder than other 5(but it was easy ) . involved rate limiting + ID route changes. iv)Passed all test cases ✅(6/6) Hope this helps someone preparing for Amazon SDE Intern!

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  Pavan (@pannuz9) reported 24 minutes ago

  @amazonindia @AmazonHelp Your support team also failed to resolve the issue despite promising a callback. Please investigate the price difference and customer service experience and provide a resolution.

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  mustaeen (@wustdev) reported 25 minutes ago

  really wish issue #29 in amazon-redshift-monitoring was resolved!

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  Romy Jacob (@JacobRomy78019) reported 26 minutes ago

  "When it comes to platform economics, scale directly dictates revenue. For Amazon and Twitch, more active units mean more financial return. Hasan Piker utilizes a fully monetized infrastructure, turning high viewership and constant user engagement into steady subscription and ad revenue shares. Conversely, unmonetized alternatives like Asmongold's secondary channel generate heavy server and bandwidth costs while yielding zero platform cuts. Ultimately, active monetization proves that high engagement units directly translate to corporate profit."

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  Matchless (@nitivan) reported 29 minutes ago

  @ajassy @AmazonHelp @amazonIN 2/ Is this Code & Conduct of ur Business ? Leaving items unattended puts them at risk of being stolen or tampered with. Who is responsible if this package goes missing? Please let me know how you plan to address this issue."

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  Raj Priyanshu Barnaw (@RBarnaw) reported 30 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp @AmazonHelp Stop sending copy-pasted generic replies about "undeliverable packages." My email clearly states a "pricing error." ​If you can't honor sale prices, why list them? Holding customer money for days and unilaterally cancelling multiple orders is completely unacceptable

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  Daniel Feldman | Google Ads (@mrfeldmanSEM) reported 31 minutes ago

  Had a client already doing millions a year on Amazon who wanted to scale their Shopify store The product wasn't the problem. Demand was proven. The issue was that SEO was bringing in traffic that wasn't converting and their Google Ads was almost entirely branded spend So they were only capturing people who already knew them Nobody was finding them through non-branded search First thing I did was flip the spend allocation: 80% to non-brand, 20% to brand Then I rebuilt the product feed so Google had the data it needed to match their products to the right searches And set up campaigns focused on high-intent buyers who were in the market for what they sold but had never heard of the brand before Within a few months we were at $15-20k a month in ad spend and had added $50k in consistent monthly Shopify revenue No volatility. Same results month over month. Google just finally had a way to capture the demand that was already there

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  The Kobeissi Letter (@KobeissiLetter) reported 31 minutes ago

  Wall Street is paying less attention to the Magnificent 7: Monthly mentions of the "Magnificent Seven" across news stories on the Bloomberg terminal are down to ~1,400, near the lowest since Q4 2023. This marks a -70% decline from the Q1 2024 peak of ~4,300 mentions, which came shortly after the term was introduced in 2023. A similar pattern occurred with the "FANG" and later "FAANG" labels, originally referring to Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google before Apple was added. Monthly mentions of "FANG" and "FAANG" surged to a record ~2,800 in Q4 2018. Subsequently, they dropped -82%, to just ~500 mentions by early 2020. Investor attention has shifted away from the Mag 7.

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  Here's What I Reckon: (@angryaboutbikes) reported 33 minutes ago

  lmao that you can’t even shovel Amazon-sourced microwave frozen burritos down your gullet for less than $3 a portion. Even the bargain basement is ******* expensive these days!

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  satish sharma (@satishshar52235) reported 38 minutes ago

  Hello Amazon, I placed an order using my credit card, but the order was cancelled. However, the payment amount has already been deducted from my credit card. Please check this issue and confirm when the deducted amount will be refunded.

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  akash (@BolDiyaToDiya) reported 38 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp My issue is not yet resolved😡

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  M.E (@MontyIsblessed) reported 39 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Jack is a robot. This is a human problem. Where is my delivery Rhonda ???

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  Wandering (@Wander626) reported 42 minutes ago

  @PaulTassi Almost as if judging a performance based on a singular still image is an incredibly stupid thing to do Terrible that Amazon isn’t waiting for Ryan to heal up and finish this role

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  🔆 j i k o ⋆₊ ‧ ˚⊹ 🏜️ (@lisey_ann) reported 43 minutes ago

  amazon is down for me, can't place an order despite trying a few payment methods and have enough money on each card. sucks to suck ig

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  Vivek Bachkaiya. (@VivekBac1986) reported 44 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp There has been no returns or refunds from my end and I have explicitly stated that to the OFM team earlier, and I was told that it was an error from their side previously. So how come now they're accusing me of the same thing that they themselves have recognised as an error?

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  alco ⊢ ꙮ (@qualiascript) reported 46 minutes ago

  here's my challenge: put a malicious agent in an EC2 instance and task it to escape its containerization and gain access to internal Amazon server data i wonder, are the industry's sandboxing techniques really this lax when it actually hurts the tech company in question?

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  raf (@mourninstars) reported 50 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp @amazon my bindings are in terrible condition ms shanta

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  James DeRoest (@JamesDeroest) reported 53 minutes ago

  @spotted_model @amazon Amazon in the last year has started to get really unreliable, especially delivery times, and even things actually arriving. Even 3 weeks ago, ordered a mouse, it arrived 2 days later than expected, and then the following day another mouse arrived unexpectedly. I mean, I love having an extra mouse, but these problems must be costing them a fortune. And number of things being lost in transit. What was occasional, feels much worse now.

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  Ted D. (@Ted_D_Fate) reported 55 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Why lie about shutting down another account of mine if I never had another account ? Why not put a pin on my physical orders so they won’t get stolen ? As I requested for previously but was told that it’s reserved for high price items. 🤔

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  Lateef M Oyalola (@larteyphmumen) reported 55 minutes ago

  It was meant to be a productive year but Amazon had another plan. I planned to publish a minimum of 20 books (the type readers are unable to put down until they get to the last page). Halfway down the line, Amazon suspended my account permanently.

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  Yas (@_adhd_raj) reported 56 minutes ago

  @coolcoder56 Amazon oa question with AI built-in on hackerank: Movie DB Fix the movie notification feature. When an admin adds or launches a movie, notify every user following any of its stars. Also fix unread count so it counts only the current user's unread notifications.

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  Zakiya Tasneem (@Dev_Zoi) reported 60 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp I've already contacted your chat support, but the issue is still unresolved.