Coinbase Outage Map
The map below depicts the most recent cities worldwide where Coinbase users have reported problems and outages. If you are having an issue with Coinbase, make sure to submit a report below
The heatmap above shows where the most recent user-submitted and social media reports are geographically clustered. The density of these reports is depicted by the color scale as shown below.
Coinbase users affected:
Coinbase is a digital asset broker headquartered in San Francisco, California. They broker exchanges of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin and other digital assets with fiat currencies in 32 countries, and bitcoin transactions and storage in 190 countries worldwide.
Most Affected Locations
Outage reports and issues in the past 15 days originated from:
| Location | Reports |
|---|---|
| Paris, Île-de-France | 1 |
| Le Taillan-Médoc, Nouvelle-Aquitaine | 1 |
| Leipzig, Saxony | 1 |
| Maquoketa, IA | 1 |
Community Discussion
Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.
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Coinbase Issues Reports
Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:
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Laura Shin (@laurashin) reported"This creates a split which means this is hyper ripe for a higher court to take this on" Katherine on why the prediction markets fight is heading straight to the Supreme Court "All of this is going to end up at the Supreme Court. I don't like to use absolutes, I am a lawyer, but we are at the point where this is pretty absolute. Why? Because when there is a split, that makes it ripe for circuit court review, which we're already seeing with this New York issue" "What's really interesting is that although the prediction markets have lost in a number of states, and this is not just Kalshi, Coinbase and others are involved in this litigation. But very recently New Jersey, right across the way, actually disagreed with New York" "So this is a mixed record, and that's great. This creates a split, which means this is hyper ripe for a higher court to take this on"
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Ryan G (@RyDawg42) reportedI am sure crypto will eventually come to X Money. It seems like it was intentional left out, until they get the basic payments working well. X Money did not partner with some random FDIC-Insured community bank. They partnered with the most crypto active regulated bank in the US. The bank for Coinbase & Circle. The bank that joined Visas USDC stablecoin program in 2025. They integrated Ripple in 2014. And it has a head of Crypto on its executive team. If any US bank was already equipped, staffed, and regulatory positioned to use Crypto in a fintech product on launch day; it is Cross River Bank. And same with VISA. Visa launched USDC stable coin settlement in 2025. They issue the Coinbase Card and the Crypto dot com card. Visa is prepared to underwrite crypto and integrate it with a debit card. This was an intentional choice to not launch with Crypto. @XMoney But I think it will be coming.......
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Erica Von Schimpf (@EVonschimpf) reportedWas reading a coinbase legal brief that is on their website that says users of coinbase do not legally own the crypto in their wallets. And that provision is why i think coinbase put out that if they file bankruptcy then users would lose their wallets.
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Agent farmer (@AgentFarmerxing) reported@OKXHelpDesk @okx I’m going to ask a bank teller in person, but it’s a small town bank and they are not too helpful. All my other bank accounts don’t have tellers within a 60 mile drive to my farm. I’ve quit all my other big brick and mortar banks This small town bank is my only bank I use to exchange fiat dollars with. I use this bank account with uphold, coinbase, and others daily with no issues. Only OKX IS A PROBLEM
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Khufu (@KingKhufu1111) reported@BritishHodl In general I agree. But there is one slice of this I don't. You seem to be suggesting, Fidelity (Coinbase, etc) somehow are immune to the core issue here. They are not, never have been, no body is. Fidelity manages its own institutional-grade, proprietary "omnibus" custody architecture. Instead of using commercially available retail cold wallets (like Ledger or Trezor), they build custom hardware and software security solutions to protect client funds. But here is the rub. Their own "custom hardware and software solution". Made by people, closed source, few eye ***** on it. Same type of people that made Coldcard wallet, make these custom solutions for institutions. People are not perfect. So your not solving that problem, you are only shifting it off your plate to someone else's possible bugs and attack vectors to a bigger hunny-pot target. So it solves a set of problems (which is good and agree), but does not really solve the threat in question here, only puts it behind a pay wall.
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AX1 (@ax1vc) reportedBase kills the bundler in September. Along with it, four other categories. Cobalt makes native account abstraction available. The exact same three points were repeated ad nauseam: sponsored gas, batching, session keys. But what becomes of the middleware layer? Everything is written in the spec. The answer is nasty: one category after another. Bundlers. Pimlico, Candide, Etherspot. There is no such function anymore in Base: no alternative mempool, no entrypoint, no UserOperation. A transaction is just a transaction. Paymasters as a service. Alchemy Gas Manager, Biconomy, Coinbase's own tools. Sponsorship becomes a payer field, and the payer will be a default set inside the wallet. The business lives on, the power to price it does not. Nobody shops around for something already picked for them. Smart account SDKs and factories. ZeroDev, thirdweb, Safe. The account abstraction architecture becomes canonical, addresses are derived from a single configuration contract, and there is even a function called importAccount in the spec with its example being the import of a deployed ERC-4337 wallet. It gets absorbed and not deleted: an even nastier outcome for a valuation. Session key middleware. Permission scopes were a product. In 8130, they turn into a scope byte, a signed commitment and a single permitted call target. Enforced by the protocol. Embedded wallet and passkey vendors. Privy, Dynamic. P-256 and WebAuthn become part of the canonical authenticator set that every compliant node must accept. Cryptography is not the value proposition anymore. The onboarding process is, and that's what remains of the company. Every $BASE update this year kills a paid layer and introduces free protocol surface instead. Azul rebuilt the proof system on Base's own stack. Beryl turned the token standard into a Rust precompile. And Cobalt now takes the account. Adoption is voluntary and the spec is compatible with the existing 4337 infrastructure. You are free to continue running 4337 infrastructure, if you choose to do so. But the 8130 spec is still at Draft stage and competes with 8141 for Ethereum's account architecture. Nothing outside the OP Stack has been decided yet. What lives through this is the rent. It just changes hands. The sponsorship needs someone holding ETH and charging you for gas in something else. The spec explicitly states that the authority role is economically transferable and that it can run as a paymaster service. Nodes may increase mempool limits for large locked payers, which makes transaction admission dependent on scale advantages. The default payer comes with a wallet, and Coinbase ships the wallet (w/ Cobie). This is the new rule to live by. Do not build anything that Base could turn into a precompile.
