Amazon status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Amazon reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Amazon users through our website.

• Website Down (45%)
• Errors (32%)
• Sign in (24%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Amazon outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Paris	Website Down	1 day ago
Guadalajara	Errors	2 days ago
New York City	Website Down	2 days ago
Pozza di Fassa	Website Down	2 days ago
Bristol	Website Down	2 days ago
Paris	Website Down	2 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Amazon Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Velora.tv (@VeloraTV) reported 4 minutes ago

  @MommyCeres @HellRiserShuVT I believe Amazon was already doing more with people's data across both Amazon and Twitch before this became a toggle. I thought it was wrong then. I think it's wrong now. I'll think it's wrong next week, next year, next decade. For one, "opt out" ...the fact they cheekily thought they could slip that in where people were "in" by default ....the level of insanity behind that floors me... and if someone wants to "opt out" of something, they should be fully "out" of it, not partially out... fully out. They're marking their own death sentence....and because the money's there, it's going to be a long, slow, painful death. -CL

• 
  🌻🖤 (@DropsOfEmerald) reported 6 minutes ago

  @Guy_026 @SaltyGirl09 If you think that uber and amazon are the resolve to the struggles of being a new mother with the physical hormonal and life changes and stressors.. then you are a vast part of the problem. Women are only expected to do it all because men dictated long ago that that was the norm

• 
  Kyle Lamb (@kylamb8) reported 8 minutes ago

  @Gus7143 @ChristinaPushaw Well I appreciate the sentiment of working with domestic manufacturers but the problem is most of the tech giants that are U.S. companies are still operating in and with China. Companies like Microsoft, Apple, Google, Amazon, Equinix, Nvidia, Oracle, Meta, Digital Realty, etc.

• 
  ✨ Go Go Guillotines ✨ (@GoGoGuillotines) reported 12 minutes ago

  @timothy_sch @JoeStrick1 @ReubenR80027912 Having an amazon warehouse is not the same as having a data center closer to your home. One would take literal days of delivery otherwise while a server being based a bit further away is millisecond response difference.

• 
  Michael Mistretta (@xerofly) reported 15 minutes ago

  @Revelation1217 I can’t help but wonder if she did this for online clout. On Amazon, you decide exactly where the drone drops it. It’s precise down to the inch.

• 
  Pemberley (@collected_mind) reported 15 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Thank you for your help, but I no longer have any confidence that this is going to be addressed. There are many reviews, complaining of the exact same problem.

