Amazon status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Amazon reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Amazon users through our website.

• Website Down (44%)
• Errors (34%)
• Sign in (23%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Amazon outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Inverurie	Errors	21 hours ago
Carrollton	Errors	21 hours ago
Nicolás Romero	Errors	23 hours ago
Valencia	Errors	1 day ago
Châtenay-Malabry	Sign in	1 day ago
Cergy	Errors	1 day ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Amazon Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Michael Patrón (@michaelpatron0) reported 6 minutes ago

  @DanielDoor8 FTC is suing Amazon and released info. Amazon replied back with a bunch of counters that don't really address the issue at hand.

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  Wearesource9 (@wearesource999) reported 7 minutes ago

  @allenanalysis Ain’t nobody got to over work them self more than what they do that’s there fault that we in debt they did it on purpose, to busy spending money on war and playing slow. These big company like Amazon and not raising people pay checks🤔 they must don’t care

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  STR8BGN (@StraightBugging) reported 8 minutes ago

  @Variety Energetic my ***. Horrible acting and terrible plot. It's like speed, but she's running. Amazon Studios strikes out again.

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  Duck (@penguinfiles7) reported 8 minutes ago

  @Ryan_Daigler If you're interested I can send you instructions. You need about $100 in Amazon parts plus an once or two of silver. It's basically electrolysis. It's pretty easy if you're careful about a few things. Low voltage not dangerous. Once you're set up a couple Oz of silver makes an infinite amount of end product. You end up with silver ions in distilled water and it legit instant stops any problem with skin or mucous membrains. I used to get really bad facet nose a few times a year. Now as soon as I start to feel it I snort a bit of this stuff and I mean it instantly stops it. I've used and given it to people for pink eye - instant stop. Like one minute. No more pink eye. I absolutely swear by this stuff. I make it a few small jugs at a time and pour it into dropper bottles. I make a batch every couple years. If you would use the info I can write up details sometime.

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  Fi Rhodes (@RhodesFi32898) reported 9 minutes ago

  @sunakball @Lord_Sugar Amazon does some direct supply. There are so many issues.

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  American 🇺🇸 (@SupportAmericaF) reported 10 minutes ago

  @akafaceUS Fry’s Electronics used to be my number one store for everything from basic diode bulbs to high-end computers, monitors, and cameras. But everything changed during one specific visit. I went in to buy a 9-volt battery adapter and asked an employee if they had it. He told me flat out, "We don’t carry those—go buy it on Amazon." Right then, I knew the company was doomed. Exactly one year later, every single Fry's store closed down for good.

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  two (@one2gloss) reported 14 minutes ago

  this is not a recall btw it just an amazon issue

• 
  Kolluru Akhil Teja (@akhilteja099) reported 17 minutes ago

  @ZeptoNow Placed order OIJJRHNRL21779 purchased 3 rakhi special amazon GC issued by pine labs and when we are trying to add it in amazon it is throwing validation error.Please help.Reference Id 6014854979439364,6014854979329348,6014854979407104 @AmazonHelp @PineLabs

• 
  Bulletproofsoul (@bulletprfsoul) reported 18 minutes ago

  @amazon you incompetent *** people . I’ve been home ALL day and you were 4 stops away and you said it was a delivery issue because the front door wasn’t accessible. I get multiple deliveries a day. TRaSH!

• 
  Pixelite (@LittlePixeL_1) reported 19 minutes ago

  @unusual_whales Amazon and similar companies are making record profits and none of that is being passed down employees and consumers as it is...

