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Amazon status: access issues and outage reports

Problems detected

Users are reporting problems related to: website down, errors and sign in.

Full Outage Map

Amazon (Amazon.com) is the world’s largest online retailer and a prominent cloud services provider. Originally a book seller but has expanded to sell a wide variety of consumer goods and digital media as well as its own electronic devices.

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Amazon reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

June 10: Problems at Amazon

Amazon is having issues since 05:00 PM AEST. Are you also affected? Leave a message in the comments section!

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Amazon users through our website.

  • 45% Website Down (45%)
  • 29% Errors (29%)
  • 25% Sign in (25%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Amazon outage reports came from the following cities:

CityProblem TypeReport Time
Paris Errors 1 hour ago
Paris Errors 2 hours ago
Wien Stadt Errors 4 hours ago
Gretz-Armainvilliers Errors 7 hours ago
Marquette Website Down 11 hours ago
Doncaster Website Down 12 hours ago
Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Amazon Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

  • TstreeT_Contro
    TstreeT Controversy (@TstreeT_Contro) reported

    The wall his been torn down regarding broadcasters being used as the scapegoat on why certain fights can happen. They are ALL under the same umbrella even PBC unofficially or at least until their Amazon partnership ends. Interested in how fighters are going make excuses on why they can't fight each-other now but they will find a way. **** happening right now with Haney, Shakur, and Keyshawn...just tweet tweet tweet

  • Cecilia_Flip
    Cecilia Flip (@Cecilia_Flip) reported

    @GavinSweeneyy I know bqool doesn't understand Amazon promotion in general, so the repricer will outright ignore promotional prices exacerbating its price tanking issue.

  • xleaps
    Eric Xu (e/Mettā) (@xleaps) reported

    A formal co-worker of mine who once worked at Amazon told me that they had to solve similar problems when Alexa ads was on Super Bowl. It's a classic case we have to tell apart human and machines -- inverse CAPTCHA. BTW my quick get-rich idea for you all. 1. Publish a book and price it at $1,000; call it "How to Get Rich using AI" 2. Get on a national TV 3. Say "Siri, Alexa, Google, buy the book"How to Get Rich using AI"

  • Spectralegato
    Javier Uribe (@Spectralegato) reported

    @Wario64 Amazon took the page down 😬

  • IamAbhijit
    Abhijit Jagtap (@IamAbhijit) reported

    @AmazonHelp I understand the policy. My concern is simply that a product showing visible damage within one month of normal use deserves better consideration as a quality issue.

  • Panchampagadam
    Mukkanna (@Panchampagadam) reported

    @AmazonHelp @amazonIN Thanks, but that is of little help. Bots are not the solution all the time. My issue is beyond a Bot's comprehension. Can you send me a DM so that I can share my contact number?

  • SUCCESSMAPPERS
    Pietro Mappers (of Success Mappers) (@SUCCESSMAPPERS) reported

    Amazon SEO is a multi-stage funnel. If you have no impressions, you have an indexing or bidding problem. If you have impressions but no clicks, the problem is your main image or price, NOT the listing body. Fix the exact leak.

  • realKunalAShah
    Kunal Shah 🗽 (@realKunalAShah) reported

    @bobspaysubstack @noyesclt A few things. Merchants will first create a portal through which they pass the discounts if you use a particular channel first, and they if Walmart/ Amazon and other merchants are clever and partner up with alternative wallet solutions like stablecoin services etc- they will force both behaviour change and Visa/ MA To me - while caps the damage to V/MA in the short run- is a long run problem for them

  • Cybr_Pvnk
    Cybr Pvnk (@Cybr_Pvnk) reported

    @AmazonHelp my routines are not working! Every time I say the prompt that used to activate the routine, the idiotic new model thinks I'm talking to it and responds to me without running the routines. Seriously wtf!!!!

  • j_smith27008
    J Smith (@j_smith27008) reported

    @Popstonox @AOC Commies of a feather flock together! AOC you’re a JOB KILLER. You stopped 50,000 poor people from getting a hand up when you chased away AMAZON! You want to keep your constituents down and stupid!