• 
  W William Woods (@wwwoods) reported 18 minutes ago

  Contrasting the Global Financial Crisis with the Frauds/Failures described in my new Amazon Bestseller book "Famous Frauds and Financial Failures" Immediately following Lehman’s collapse, global markets tanked, with the Dow Jones dropping over 500 points on September 15 (its worst day since 9/11), a US$10 trillion market value loss. The collapse triggered a debate as to whether some financial institutions (especially banks) should be protected as “too big to fail.” In the prologue to the 2013 reissue of his memoir On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System, Hank Paulson, the former U.S. Treasury Secretary (during the GFC), wrote: "...“Too big to fail” is a misnomer in any case. Complexity and interconnectedness matter as much as size in assessing risk in banking. No bank should be too big or too complex to fail, but almost any bank is too big to liquidate quickly, particularly in the midst of a crisis." Since 2009, Paulson has argued that he bailed out firms not because they were too big to fail, but because their failure would have caused unacceptable damage to the broader economy. Size alone wasn’t the issue; it was the interconnectedness and complexity that made the fallout so severe. The events of 2008 showed that orderly resolution is possible in theory; however, in practice, when markets are frozen and confidence is shattered, liquidation can trigger contagion. Lehman Brothers’ collapse proved that point: its size wasn’t the problem; its web of derivatives and funding dependencies turned a bankruptcy into a heart attack for the financial system. So, the real issue isn’t that any one institution is too big to fail, but that it may be too big or too interconnected to liquidate quickly. In his memoir, Paulson argues: “Larger amounts of higher-quality capital and larger liquidity cushions are the best defences against failures, and liquidity is even more important than capital.” Mark Twain, in his novel The Gilded Age: A Tale of To-Day, famously said that history never repeats itself, but, like a kaleidoscope, the present often seems to be constructed out of the broken fragments of the past. In the same way, every financial market crisis is different, but financial crises often have the same proximate causes. As I write (Aug 2026), there are parallels developing between the tremors that emerged in U.S. subprime mortgages in 2007, which led to the 2008 collapses, and the liquidity concerns now surfacing in private credit markets. Readers may see, in the factoring of receivables that led to the bankruptcies of U.S. auto-parts supplier First Brands and car dealership Tricolor in the fall of 2025, strong parallels with the failure of Petters (see Chapter 7 of my book, where those stories are explored). First Brands’ failure prompted Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, to famously warn during the bank’s Q3 2025 earnings conference call with analysts on October 14, 2025: “When you see one cockroach, there are probably more ... [E]veryone should be forewarned on this.” These defaults and reports of other bad loans have investors spooked about potential losses. As this concern spreads, retail investors are voting with their feet and rushing the exit doors. Investment fund managers both large and small are now limiting quarterly redemptions from their private debt funds as redemption requests from retail investors surge—just as Bear Stearns had to block redemptions from their subprime funds back in 2007. Private credit managers are currently being forced to restrict investor withdrawals, in part in order to avoid triggering a fire sale of their fund’s illiquid loan assets to meet the cash demands. Fire sales are disastrous for hedge funds and investors (see Archegos, Chapter 4). The mounting stress in private credit funds is caused by a liquidity mismatch— between how quickly their loans mature and how quickly investors now want their money back—and the fact that many of these funds lack a sufficient liquidity cushion. Between loans maturing, asset sales, bank credit lines, and other sources of liquidity (such as emergency injections of capital by the manager itself), these private credit funds simply don’t have sufficient liquidity to meet the skyrocketing level of redemptions. Although these semi-liquid private funds can limit how much gets redeemed each quarter, making dramatic collapses unlikely, the levels of withdrawals could stay elevated in the coming quarters and potentially spill over into public markets. As we show in the book, the lack of a sufficient liquidity cushion, which is what sank Lehman, is often at the root of a financial failure—whether it’s a very large, listed company (Enron—Chapter 2), a big crypto exchange (FTX—Chapter 3), or a hedge fund (Amaranth—Chapter 5, LTCM—Chapter 6, and Platinum—Chapter 8). If another financial crisis is developing now, we can expect to see new Ponzi schemes and frauds exposed and new financial failures emerge. One difference between the 2007–9 global financial crisis and the financial failures described in the book: the GFC produced almost no criminal convictions of top executives at major Wall Street banks or systemically important institutions, despite the trillions in losses, the bailouts, and the widespread harm caused. By contrast, more clear-cut individual cases of fraud, like Enron, Bernie Madoff’s and Tom Petters’ Ponzi schemes, the collapse of FTX, and the hedge fund failures I describe, often led to high-profile prosecutions, convictions, and lengthy prison sentences for the key figures. Perhaps this is the result of a “too big to jail” policy choice by the U.S. Department of Justice. Federal prosecutors often weigh “collateral consequences,” such as considering whether prosecuting a giant bank would cause job losses, market instability, and economic damage. After the GFC, this may have led them to favor deferred prosecution agreements and large civil settlements over criminal trials. Stories like Madoff, Enron, and FTX involve blatant, provable fraud: falsified records, direct theft, or lies told to investors about where the money was. Prosecutors could show mens rea (criminal intent) beyond a reasonable doubt with emails, recordings, and whistleblower evidence. The GFC, on the other hand, was driven by complex, often legal (or deregulated) practices: subprime lending, mortgage securitization into CDOs, credit default swaps, and rating agency failures. Much of it was reckless risk-taking or “control fraud” enabled by weak oversight. Proving that a top executive knew that specific securities were fraudulent and intended to deceive would have been extremely difficult in those complex cases. The GFC was a system-wide failure, and that made proving individual criminal liability much harder to establish than in clear Ponzi schemes or accounting scandals. The U.S. prioritized systemic stability over personal accountability, which meant there were very different enforcement outcomes from the GFC than from the top ten famous frauds and financial failures I write about in my book. BUY THE BOOK AND CHECK OUT THE WEBSITE BONUS MATERIALS at williamwoods dot com/FFandFF

• 
  Rajat Toshniwal (@rajattrt) reported 20 minutes ago

  @amazonIN @amazon Gift cards added through the app aren’t showing up as credits in the Amazon Pay transaction history. Is this a known issue, or am I missing something?