• 
  JK47 (@Habanero_Jefe) reported 21 minutes ago

  @mookiealexander Dumb move...I like / respect DM, but blending SNL tabloid news skits into MNF was a giant F - . Then they doubled down by bringing in Tony K... then C.C... The **** list goes on... glad A.M bounced and got PAID 💰 by Daddy Amazon... he earned it

• 
  Raye (@rayemarkets) reported 22 minutes ago

  Every time Damodaran uploads a video, I always watch it because he usually takes a concept that sounds simple on the surface and then breaks down the incentives and economics underneath it, and this discussion on scaling versus profitability is a good example. The common startup narrative is that companies should grow as quickly as possible, capture market share, and worry about profits later, but Damodaran's argument is that this approach only works when the structure of the business actually supports it. A large addressable market and fast revenue growth can tell us how big a company might become, but they tell us very little about how valuable that company will eventually be unless growth can translate into better unit economics, operating leverage, pricing power, and returns on invested capital. A company can therefore become much larger without becoming economically stronger, and in some cases scaling simply multiplies the weaknesses that were already embedded in the original business model. This is why the distinction between scalability and business quality is so important. Software businesses can often add customers at very low marginal cost, meaning revenue can grow much faster than the underlying cost base, while businesses involving manufacturing, logistics, physical infrastructure, or expensive customer acquisition may require significant incremental spending for every additional dollar of revenue. Even within technology, being asset-light does not automatically solve the problem because customer acquisition costs, incentives, cloud infrastructure, research spending, and competition can effectively become variable costs that rise alongside growth. Scale only creates meaningful operating leverage when the incremental economics improve as the company gets larger, and if costs continue rising roughly in line with revenue, the company may eventually discover that what looked like a temporary profitability problem was actually structural. Amazon is therefore an important example, but also a dangerous template for other startups to copy. Amazon could tolerate years of weak accounting profitability because its scale was gradually building infrastructure, distribution density, customer relationships, marketplace liquidity, and purchasing power that improved the economics of the business over time, so the losses were connected to assets and competitive advantages that eventually supported much greater profitability. The mistake is assuming that every company reporting losses while growing quickly is following the same path, because some businesses are simply using investor capital to subsidize prices, acquire customers, or enter markets without creating corresponding economic advantages. Both companies can initially show the same headline numbers of rapid revenue growth and negative earnings, but one may be accumulating future operating leverage while the other is accumulating obligations that require continuous external capital. Damodaran's "Field of Dreams" can become a "Field of Nightmares" precisely when investors assume profitability will automatically appear once sufficient scale has been reached. The venture capital structure makes this problem more interesting because the incentives of the investor and the economics of the underlying company are not necessarily aligned. Venture portfolios depend heavily on a relatively small number of very large winners, which means a venture capitalist may rationally prefer a founder to pursue a much larger and riskier outcome rather than build a smaller company producing steady profits. A company that could become a profitable business worth a few hundred million dollars may be economically attractive to its founder, employees, and customers, but it might barely move the returns of a multibillion-dollar venture fund, while turning that same company into a speculative attempt at a ten-billion-dollar outcome provides much more upside to the fund. Scaling therefore becomes partly a consequence of portfolio mathematics rather than purely a consequence of what is optimal for the company itself, which helps explain why startups are frequently encouraged to expand geographically, add products, increase hiring, and raise increasingly large funding rounds even before the economics of the original business have been fully proven. Damodaran's point about pricing versus valuation extends this incentive further. Private markets frequently anchor financing rounds around comparable transactions, revenue multiples, user growth, subscribers, or projected future revenue rather than the present value of sustainable future cash flows, so scale itself becomes an input into the next financing round. Once that happens, raising capital can create a self-reinforcing cycle where capital funds growth, growth supports a higher private-market price, the higher price enables another larger funding round, and that new capital funds even more growth. During favorable capital-market conditions this cycle can continue for years, making it difficult to distinguish between a genuinely improving business and a company whose growth is partly being manufactured by increasingly