  • zerohedge
    zerohedge (@zerohedge) reported

    Premarket movers Nvidia falls 2.4%, leading decliners among Magnificent Seven stocks, with technology and semiconductor firms set to extend losses (Apple -0.1%, Amazon -0.6%, Meta -0.9%, Alphabet -1.3%, Microsoft -1.5%, Tesla -1.7%) Casey’s General Stores Inc. (CASY) is up 2% after the convenience store chain reported revenue for the fourth quarter that beat the average analyst estimate. Chewy (CHWY) climbs 7% after the pet food posted first quarter results. Cracker Barrel (CBRL) jumps 9% after the restaurant chain boosted its revenue guidance for the full year, beating the average analyst estimate. Devon Energy (DVN) rises about 1% after the oil and gas producer boosted its production forecast for the full year and said it was undergoing a portfolio review to concentrate assets in the Permian Basin. Dianthus Therapeutics (DNTH) slumps 19% after peer developer Sanofi halted a late-stage trial of an experimental therapy for a rare autoimmune disorder, citing efficacy concerns. Hinge Health (HNGE) climbs 3% after the digital health-care company raised its revenue forecast for the full year. Old Dominion (ODFL) slumps 7%, falling with other less-than-truckload stocks, after Amazon expanded its LTL freight offering to all destinations in the US, including third-party warehouses, distribution centers and retail partners. Super Micro Computer (SMCI) falls 11% after the company said it plans $7 billion in equity and equity-linked financing transactions to fund component purchases to satisfy around $39b in AI server orders it has received from customers.

  • JuanRzc
    Juan Guillermo Ruiz (@JuanRzc) reported

    @AmazonHelp I can't sign up to Prime. I get the error "There was a problem validating your payment method". I have tried different cards. Thank you

  • michaelroston
    Michael Roston (@michaelroston) reported

    Bought something on Amazon and it arrived in an unnecessarily large Walmart box. Have I discovered a glitch in the retail logistics matrix?

  • someguy283
    EM (@someguy283) reported

    @AmazonHelp I've already set up a return. This has happened to me almost a dozen times already and you've never solved the core issue. Stop selling returns as new. This thing was clearly something that should have been caught.

  • rockgod1970
    Dave (@rockgod1970) reported

    @AmazonHelp @amazonmusic Getting the same error message.

  • NKAgraw42297659
    N K Agrawal (@NKAgraw42297659) reported

    @AmazonHelp Again, tried this link also, but nothing happened, really frustrate me rather helping. My life's biggest mistake that I hope with Amazon for help on issues

  • StKevinReloaded
    SaintKevin 🇺🇲 (@StKevinReloaded) reported

    @therawcomic @NoDMsPerfavore They could never position themselves as being the moral authority in this country. They traffic children with with the efficiency of a goddamn Amazon fulfillment center. Instead of dealing with their perverted issues, they rather point the finger at “ the blacks”. Typical.