• 
  anil kumar singh (@anilsingh888) reported 21 minutes ago

  Terrible experience with @amazonIN. Ordered a geyser on 17th Aug. Spent 2 days "out for delivery" before customer care admitted it was damaged in transit. Refund was initiated on 21st Aug, but the issue date keeps getting postponed (first 22nd, now 23rd) @AmazonHelp @JeffBezos

• 
  e/acctruscan (@satelles_rasnea) reported 22 minutes ago

  >order shoes from amazon >ok but last 6months before one desoles >keep wearing and exploring alternatives >reorder the exact same pair >comes in size 8 >but i just reordered the same broken pair >cancel membership >nuke india >murder bezos

• 
  DAD.PRG - making BombBloke (@dad_prg) reported 23 minutes ago

  Right, I’m done with Vega. I have absolutely no idea what Amazon are doing putting it on their newer Fire Sticks but the developer experience is absolute garbage. I am absolutely not going to bother porting KoalaPaw to it. I wanted to. I tried. I have it mostly working. But getting the UX to anything better than ******* terrible is a whole level of ballache I don’t want to get involved with.

• 
  W William Woods (@wwwoods) reported 24 minutes ago

  Contrasting the Global Financial Crisis with the Frauds/Failures described in my new Amazon Bestseller book "Famous Frauds and Financial Failures" Immediately following Lehman’s collapse, global markets tanked, with the Dow Jones dropping over 500 points on September 15 (its worst day since 9/11), a US$10 trillion market value loss. The collapse triggered a debate as to whether some financial institutions (especially banks) should be protected as “too big to fail.” In the prologue to the 2013 reissue of his memoir On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System, Hank Paulson, the former U.S. Treasury Secretary (during the GFC), wrote: "...“Too big to fail” is a misnomer in any case. Complexity and interconnectedness matter as much as size in assessing risk in banking. No bank should be too big or too complex to fail, but almost any bank is too big to liquidate quickly, particularly in the midst of a crisis." Since 2009, Paulson has argued that he bailed out firms not because they were too big to fail, but because their failure would have caused unacceptable damage to the broader economy. Size alone wasn’t the issue; it was the interconnectedness and complexity that made the fallout so severe. The events of 2008 showed that orderly resolution is possible in theory; however, in practice, when markets are frozen and confidence is shattered, liquidation can trigger contagion. Lehman Brothers’ collapse proved that point: its size wasn’t the problem; its web of derivatives and funding dependencies turned a bankruptcy into a heart attack for the financial system. So, the real issue isn’t that any one institution is too big to fail, but that it may be too big or too interconnected to liquidate quickly. In his memoir, Paulson argues: “Larger amounts of higher-quality capital and larger liquidity cushions are the best defences against failures, and liquidity is even more important than capital.” Mark Twain, in his novel The Gilded Age: A Tale of To-Day, famously said that history never repeats itself, but, like a kaleidoscope, the present often seems to be constructed out of the broken fragments of the past. In the same way, every financial market crisis is different, but financial crises often have the same proximate causes. As I write (Aug 2026), there are parallels developing between the tremors that emerged in U.S. subprime mortgages in 2007, which led to the 2008 collapses, and the liquidity concerns now surfacing in private credit markets. Readers may see, in the factoring of receivables that led to the bankruptcies of U.S. auto-parts supplier First Brands and car dealership Tricolor in the fall of 2025, strong parallels with the failure of Petters (see Chapter 7, where those stories are explored). First Brands’ failure prompted Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, to famously warn during the bank’s Q3 2025 earnings conference call with analysts on October 14, 2025: “When you see one cockroach, there are probably more ... [E]veryone