abundant financing. The real test only arrives when the marginal investor becomes less willing to finance losses and the company has to demonstrate that customers, margins, and cash generation can support the business without constant capital injections. The expansion of private capital has allowed this process to continue much further than it could several decades ago. Companies historically reached public markets relatively early because public equity was one of the few ways to obtain the capital required for large-scale expansion, whereas mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity firms, crossover investors, and very large venture funds can now provide billions of dollars while companies remain private. Damodaran describes this as the creation of a gray market between traditional venture capital and public equity, and one consequence is that startups can reach enormous revenue bases and valuations before facing the level of disclosure, governance scrutiny, and profitability expectations traditionally associated with public companies. His data also show how much this has changed the profile of companies reaching the public market, with companies generally arriving larger in revenue terms but substantially less likely to be profitable than companies going public several decades ago. There is also a governance dimension that becomes increasingly important as companies scale privately. A founder managing a small startup and a founder controlling an organization worth tens or hundreds of billions of dollars are effectively running very different institutions, yet rapid private-market scaling can allow the governance structure of the first company to survive into the second. Founder control, dual-class shares, fragmented investor bases, and competition among venture investors can weaken the normal mechanisms that challenge management decisions, while large valuations can reinforce the belief that the founder's strategy has already been validated. The danger is that valuation growth can substitute for operational accountability during the scaling phase, and by the time profitability, capital allocation, organizational complexity, or governance problems become visible, the company may already employ thousands of people and control significant amounts of capital. Another part of Damodaran's argument that I find important is that staying small should not automatically be interpreted as failure. Some businesses naturally have better economics when they remain concentrated around a specific customer base, product category, geography, or brand position, because expanding beyond that niche can weaken pricing power or require disproportionately higher capital and marketing spending. Ferrari is an obvious example of a company whose economics partly depend on scarcity, but the principle applies much more widely: maximizing revenue is not necessarily the same thing as maximizing enterprise value. A business generating high returns on capital within a limited market can be economically superior to a much larger competitor producing weak returns after enormous capital investment, which means the correct objective should ultimately be value creation rather than size itself. Personally, this is where I agree strongly with Damodaran, because I do not see profitability and growth as opposite objectives in the first place. A company should absolutely sacrifice near-term profits when it has opportunities to reinvest capital at attractive returns, especially when that spending strengthens distribution, technology, network effects, customer retention, infrastructure, or another durable competitive advantage, but there needs to be a credible economic mechanism connecting today's spending with tomorrow's cash generation. I care much less about whether a rapidly growing company currently reports a profit than about what happens to the economics of the next dollar of revenue, because improving contribution margins, lower acquisition costs, stronger retention, greater pricing power, and falling capital requirements provide evidence that scale is actually making the business better. This also makes the discussion extremely relevant to the current artificial intelligence cycle. Artificial intelligence companies are being pushed to scale models, computing infrastructure, data centers, users, enterprise distribution, and revenue extraordinarily quickly, while the capital required to support that expansion is also becoming enormous. Some of that spending could eventually create exceptional businesses if inference economics improve, utilization rises, customers become deeply embedded in the products, and artificial intelligence generates enough willingness to pay to produce strong margins, but scale alone cannot prove that outcome. If computing costs and capital requirements continue rising alongside usage, then very fast revenue growth could coexist with mediocre returns on capital, particularly when companies must continuously finance new generations of chips and infrastructure simply to remain technologically competitive. For me, the most important question in artificial intelligence therefore is gradually shifting from how fast these companies can grow to how much economic value remains after paying for the infrastructure required to generate that growth, because eventually the market has to separate companies that are using capital to build durable operating leverage from companies that simply need ever larger amounts of capital to keep the scaling story alive.