  • UserStoic69
    Naman (@UserStoic69) reported

    @AmazonHelp Not working

  • us_stock_in_fo
    DevBanks (@us_stock_in_fo) reported

    There's probably a cleaner way to think about the AI trade than just buying the names building the models. Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet, Oracle. These five are projected to spend around $660~$725B in AI capex in 2026. A lot of that gap between capex and cash flow is getting plugged with bonds. In 2025 alone, these names issued around $121B in new debt. Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan think the sector may need around $1.5 trillion in new debt over the next few years. Only about 39% of companies surveyed by McKinsey say they can actually feel AI's impact on their bottom line. Amazon's FCF is likely going negative from this spend. Barclays thinks Meta's FCF could drop close to 90%. Microsoft is down roughly 17% YTD, worst in the group. They're spending because they feel like they can't afford to stop. That's probably not the same thing as a good investment thesis. Oracle reports Q4 FY2026 earnings. RPO sitting at $553B as of Q3, up 325% YoY. Cloud revenue guided at +46% to +50% for Q4. But the debt picture is worth knowing before getting excited. Total debt reportedly over $108B. Debt to equity around 500%. FY2026 capex guided at $50B, pushing free cash flow negative. CDS spreads reportedly widened above 125bps at one point, levels not seen since 2009. Over 50% of that backlog is reportedly tied to a single customer. If that relationship softens, the whole math changes. How is Oracle financing this? Borrowing heavily against a backlog that hasn't fully converted yet. At what point does the market stop giving credit for future revenue that hasn't shown up in the numbers? That question connects to something worth noting. Earlier this year Blue Owl blocked redemptions on two funds after investors tried to pull $5.4B in a single quarter. One fund saw requests hit 40.7% of assets. Blue Owl stock is down over 40% YTD. Around $265B in market cap reportedly evaporated from private credit and PE managers since late 2025. A lot of AI infrastructure buildout runs through private credit channels. When money pulls out of those vehicles, the funding pipeline tightens. Oracle's $108B debt load sits inside the same ecosystem. So where does the money land more cleanly? $AVGO reported June 3. - Q2 FY2026 AI revenue: $10.8B, +143% YoY - Q3 guidance: $16B AI revenue, +200%+ YoY - Q3 total revenue guidance: $29.4B, +84% YoY - FY2026 AI revenue target: $56B. FY2027: $100B+ The $16B Q3 AI guide came in about $1.2B below street expectations. SOX fell 10.3% on June 5, worst day since March 2020. $MRVL - FY2026 revenue: $8.195B, +42% YoY (record) - NVIDIA invested $2B, NVLink Fusion partnership March 2026 - Working on Amazon Trainium and Microsoft Maia chip designs Together with AVGO, probably owns around 95% of the custom AI ASIC co-design space. $MU - Q2 2026 revenue: $23.9B, a record - Directly tied to HBM demand - AI memory demand is probably just getting started SK Hynix ADR, targeting H2 2026 NYSE listing. - Confidential SEC F-1 filed March 24, 2026 - Looking to raise between $9.6B and $14B, no dilution - Stock up roughly 60% YTD in Seoul - Memory supply could run ~20% short of demand through 2030 A lot of U.S. institutional money cannot hold Korean listed shares. This listing probably opens that door for the first time. It's not just a fundraise. It could be a re-rating moment. The AI trade probably isn't really about who builds the smartest model. It's more likely about who supplies the infrastructure those models can't run without. The spenders are competing. The suppliers are collecting. Not financial advice.