should be forewarned on this.” These defaults and reports of other bad loans have investors spooked about potential losses. As this concern spreads, retail investors are voting with their feet and rushing the exit doors. Investment fund managers both large and small are now limiting quarterly redemptions from their private debt funds as redemption requests from retail investors surge—just as Bear Stearns had to block redemptions from their subprime funds back in 2007. Private credit managers are currently being forced to restrict investor withdrawals, in part in order to avoid triggering a fire sale of their fund’s illiquid loan assets to meet the cash demands. Fire sales are disastrous for hedge funds and investors (see Archegos, Chapter 4 in my book). The mounting stress in private credit funds is caused by a liquidity mismatch— between how quickly their loans mature and how quickly investors now want their money back—and the fact that many of these funds lack a sufficient liquidity cushion. Between loans maturing, asset sales, bank credit lines, and other sources of liquidity (such as emergency injections of capital by the manager itself), these private credit funds simply don’t have sufficient liquidity to meet the skyrocketing level of redemptions. Although these semi-liquid private funds can limit how much gets redeemed each quarter, making dramatic collapses unlikely, the levels of withdrawals could stay elevated in the coming quarters and potentially spill over into public markets. As we show in the book, the lack of a sufficient liquidity cushion, which is what sank Lehman, is often at the root of a financial failure—whether it’s a very large, listed company (Enron—Chapter 2), a big crypto exchange (FTX—Chapter 3), or a hedge fund (Amaranth—Chapter 5, LTCM—Chapter 6, and Platinum—Chapter 8). If another financial crisis is developing now, we can expect to see new Ponzi schemes and frauds exposed and new financial failures emerge. One difference between the 2007–9 global financial crisis and the financial failures described in the book: the GFC produced almost no criminal convictions of top executives at major Wall Street banks or systemically important institutions, despite the trillions in losses, the bailouts, and the widespread harm caused. By contrast, more clear-cut individual cases of fraud, like Enron, Bernie Madoff’s and Tom Petters’ Ponzi schemes, the collapse of FTX, and the hedge fund failures I describe, often led to high-profile prosecutions, convictions, and lengthy prison sentences for the key figures. Perhaps this is the result of a “too big to jail” policy choice by the U.S. Department of Justice. Federal prosecutors often weigh “collateral consequences,” such as considering whether prosecuting a giant bank would cause job losses, market instability, and economic damage. After the GFC, this may have led them to favor deferred prosecution agreements and large civil settlements over criminal trials. Stories like Madoff, Enron, and FTX involve blatant, provable fraud: falsified records, direct theft, or lies told to investors about where the money was. Prosecutors could show mens rea (criminal intent) beyond a reasonable doubt with emails, recordings, and whistleblower evidence. The GFC, on the other hand, was driven by complex, often legal (or deregulated) practices: subprime lending, mortgage securitization into CDOs, credit default swaps, and rating agency failures. Much of it was reckless risk-taking or “control fraud” enabled by weak oversight. Proving that a top executive knew that specific securities were fraudulent and intended to deceive would have been extremely difficult in those complex cases. The GFC was a system-wide failure, and that made proving individual criminal liability much harder to establish than in clear Ponzi schemes or accounting scandals. The U.S. prioritized systemic stability over personal accountability, which meant there were very different enforcement outcomes from the GFC than from the top ten famous frauds and financial failures I write about in my book. BUY THE BOOK AND CHECK OUT THE WEBSITE BONUS MATERIALS at williamwoods dot com/FFandFF