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Oliver L. Velez ⚡️ Bitcoin Intelligence (@olvelez007) reported@BritishHodl Mate, you're right about the part that matters most, so let me say it first. The trust chain failed. Coinkite shipped a flawed build for years. Many of us recommended it. Ordinary people had no way to audit the random-number generator. I'm one of them. I lost Bitcoin on July 30. But the conclusion you're drawing doesn't follow. A failure of one custody architecture is not a failure of self-custody. Paper wallets weren't the escape either. Coldcard-generated paper wallet keys came from the same broken generator. That's one of the least-reported parts of this story. More importantly... Across every wave of this attack, not one multisig wallet has been reported compromised. Not one. Single-signature concentration failed. Self-custody didn't. And the ETF doesn't solve the trust problem you're describing. Read IBIT's own filings. The Bitcoin custodian is Coinbase Custody Trust Company. You're saying trust failed... ...then recommending another trust model with a ticker symbol. That's not eliminating trust. It's relocating it. History matters. Mt. Gox. Quadriga. Celsius. Voyager. BlockFi. Genesis. FTX. Those institutions have cost Bitcoin holders far more than every hardware wallet defect combined. For someone completely non-technical with one affected device and nowhere else to go, using a reputable exchange while they learn or migrate is a defensible temporary decision. But making institutional custody the destination rather than the bridge abandons the very breakthrough Bitcoin introduced. Bitcoin didn't give us a better intermediary. It gave us the option to remove one. The lesson from this week isn't that self-custody failed. The lesson is that life-changing wealth should never depend on one key. That's a custody lesson. Not a Bitcoin lesson. And certainly not a reason to surrender the one property an ETF can never deliver: Final settlement without asking anyone's permission.
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RebelScum (@han64compuserve) reported@CoinDesk @coinbase @brian_armstrong Penis head is the one that delayed it 6 months ago. **** that scammer.
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Coinbase 🛡️ (@coinbase) reportedAvailable products vary by country/region. In some countries, access may be limited to select services such as Coinbase Wallet, DEX, or certain trading features.
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Dos Commas ,, ♦️♦️♦️♦️ (@dos__commas) reportedDamn Coinbase spent all that money in DC for CLARITY to play out like this? Crazy. Getting scammed like a $wLUNA customer, that's rough. Still, it's a fraction of the karmic iceberg that is approaching.
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Pulse Digital 🟣 (@CryptoPulse9) reported@coinbase I am still writing my ending, @coinbase I will not go down so easily.
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SPLIFF (@OG__SPLIFF) reported@RobinhoodApp Is till want to know why I can’t move crypto from Coinbase to Robinhood? Please help! Been waiting weeks for the approval??
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drew (@DBrown907) reported@EsenEraslan @RobinhoodApp Coinbase is deeply shameful for getting help
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Darin James (@DJBuildIt) reported@coinbase is so pathetic. Take my ACH Money Allow me to signup for CoinbaseONE Block me from using my debit card and put a hold on my account. Worthless
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DJR (@404fiatnotfound) reported@BritishHodl @PortlandHODL Man if a single firmware bug in one hardware wallet means self custody is finished then the institutions holding most of the new Bitcoin capital are already finished too. Coinbase Custody BlackRock’s IBIT setup Fidelity Digital Assets BitGo Anchorage and the rest all secure BTC the exact same fundamental way. Private keys protected by cryptography. They use multiparty computation so no full key ever exists in one place hardware security modules multi-signature schemes cold storage and strict access policies. These are not different physics. Same cryptographic primitives just rolled out at institutional scale with SOC audits insurance and teams of engineers instead of one device’s firmware. The Coldcard bug was a specific five-year-old implementation failure in seed entropy generation. It does not falsify elliptic-curve cryptography or the security of properly generated keys. It just shows the risk of relying on closed or poorly audited consumer firmware without extra entropy sources like dice rolls external RNGs or multi-sig. Institutions sit on the identical cryptographic attack surface plus the bigger risks of counterparty failure regulatory freezes or insider compromise that self custody was built to avoid. Calling self custody dead because one popular device had a bug is like saying all banking is finished after a single vault design flaw. The 21 million still rewards the people who actually control the keys. Institutions just outsource that control for a fee and take on the extra risks that come with it. The principle is still intact. 😎