  • SeanPolley
    Sean Polley (@SeanPolley) reported

    SpaceX Is Three Businesses Wearing One Name Ask ten people what SpaceX does and most will say rockets. A few years ago that answer was complete. It isn't anymore. The company lists publicly this week under the ticker SPCX. Before the headlines settle on what it's worth, it's worth understanding what it has actually become, because the single name on the ticker covers at least three separate businesses, each with its own economics. Here is how I'd break it down for an investor trying to see past the noise. The part that actually makes money Most of SpaceX's revenue has nothing to do with sending anyone into space. It comes from Starlink, the satellite internet network now serving more than 10 million subscribers across over 100 countries. More than 10,000 satellites support it, and the subscriber count has nearly doubled in 15 months. The old telecom giants needed decades to reach customer bases that size. The financials follow. Starlink revenue climbed about 50% last year to $11.4 billion, roughly two-thirds of everything the company takes in. It's also profitable, and it grows more profitable with scale. Each subscriber pays every month, and that predictable income funds the next batch of satellites. The closest analogy is the cloud business buried inside Amazon. A quiet compounding machine sitting inside a company most people file under something else entirely. The part that built the moat The rockets are still the foundation, even if they aren't the cash register. Falcon 9, Falcon Heavy, the Dragon capsule, and the much larger Starship handle NASA flights, defense payloads, and commercial cargo. That work brought in about $4.1 billion in 2025, and SpaceX carried more than 80% of everything humanity put into orbit that year. That last figure is the real story. If you build satellites, sensors, or anything else headed for space, you generally need SpaceX to get it there. The company owns the on-ramp. What it doesn't own yet is easy profit from this segment. A single Falcon 9 flight runs somewhere between $15 million and $28 million, and developing Starship has already absorbed more than $15 billion. The launch business buys position and leverage. It hasn't started handing back cash. The part most people miss Here's where it gets interesting. In February 2026 SpaceX acquired xAI, the company behind the Grok models, and with it the X platform. So a share of SpaceX is now also a share of one of the larger artificial intelligence operations on the planet. The pieces fit together. xAI supplies the models, X supplies real-time data and a distribution channel, and two of the world's largest compute clusters, Colossus and Colossus II, supply the horsepower. That segment generated around $3.2 billion last year, and the contracts keep getting larger. SpaceX recently agreed to rent computing capacity to Anthropic, the maker of Claude, for a reported $1.25 billion a month. That's one customer. The company estimates the long-term market for this work near $28.5 trillion. Seeing the whole company Put the three together and the picture changes. SpaceX is a global internet utility, the gatekeeper to orbit, and a major AI platform, all operating under one roof and one ticker. For the investors I advise, the takeaway isn't whether SpaceX is impressive. It plainly is. The real questions are quieter. How would a position like this change your concentration and liquidity? Does it move the plan you already have forward, or just add excitement to it? This is exactly the kind of decision that should start with a conversation, not a click. Have it before the listing opens, while there's still time to think clearly. Sit down with your advisor, walk through how a holding like this fits the portfolio you already own, and decide whether it belongs there on the merits rather than the momentum. Whether SpaceX is right for your investment portfolio is a question worth answering deliberately, ahead of the moment everyone else is reacting.