• 
  pan76 (@PennyPerce84895) reported 27 minutes ago

  @JackDaniels0314 Prices have gone way down in the past year. Off costs six dollars on Amazon.

• 
  Amazon Help (@AmazonHelp) reported 29 minutes ago

  @PunithGowd53668 Since you are unable to submit the details, we ask that you try after some time by copying the link and pasting it on the web browser/mobile browser, which redirects to the Amazon application; please sign in, fill in the details, and submit it. -Ruthika

• 
  DCarbo (@dajc) reported 31 minutes ago

  @iamcanadian51 Lmao don’t forget they are at Walmart shopping and on the computer buying Amazon product , you just can’t fix stupid

• 
  Makelegs (@Makelegs) reported 32 minutes ago

  @CharlesFLehman We have reached the "feel free to loot and destroy Minneapolis, Portland, Seattle, LA, and NYC, or burn down Amazon warehouses and AI data centers, but how dare you cut down tyrannical surveillance equipment that nobody voted for but everyone paid for" portion of Western societal collapse.

• 
  LVIS (@goose_farming) reported 34 minutes ago

  Welcome to history class: the $AAOI curse — 10 years surviving for a second chance To understand $AAOI’s bad reputation, you have to go back to 2017. Q2 2017: Revenue: $117M Gross margin: ~45% Net income: $29M AAOI manufactured its own InP lasers, was vertically integrated and sold almost everything it could produce. The stock went from below $10 to above $100. Then the curse began. Amazon, Facebook and Microsoft represented ~78% of revenue. Amazon alone had previously been more than half the business. Amazon didn’t stop building AWS. It changed its network architecture, requiring fewer transceivers than AAOI expected. Cloud kept growing. What collapsed was optical content per unit of infrastructure. Amazon went from 35% of AAOI revenue in 2017 to 12% in 2018, after AAOI had already built capacity around much higher forecasts. Vendor-owned inventory made it worse. When consumption slowed, inventory piled up. Revenue collapsed: Q2 2017: $117M Q3: $89M Q4: $80M Q1 2018: $65M Management expected 100G to rescue the business. Then another hit: a reliability issue in certain 25G lasers caused a major customer to slow product acceptance. Competition increased. ASPs fell. Factory utilization collapsed. 2017: Revenue: $382M GM: 43.5% Net income: +$74M 2019: Revenue: $191M GM: 24.2% Net loss: -$66M The easy conclusion became: “Bad management.” I think that is too simplistic. They made mistakes. Customer concentration was extreme and capacity planning relied too heavily on customer forecasts. But they also suffered an extraordinary sequence of bad luck: Architecture change. Inventory correction. Quality issue. ASP collapse. Delayed technology cycle. Trade-war disruption. Yet they didn’t quit. For years they kept investing in what they believed gave AAOI an edge: InP laser manufacturing + vertical integration. For a long time, that looked like stubbornness. Today it may look like foresight. Because 2026 is different. In 2017, optics benefited from cloud growth. Today, optical bandwidth is becoming a physical bottleneck for scaling AI. More GPUs → more communication. Larger clusters → more bandwidth. 400G → 800G → 1.6T → 3.2T. And AAOI is no longer betting on one architecture. It is scaling: 800G 1.6T InP lasers ELSFP CPO / external laser sources If CPO replaces some pluggables, AAOI wants to supply one component it still cannot avoid: the laser source. The scale is completely different. AAOI plans to move from roughly 200k transceivers/month today to: 650k by YE2026 930k by YE2027. Its mid-2027 targets imply roughly $471M/month of datacenter transceiver revenue — more than $5.6B annualized. AAOI generated only $382M in all of 2017. It is also increasing InP laser capacity by roughly 350%. The same vertical integration that nearly buried AAOI after 2017 could become one of the industry’s most valuable assets if InP and laser capacity remain the bottleneck. That is why I don’t fully buy the idea that management simply destroyed shareholder value. The dilution deserves criticism. But they also spent a decade surviving a brutal optical cycle without abandoning the technology that has suddenly become critical again. If the shortage ends in 2028, today’s capacity build could become another 2017. If the optical bottleneck lasts through 2030, it could transform AAOI. 2017 again, or the reward for 10 years of perseverance? My valuation framework: Normalization 2028-29: $250-300 $6-7B revenue, ~25% EBIT. Extended bottleneck: $450-550 ~$8B revenue, ~27% EBIT. Severe bottleneck through 2030: $700-1,000 $10-12B revenue, ~30% EBIT. Blow-off top: $1,200+ $13-14B revenue, >30% EBIT and ~30x EBIT. That last scenario is roughly a 10x from here. If it happens, I doubt the stock peaks with 2030 earnings. More likely: H2 2029–H1 2030, when the market is pricing 2031 and nobody believes the optical cycle can turn again. Management already knows how that movie ends. Will this time be different?

• 
  Jungle for Hire ✨️ Everybody's Smite GF✨️ (@CL0V3RC0D3D) reported 35 minutes ago

  Everything I'm searching up says to swipe it down or press "x" and THERE IS LITERALLY NO X TO CLOSE THE AI, and swiping down doesn't close it either. They're really shoving it down our throats, I don't like using Amazon outside of necessities but holy this might be the last straw

• 
  ライオン Lion (@LionBlogosphere) reported 35 minutes ago

  The top 10 companies that crashed in 2000: Cisco, Microsoft, Intel, Lucent, JDS Uniphase, WorldCom, AOL Time Warner. While the internet and computers did become really big, the market was wrong about every one of these companies except Microsoft, and there was plenty of opportunity to buy it after the crash at a much lower price. (Intel and Cisco are still around as major companies too, but they were extremely overpriced then compared to what they are worth now. Terrible investments even if you had a very long time horizon.) Amazon was considered a minor company (and it crashed big time), Apple was considered a minor has-been company (and it crashed big time), Google wasn't a public company yet, and Facebook didn't even exist. So the point of this is to not believe the market hype about which companies are going to benefit in the long run from AI.