• 
  Al Hood (@albhood) reported 25 minutes ago

  *You DO have to download Prime Video, sign in with an Amazon ID (free), and purchase the Hurricanes Hockey Network channel *You DO NOT get a discount if you are already a subscriber to Amazon Prime *This will NOT be the only way the HHN will be available

• 
  Michael Rauch (@Michael_L_Rauch) reported 31 minutes ago

  @WaterGardenApps @Tesla @Waymo Terrible business with race to bottom on margins. Neither Waymo or Zoox are going anywhere with Google & Amazon money, but too many want to believe.

• 
  Jonathan Smith (@DegenerateTBone) reported 33 minutes ago

  As some of you have pointed out, one option is to get the free Amazon Prime account and then pay for the Jackets subscription. Still a massive downgrade from the (terrible) FanDuel TV deal, where the same price got both the Jackets and the Cavs. Now, $19.99/ month per team.

• 
  ℂ𝕠𝕕𝕖𝕩, ℍ𝕖𝕣𝕖 (@CodexHere) reported 33 minutes ago

  @azkadelya @amazon Amazon is terrible anymore. They do not care about their customers in the least bit... I know growing up people hated on Walmart because they hurt small businesses, but lately they've had the best customer service amongst every service I've ever used. it's crazy.

• 
  The Inner Circle Trading Group DP David Prince (@epictrades1) reported 34 minutes ago

  @CardiCNBC Really ? That is what you took from this ? I see much worse broken business models w low valuations over amazon. Indeed amazon is doing quite well... rem last earnings. Oh and no nothing is a hard rule for all stox, odd u thought that

• 
  AFCB Oldgit 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿🇺🇦 (@AFCBOldgit) reported 34 minutes ago

  @DeborahHD @amazon I don't know about you, but we sometimes have an English girl deliver to us, she's EXCELLENT, but it's virtually always foreign delivery drivers that are the problem, and some, hardly speak English, so whether they're trying to do everything to avoid talking I've no idea 🤷

• 
  tim212 (@tim2_12) reported 35 minutes ago

  @FromPemberley @Meredicchio Fair enough best of luck. Ftr I’m not saying these stocks will not go down, but if your contention is that the Iran war will cause Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta to go to 0 I will take the other side of the trade.

• 
  C H (@Homie_san) reported 38 minutes ago

  Did @Amazon fix the battery drain problem on their Fire Stick TV remotes? I’d like to upgrade, but not if I only get a few minutes of battery life in a device that should last a year.

• 
  Francisco Kemeny (@FranciscoKemeny) reported 41 minutes ago

  @petergyang @bot I tried using my passkey, that would have been nice. Didn’t work with my Amazon login.

• 
  two (@one2gloss) reported 48 minutes ago

  @_2skinny its not a recall its just an amazon issue

• 
  Hanadi A. (@LittlesTeacher1) reported 51 minutes ago

  @MsKinCali They should be able to send the correct item since it’s their mistake. Hopefully Amazon can fix it 🥰

• 
  Conor (@leprechaunsrfun) reported 53 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp No you're good this is a staff issue with the delivery hand off

• 
  Ruffian (@Ruffian425) reported 55 minutes ago

  The Eastside luxury market is not having a normal seasonal slowdown. It is showing the first real stress fractures in the exact places that were supposed to be invincible — Bellevue, Redmond, Kirkland, Sammamish, and the waterfront corridors — because three things hit at once: AI-driven tech job cuts, the 9.9% millionaire tax, and a buyer pool that suddenly stopped feeling urgent. The inventory explosion is concentrated where the money lives. King County homes over $2 million saw listings surge roughly 84% year-over-year. Kirkland listings roughly doubled (about 150 to 303). Bellevue and Sammamish jumped around 70%. Redmond was up about 77%. The day after the legislature passed the tax, $2 million-plus listings statewide jumped 65% in 24 hours. That is not random seasonality. Those are the zip codes stuffed with Microsoft, Amazon, and Meta compensation.97 Demand at the top is breaking first. In the six most expensive Seattle suburbs, homes over $2 million averaged 44 days on market in the first half of 2026 versus 25 days a year earlier. Pending luxury sales in the top 5% of the market dropped 15% in the three months through July. July pending sales in the Seattle metro were among the steepest declines in the entire country — Eastside pending sales were down 16–17% year-over-year. One tally put July pending activity at the lowest since 2017. Homes that used to go pending in a weekend now sit, take price cuts, and sometimes get a handwritten new number on the sign.34 The jobs that paid for these houses are being cut while companies spend on machines. Since May 2025, more than 10,000 Seattle-area tech workers have been laid off, with Amazon and Microsoft accounting for the bulk. Microsoft cut 605 Seattle-area jobs in July 2026. Amazon has already done massive corporate reductions and just filed another 121 Washington cuts (53 of them in Bellevue) effective October. Meta has cut nearly 1,400 King County employees in waves. These companies are simultaneously pouring $190–$220 billion into AI infrastructure. When headcount shrinks and equity compensation gets choppy, the $2.5 million–$8 million buyer does not disappear overnight — he just stops racing.67 The tax is already changing behavior even though it does not start until 2028. The 9.9% levy on household income over $1 million does not tax the sale of a house. It does tax the ongoing income that lets someone stay in a $4 million waterfront home and keep funding the next custom build. Agents reported clients listing specifically because of the tax. High earners who were already thinking about Florida, Texas, Tennessee, or Wyoming are accelerating the timeline so they are not Washington residents when the tax bites. That is why you now see for-sale signs on East Lake Sammamish Drive, in West Bellevue, and along streets that almost never turned over. Those owners are not “testing the market.” Some of them are planning an exit. What this looks like on the ground. Sammamish median prices are down 10–17% depending on the window. Eastside single-family median is off about 4% with inventory up nearly 30% and days on market nearly doubling. West Bellevue has at times shown 7–8+ months of supply. East of Lake Sammamish posted the biggest inventory jump of any Eastside submarket. Sale-to-list ratios have slipped into the mid-96% range. Price reductions are common. The mid-market still moves if it is priced correctly. The upper end is where absorption has slowed hardest. This is alarming because the Eastside luxury market was never a diversified local economy. It was a high-beta bet on a handful of tech employers and the stock-heavy pay packages they issued. AI is letting those same companies do more with fewer people. The tax raises the carrying cost of staying. Rates are high enough to kill impulse buying. Result is visible on the street: more signs, longer days on market, and a buyer who now has time and leverage. That combination did not exist here two years ago. It exists now.