  • svenky608
    Venky S (@svenky608) reported

    @Kilaruness @Swiggy @SwiggyCares Most of these 10 min insta companies inc Amazon IN have taken the customer for granted. Of course some of us squeezed their nuts so hard that now most of us have to endure the pain. Boils down to the civility, accountability and decorum among us inc Indian Corporate which ~ 0

  • us_stock_in_fo
    DevBanks (@us_stock_in_fo) reported

    There's probably a cleaner way to think about the AI trade than just buying the names building the models. Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet, Oracle. These five are projected to spend around $660~$725B in AI capex in 2026. A lot of that gap between capex and cash flow is getting plugged with bonds. In 2025 alone, these names issued around $121B in new debt. Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan think the sector may need around $1.5 trillion in new debt over the next few years. Only about 39% of companies surveyed by McKinsey say they can actually feel AI's impact on their bottom line. Amazon's FCF is likely going negative from this spend. Barclays thinks Meta's FCF could drop close to 90%. Microsoft is down roughly 17% YTD, worst in the group. They're spending because they feel like they can't afford to stop. That's probably not the same thing as a good investment thesis. Oracle reports Q4 FY2026 earnings today after close. RPO sitting at $553B as of Q3, up 325% YoY. Cloud revenue guided at +46% to +50% for Q4. But the debt picture is worth knowing before getting excited. Total debt reportedly over $108B. Debt to equity around 500%. FY2026 capex guided at $50B, pushing free cash flow negative. CDS spreads reportedly widened above 125bps at one point, levels not seen since 2009. Over 50% of that backlog is reportedly tied to a single customer. If that relationship softens, the whole math changes. How is Oracle financing this? Borrowing heavily against a backlog that hasn't fully converted yet. At what point does the market stop giving credit for future revenue that hasn't shown up in the numbers? That question connects to something worth noting. Earlier this year Blue Owl blocked redemptions on two funds after investors tried to pull $5.4B in a single quarter. One fund saw requests hit 40.7% of assets. Blue Owl stock is down over 40% YTD. Around $265B in market cap reportedly evaporated from private credit and PE managers since late 2025. A lot of AI infrastructure buildout runs through private credit channels. When money pulls out of those vehicles, the funding pipeline tightens. Oracle's $108B debt load sits inside the same ecosystem. So where does the money land more cleanly? $AVGO — reported June 3. - Q2 FY2026 AI revenue: $10.8B, +143% YoY - Q3 guidance: $16B AI revenue, +200%+ YoY - Q3 total revenue guidance: $29.4B, +84% YoY - FY2026 AI revenue target: $56B. FY2027: $100B+ The $16B Q3 AI guide came in about $1.2B below street expectations. SOX fell 10.3% on June 5, worst day since March 2020. $MRVL - FY2026 revenue: $8.195B, +42% YoY (record) - NVIDIA invested $2B, NVLink Fusion partnership March 2026 - Working on Amazon Trainium and Microsoft Maia chip designs Together with AVGO, probably owns around 95% of the custom AI ASIC co-design space. $MU - Q2 2026 revenue: $23.9B, a record - Directly tied to HBM demand - AI memory demand is probably just getting started SK Hynix ADR, targeting H2 2026 NYSE listing. - Confidential SEC F-1 filed March 24, 2026 - Looking to raise between $9.6B and $14B, no dilution - Stock up roughly 60% YTD in Seoul - Memory supply could run ~20% short of demand through 2030 A lot of U.S. institutional money cannot hold Korean listed shares. This listing probably opens that door for the first time. It's not just a fundraise. It could be a re-rating moment. The AI trade probably isn't really about who builds the smartest model. It's more likely about who supplies the infrastructure those models can't run without. The spenders are competing. The suppliers are collecting. Not financial advice.