• 
  Josh - San Diego GC☀️🌴🏠 (@JoshInEncinitas) reported 37 minutes ago

  @BowTiedBroke This is becoming a huge issue for car parts and filters. Guys are asking why reputable shops are selling filters for 4X Amazon. 🙄

• 
  Paul Mcmillin (@paulmcmillin5) reported 37 minutes ago

  @Pierre13MLIFR And good luck trying to get most eastern titles in English or counting to be sold here in the US bc they want the narrative that disc sells are down. When in truth the games are indies on digital only and Asian that must be ordered outside even from Amazon or Walmart goes thatway

• 
  Top Stock Alerts (@TopStockAlerts1) reported 39 minutes ago

  Veteran bond investor Scott Colbert is reducing corporate-credit risk as tight spreads leave investors with little compensation for taking on additional risk. Colbert, Commerce Bank’s fixed-income chief, has cut corporate bonds to their lowest allocation since 2012 while increasing Treasuries, government agency debt, mortgage-backed securities and cash. Investment-grade bonds from AT&T, JPMorgan and Amazon now offer only about 0.8 percentage points over Treasuries, near multi-decade lows. Colbert estimates that a spread widening of roughly 12 basis points could erase a full year of extra income from corporate debt. Corporate bonds accounted for 39% of his portfolio at the end of June, down from about 53% in 2021, while Treasuries and cash rose to 23% and mortgage-backed securities to 27%. The shift lifted the portfolio’s average credit rating from A+ to a record AA-. Colbert says the move is not a recession bet but a risk-management strategy. $T $JPM $AMZN

• 
  Steve McIlroy Music ♪ (@smcilroymusic) reported 42 minutes ago

  Hey @amazon, **** you and you incompetent employees. Your apologies mean nothing. Your promises were broken and mean nothing. I cannot feed my cats apologies and broken promises. They are hungry. You stole my money. You are the WORST company EVER.

• 
  Jayanth Suresh (@jayanth9599) reported 43 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Bro when my order dispatched I want to know , I will make arrangements at the time of delivery open box UNDERSTAND MY PROBLEM.

• 
  Susumu Kodai (@jmo22966085) reported 48 minutes ago

  BTI injection gnat DESTROYER! Aquabac 2000g Tea bags, very large tea bags I get a 40 pound bag of it, I’ve been working on for the past year and a half, i still have a 5 gallon bucket left which is about half of it. For around $114 from a US forestry company out of Boulder they use it for mosquito control( amazon) it’s been steeping about an hour and minutes away from being auto fed. The Plant Guy Colorado grow “vessel” needs to be blueprinted at this point. I’m going to show you some amazing things, it’s been a dream of mine to get my grow to be at this point I’ve done nothing but think about how to improve it for 25 years, and I’ve struggled pretty hard at times, but I kept my head down and in it and the vessel is THERE.

• 
  Sourav Saha (@talktosaha) reported 50 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Your support team is already aware of this issue. I am looking for tour grievance redressal dept. so that the issue can be escalated further

• 
  tidux (@skibidiblazor) reported 51 minutes ago

  Keep in mind that this is at least half (Google+Microsoft) an Indian CEO problem, and that SamA and Dario are infamous freaks even by techie standards. Amazon and SpaceXAI don't have these troubles with construction.

• 
  Modernus Cicero (@_22over7ish_) reported 57 minutes ago

  BofA has gone to ****. I'v'e had accounts at the same branch since 1972. My piggy bank went to my savings there. Last year I went to the branch, there were no tellers, hardly anybody. A person on a phone at a desk, another in a fishtank office came out to tell me to use the app. I said no, you do it handed him my phone. It took him 5 minutes of digging through the app to fix the problem, would have taken me all day. Been wanting to pull the cord for a while now. Yesterday was the last straw. I was trying to buy computer equipment, a few thousands of dollars, much less than $10k, plenty in the account. Denied. Tried again, three times. Tried a different card. Denied. Applied for Amazon credit. My score is near perfect. Denied. Crap, I need this for my business and they really really really hate the idea of me building an offline AI supercomputer. 2x DGX Sparks. X money to the rescue HAHA! I Xfered enough to cover the expense in about two seconds, then made a virtual throw away card, used that. Bada-boom bada-bing. Done. ********.

• 
  BuuBooHearts (@BuuBooHearts) reported 1 hour ago

  Y’all wouldn’t need Amazon if you moved down to the south Walmart basically replaces it 💀

• 
  Darren Sheath (@darren_sheath68) reported 1 hour ago

  Why is it that every time you order something on line whether is from #Amazon or #BandQ there are always problems and you feel ripped off.