• 
  Badgers4life48! (@badgers4ever48) reported 55 minutes ago

  @Vikeologist I don’t mind paying to watch my teams however I do have an issue when I need. Netflix YouTubeTv Peacock Amazon just to watch the NFL and I am lucky and live where I get the packers but that’s another $235 bucks for Sunday ticket if I didn’t It’s making it hard to watch on sport

• 
  The Powerful Katrinket (@katrinket17) reported 55 minutes ago

  @leock224 The brand I'm using is called VITALFLOW from Amazon. I ran out and tried a different brand, but much preferred this one. There seems to be a plethora of issues this treats, my mind even seems clearer. It's worth checking into.

• 
  Captiin (@CaptnUson) reported 1 hour ago

  @KennyEmm8101 There is also no record that Preston was offered Amazon and refused it. Bezos stepped down as CEO in 2021 and handed the job to Andy Jassy,

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  Brian McCormick (@bjmtweets) reported 1 hour ago

  Take the entire market cap value of businesses that require the internet to run. Amazon, Google, Uber, AirBnB, the list goes on. Tens of trillions. Now take the entire market cap value of businesses providing that infrastructure to run the internet. Much less. Although the value of the internet is transformative to everyone, internet providers were not able to capture much of that value. Ultimately, profitability is not from the value you create, but from your pricing power and moat. Another internet provider will lay cable or provide WiFi for less profit, bringing down industry margins, until the point nobody finds it profitable enough to compete. The market is currently rewarding most every AI infrastructure layer AI business today, but being essential does not guarantee superior economics. The providers that capture the most value will be the one with the most durable scarcity, pricing power, and competitive protection.

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  Paradis (@ParadisLabs) reported 1 hour ago

  Bought some stocks today...finally. 1. $NBIS - Already a top 10 position for me, but one of my highest conviction names. 2. $INTC - I don't own enough Intel. 3. $CRDO - Averaging my position down on this earnings drop (I personally think earnings were good). I started my Credo position on last quarter's earnings drop. 4. $BE - We all know the bottleneck by now... 5. $AMZN - Can never own enough Amazon. Nearly 10% down in a month is a treat (imo). I don't care about day-to-day fluctuations w/ Amazon since I'll be a shareholder for a *very* long time. If you've been reading my macro notes recently, you'd note that I've been holding cash (and buying some hedges like "defensive tech" AKA software). But it got to a point today where I just couldn't resist buying some discounted names for my core AI portfolio. This is obviously NFA - as per my macro note earlier, I think that semis still have room to go lower (war = bad narrative). I personally have enough cash / hedges to unwind - to buy more semis on additional drops...idk if you do which is why this is never individual advice.