  • _TheFallibilist
    The Fallibilist (@_TheFallibilist) reported

    Here's my take on Steve Eisman's take on SpaceXI's IPO: SECTION 1: THE SKELETON The core claims this thesis depends on Claim 1: Tesla is fundamentally a car company operating in a structurally unattractive industry — capital intensive, hyper-competitive, and undercut on cost by Chinese manufacturers. Role in thesis: Establishes that Tesla's problems are not temporary setbacks but permanent features of its business. Without this, the merger isn't necessarily value-destructive. Claim 2: Four consecutive years of declining earnings are evidence of structural, not cyclical, deterioration. Role in thesis: Provides the quantitative anchor for Claim 1. The earnings decline is presented as proof that the structural problems are already manifesting in financial results. Claim 3: Musk will use SpaceX IPO stock as currency to acquire Tesla and merge the companies into a single entity called "X." Role in thesis: This is the predictive core — the event the entire argument is built around. Without this, the rest is just commentary on Tesla's competitive position. Claim 4: SpaceX's $1.75 trillion IPO valuation depends on presenting a clean, high-growth narrative to public market investors. Role in thesis: Establishes why the timing is critical. If SpaceX's valuation doesn't require narrative purity, absorbing Tesla's complexity isn't necessarily damaging. Claim 5: Combining the two entities would force SpaceX shareholders to absorb Tesla's margin pressure, China exposure, and capital requirements — destroying value at the worst possible moment. Role in thesis: This is the punchline. It converts the prediction (Claim 3) into a negative outcome by combining Tesla's weakness (Claims 1–2) with SpaceX's vulnerability (Claim 4). Chain Strength: This is a serial chain with a dependent conclusion. Claims 1 and 2 feed into Claim 5. Claim 4 feeds into Claim 5. Claim 3 is the trigger for Claim 5. If any upstream claim breaks — if Tesla isn't just a car company, if the earnings decline is cyclical, if SpaceX's valuation can absorb complexity, or if Musk doesn't execute the merger — the conclusion weakens or collapses entirely. SECTION 2: THE FRAGILITY FLAGS Where this thesis is structurally strong and where it could break Claim 1: Tesla is fundamentally a car company in a structurally unattractive industry.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: The three specific mechanisms cited — capital intensity, competitive intensity, and China's manufacturing cost advantage — are real and well-documented in the EV segment specifically. Chinese manufacturers do produce vehicles at lower cost, and this is driven by identifiable supply chain, labor, and industrial policy advantages. That part of the argument is specific and difficult to replace with alternative reasoning. However, the claim performs a critical framing move: it categorises Tesla as "a car company." Tesla's current market capitalisation of roughly $1.3 trillion reflects market pricing of autonomous driving, robotics, energy generation and storage ($12.8 billion in 2025 revenue, up 27%), and AI compute — none of which are addressed. The structural criticism applies to one business line but is extended to the entire entity.Alternative Explanations:Tesla's valuation is driven primarily by FSD, Optimus robotics, and energy — not EV manufacturing margins. The "car company" label may itself be the analytical error. Capital intensity in EVs creates barriers to entry that ultimately benefit scaled incumbents who survive the shakeout. China's cost advantage applies most strongly to the mass-market segment. Tesla's brand positioning and software differentiation may insulate it from pure cost competition. Claim 2: Four consecutive years of declining earnings prove structural decline.Structural Assessment: 🔴 FragileWhy: The evidence is factually grounded — Tesla's automotive revenue declined from $82.4 billion (2023) to $77.1 billion (2024) to $69.5 billion (2025). But the thesis presents correlation as causation without specifying the mechanism that makes this structural rather than cyclical. The word "structural" does enormous work here and is never defined or defended. Critically, the most recent data contradicts the trajectory: Q1 2026 shows 16% year-over-year revenue growth and a 50% increase in gross profit. Gross margin expanded nearly 500 basis points year-over-year to 21.1%. A thesis that depends on "four straight years of decline" while the most recent quarter shows acceleration in the opposite direction has a timing problem.Alternative Explanations:The earnings decline reflects deliberate price compression to gain market share while new revenue streams (energy, FSD) scale — a strategy Amazon executed for years. Heavy capital investment in next-generation products (Optimus, next-gen vehicle platform, Megapack) temporarily depresses current-period earnings. Cyclical auto industry downturn, not Tesla-specific structural weakness. Q1 2026 may signal the turn. Claim 3: Musk will use SpaceX IPO stock to acquire Tesla and merge both into "X."Structural Assessment: 🔴 FragileWhy: This is the central prediction and carries the least evidentiary support of any claim in the chain. Eisman states he "fully expects" this, but the source material provides no causal mechanism for why Musk would execute this, how he would overcome structural barriers, or when it would happen. The amended language in SpaceX's S-1 — noting the company "may issue a significant amount of equity in connection with future transactions" — is circumstantial. Standard IPO filings routinely include broad acquisition language for flexibility; it is not evidence of a specific plan. Prediction markets currently price a merger at 51–57% before mid-2027, which means the market itself treats this as roughly a coin flip. The thesis presents it as a near-certainty.Alternative Explanations:Musk could pursue the "X" vision through a holding company structure, shared services agreements, or operational partnerships without a full corporate merger. SpaceX's board has independent fiduciary duties to its shareholders. A merger that Eisman himself calls value-destructive would face board resistance, shareholder lawsuits, and regulatory scrutiny. Musk may not want to merge operationally. Running a combined aerospace/AI/automotive/energy company would create organisational complexity he has publicly criticised in other conglomerates. The S-1 acquisition language may refer to smaller, targeted acquisitions (AI companies, satellite firms) rather than a Tesla-scale deal. Claim 4: SpaceX's valuation depends on maintaining a clean, high-growth narrative.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: There is a well-established dynamic where IPO valuations benefit from narrative clarity — simple stories command higher multiples. This is grounded in observable market behaviour, not speculation. However, the claim assumes markets would view a Tesla merger as narrative contamination. That is one interpretation but not the only one. Markets have assigned premium valuations to conglomerates when the combination story is compelling: Amazon across retail, cloud, media, and advertising; Alphabet across search, cloud, and autonomous vehicles. If the "X" narrative — combining orbital infrastructure, global connectivity, autonomous vehicles, robotics, and energy — resonates as a coherent platform story, the merger could enhance rather than damage the narrative.Alternative Explanations:The combined entity could be positioned as the ultimate vertically integrated technology platform, commanding a conglomerate premium rather than a discount. SpaceX's core fundamentals (Starlink at $11.3 billion in 2025 revenue with strong operating margins) may be robust enough to absorb Tesla's complexity without repricing. Retail investors — who are allocated 30% of the SpaceX offering — may respond positively to the "X" vision rather than negatively. Claim 5: Combining the entities would destroy value for SpaceX shareholders.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: The internal logic is consistent: if Tesla's problems are structural and SpaceX's valuation requires narrative purity, then forcing SpaceX shareholders to absorb Tesla's baggage destroys value. As conditional reasoning, this is sound. But it is entirely dependent on Claims 1, 2, and 4 all being true simultaneously. If Tesla's non-EV businesses are valuable (weakening Claim 1), if the earnings decline is reversing (weakening Claim 2), or if markets welcome the combined story (weakening Claim 4), then the value-destruction conclusion collapses. This claim has no independent structural support — it inherits every fragility from the claims above it.Alternative Explanations:If the merger exchange ratio reflects Tesla's weaknesses (i.e., SpaceX shareholders absorb Tesla at a significant discount to Tesla's standalone market cap), the deal could be accretive. Synergies between SpaceX's orbital infrastructure and Tesla's AI, robotics, and energy capabilities could create value that neither company achieves independently. A merger might unlock operational efficiencies (shared AI compute, combined manufacturing scale) that reduce Tesla's cost disadvantage. A note on the framing. The source material opens with "The man who called the 2008 housing collapse just made a prediction that is hard to ignore (Save this)." This performs a structural function worth flagging. Eisman's 2008 call was a product of specific analytical work on specific financial instruments — collateralised debt obligations, subprime mortgage pools, and the credit default swaps that insured them. That expertise does not transfer to predictions about tech M&A. A structural engineer who correctly identified a bridge flaw does not become generally credible on aircraft design. The "(Save this)" parenthetical creates urgency that substitutes for evidence. Neither the authority appeal nor the urgency framing strengthens any of the five claims above. They are rhetorical packaging, not structural support. SECTION 3: THE BLIND SPOT SUMMARY If this thesis is wrong, this is the most likely reason why The most critical vulnerability is the thesis's definition of Tesla as "a car company." Every downstream claim — the structural unattractiveness, the declining earnings narrative, the value-destruction conclusion — is built on this categorisation. Tesla's $1.3 trillion market cap is not a bet on EV manufacturing margins. It prices autonomous driving, humanoid robotics, energy infrastructure, and AI compute. If Musk's strategic rationale for the merger is to combine SpaceX's orbital network and AI division with Tesla's autonomy stack, robotics programme, and energy business into a vertically integrated technology platform, then the entire "absorbing Tesla's problems" framing is evaluating the wrong asset. For Eisman's argument to hold, it is not enough that Tesla's EV business is under competitive pressure — it must also be true that Tesla's non-EV businesses are worth too little to justify the transaction. The thesis never examines this question, and that unexamined assumption is bearing the most weight.

  • mrdavemorgan
    Dave Morgan (@mrdavemorgan) reported

    The online shopping experience for @Walmart is just crap. Have to sign in with my password. Then they have to send a code to my email. Then I go to buy and they have to send a text to my phone. UX rule no. 1: don't interrupt a customer when he's ready to buy. Amazon got the sale

  • binreminded
    Student of Criminology (@binreminded) reported

    We have had 2 years of AI and nothing has changed - X looks like Twitter, Amazon 2026 looks like Amazon 2024. Google looks the same. In effect these companies seem to have paid $ Billions to fix internal software bugs not the customer interface.

  • BrettOLittle
    Brẹtṭ ḺittІe (@BrettOLittle) reported

    I'm down with this. Got a local hardware shop and also Amazon lol

  • mhp_guy
    Chris Koerner (@mhp_guy) reported

    This guy bought a $300 inflatable movie screen on Amazon as a Christmas gift for his family and turned it into a $100,000 a year business at 80% profit margins. He just booked a $10,000 week. His startup cost was literally that Amazon gift. This is backyard movie theater rentals. But here's where it gets really freaking cool. Derek realized movies can't start until 9:30 PM in Texas summers because it doesn't get dark until then. That doesn't work for seven year olds. So he built the world's first indoor air conditioned inflatable movie theater. Full carpeting. LED lights. Four window AC units he bought off Facebook Marketplace for $150 each. He charges $1700 for it. His outdoor packages start at $375 and scale up from there to $1500. Then he added LED dance floors because kids kept dancing after the movies ended. Those rent for $3,000 and he'll have it paid off in eight rentals. In this episode Derek: - Breaks down how he went from unprepared at his first HOA event to a $10K booking week - Shares how he sources equipment from Alibaba and Facebook Marketplace - Tells me why his best clients are people sitting on a few acres who don't blink at price - Gives me the exact package structure he uses, from $375 starter to $1,700 indoor This one is awesome. Check it out.

  • imrank745
    Amran Khan (@imrank745) reported

    @amazonIN What happened to Amazon services and full process seems collapsed my next day delivery of order still not delivering on 3rd day and 14 times I called to customer support no once able to help seems conspiracy to down size business in India id - 405-3627352-6532300 helpme

  • KevinCwo
    Kevin CWO (@KevinCwo) reported

    Anyone else having shipping and delivery issues with Amazon? Multiple delays in shipping and delivery has become the norm even though we pay a lot of money for on-time delivery via Prime. Amazon is dying and no one at Amazon cares. Amazon hosts sellers with fake products that steal from customers and don't do anything about it even after being notified repeatedly. Indian reps in the call center lie to customers to get them off the phone/chat saying they will contact the carrier and have it picked up and delivered the same day by end of day. These are egregious lies and I've heard them many times lately when inquiring as to why I still haven't received my purchases. Bezos needs to fix the issues and stop blowing up rockets. Seems he lost interest in Amazon, and it shows. The people he has running it in his absence don't care and IT shows. Amazon has gone from great to crap. Not worth the cost or aggravation any more.

  • SIMutenyo
    Evans | eCommerce CRO Specialist (@SIMutenyo) reported

    I've been inside 50+ Shopify stores since 2024. Here's something that would shock most media buyers: The stores with the best ads usually have the worst landing pages. Not because the founders don't care. Because they were never taught to think past the click. Every agency, every course, every guru teaches you how to get the click. Nobody teaches you what happens after. So you're running $500/day to a page that was built in 3 hours, never tested, and hasn't changed in 8 months. And when sales dip, you do what you were taught: New creative. New audience. New offer. When the real problem is 4 seconds after the click. 🧵 The 7 things I look at in the first 60 seconds of any Shopify store audit: 1. Does the headline speak to a pain or a product? Pain = conversion. Product = catalogue. 2. Is there proof above the fold? Not a logo strip. A real human result. Before the buy button. 3. What does the CTA actually say? "Add to Cart" is lazy. "Start My 30-Day Trial" is psychology. "Get Yours Before Stock Runs Out" is urgency. Three different conversion rates. All the same button. 4. Does the hero image show the transformation or the product? Show me the after. I'll imagine the before myself. Show me the product. I'll go compare it on Amazon. 5. How fast does the page load on mobile? Every extra second costs you 7% of conversions. Most store owners don't know their own load time. Go check yours. Right now. 6. Where are the reviews placed? Below the fold is a graveyard. One powerful quote above the CTA changes everything. 7. Is there a reason to buy TODAY — not someday? Not a fake countdown. A real, logical reason this offer is better right now than next week. If your store fails 4 or more of these 7 — You don't have a traffic problem. You have a page problem. And no ad budget in the world fixes a page problem. --- No pitch. Just honest feedback. Save this post for later. You need convert more of your traffic? Comment “SALES PAGE” and I will personally send you 50+ optimized pages for your design inspiration. Don’t re invent the wheel. You must be following for me to share in your DM