Battlefield 6 Outage Map

Community Discussion

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Battlefield 6 Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  No Man's Smile (@NoMansSmile) reported 5 minutes ago

  @Battlefield @BattlefieldComm So sad that these guys work hard to add good features/modes to the game just to take it away from their player base weeks later because of greed and a broken anti-consumer live service system. Every developer should take a page out of HelloGames. Make games as passion not greed.

• 
  Reluctantly Present (@ReluctantlyPre1) reported 5 minutes ago

  @Battlefield Can we fix the camping on carriers? I refuse to play that mode.

• 
  Aaron Golding ✝️ (@aaronGolding9) reported 5 minutes ago

  @32Cassell Let's have what you melt? All the white British lads that currently have no job, because we imported 4 million indians, will be sent to die, in the trenches of Ukraine. All to try and cover the EU debt crisis, and UK pension liabilities problem. They need 500 million dead to solve the issue. ***** like you cheer it on. You would not last 5 minutes in today's battlefield.

• 
  Mohamed Ibrahim (@m_ibrahim_21) reported 7 minutes ago

  I have been broken and defeated. The world has finally won its long and arduous battle over my soul. There is nothing to be done now but walk the bloody battlefield and gaze upon my fallen soldiers... and weep.

• 
  James ⚜️ (@SisterDogmata) reported 11 minutes ago

  @HobbyFawx @Majorcheeks117 Your hypothesis would be correct, Sisters are promoted not only because of exemplary service and battlefield skill, but because of unyielding devotion to the Emperor, an especially pious nature, knowledge of their Order, communication skills, etc

• 
  Tye Jak (Eternal Heel Arc) 🖤🐅 (@TyeJakTV) reported 11 minutes ago

  @K4kirigaya @Battlefield Main issue with bullet drop for snipers is that their velocity is surprisingly low for the game, which makes the drop feel more impactful. Longer to get to distance makes drop more apparent. The longest range sniper somehow has less Velocity than the mini Scout.

• 
  Legendary K9 (@MbwaLegend) reported 11 minutes ago

  @SyloveO Sometimes the problem isn’t what we’re saying, but how we’re communicating. Changing the format can change the entire conversation. Listen to understand, not to win. A good conversation should build a bridge, not another battlefield.

• 
  Chris Daulton (@blackvaultchris) reported 13 minutes ago

  @bennyjohnson There are no men in the WNBA. Nobody is advocating that there be one. You weirdos have created a battlefield for a hypothetical problem that doesn't exist.

• 
  WintermintP - Chess Arbiter and Guitarist VTUBER (@WintermintP) reported 14 minutes ago

  Several problems with this. 1. For some people the one hero/role is all they can play. Some of them can't play that said hero properly, sure, but moving them to Tank or Support only further demoralises the person. 2. Not all games allow people to contribute in a meaningful way without actually being that skilled at the game. I used to be terrible at shooters until this year where I finally managed to maintain a 2.0 avg K/D in most games (Battlefield 6; I play the LMG class and use the KTS100 LMG). 3. A large number of these games have huge spawn-related problems where you're just bound to keep ending up spawnkilled come what may. That's bad game design, nothing to do with one's skills or ability to follow instructions. 4. You can't force a DPS to play Tank/Support and you can't force a Tank/Support to play DPS.

• 
  Sean Naccari ♌ (@big_sean_ogod) reported 15 minutes ago

  @Battlefield Fix the PC input I’m getting lit up before PC gamers come around the corner it’s beyond broken console players are uninstalling due to the huge disadvantage. I uninstalled

• 
  Lost In LA (@lost_in_la) reported 16 minutes ago

  @pdxraj @lookner I don’t believe that but high tolerance for conventional casualties ≠ indifference to battlefield contamination that can immobilize your own advance and logistics. Those are different problems.

• 
  Psycho Fella (@Psycho_Fella) reported 18 minutes ago

  THE TANK ERA IN UKRAINE IS OVER. JUST NOT THE WAY COUCH EXPERTS, ADVISORS, AND CONSULTANTS UNDERSTAND IT By Rimas Armaitis, Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) veteran—Lithuanian, sapper, instructor. The New York Times reports that about half of the tank battalion soldiers from Ukraine’s 33rd Mechanized Brigade have already retrained as drone operators. Some recruits are no longer being trained to operate tanks at all. Leopard 2A4s are still maintained, repaired, and used for training, but they are rarely sent on combat missions—mostly during bad weather when drone activity decreases. This does not mean that all tanks will be scrapped tomorrow. It means something much more unpleasant for tank enthusiasts: the tank has lost its status as the primary strike platform. The platform remains, but its role, frequency of use, and cost-to-risk ratio have fundamentally changed. A tank costing millions cannot operate freely on the battlefield because it is under constant surveillance by reconnaissance drones. Once detected, a tank doesn’t even need to be destroyed in a single strike. The first FPV drone might damage a track or optics, the second hits the engine, and the third attacks the crew or the evacuation vehicle. Later, the job is finished off by a heavy bomber drone, artillery, or aerial mining. Even if the tank remains repairable, the combat mission is already ruined, the crew’s lives are at risk, and another expensive machine must be sent to evacuate the vehicle. This is where the economics of war begin—something our couch generals for some reason stubbornly refuse to understand. The key issue isn't whether a tank can theoretically be protected. What matters is how much its protection, logistics, repairs, and trained crew cost compared to how little it costs the enemy to detect, disable, and finish it off. When a chain of drones costing a few hundred or a few thousand euros disables a platform worth millions, we are not facing an emotional debate of "tanks vs. drones," but a catastrophically unfavorable cost-to-result ratio. Of course, some advisor-consultant will now pop up and solemnly declare: "But a drone doesn't hold ground!" Thank you for the breakthrough. An artillery shell doesn't hold ground either. A landmine doesn't control an intersection, and a fighter jet doesn't sit in a trench. Different tools perform different functions. The logic of modern assault is as follows: reconnaissance drones spot positions and movement; FPVs and bomber drones destroy or suppress targets; ground-based robotic systems transport explosives, lay mines, scout, provoke the enemy into revealing firing points, and provide fire support. Only then do the infantry clear, capture, and consolidate the territory—performing what is called "zakrep" on the front lines. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are already being deployed with machine-gun modules, grenade launchers, shaped charges, and fragmentation charges. They handle logistics, evacuation, engineering, and specific assault tasks. They haven't replaced all light armored vehicles yet, but they are already taking over functions where it is better to lose a machine than to lose a machine along with its driver, crew, and squad. Infantry aren't going anywhere. However, a pure infantry assault without aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, drones, combat engineering preparation, and fire support is nowadays more simply referred to as a "meat assault." The neat phrase "an infantryman will still have to clear the trench" does not justify the idiotically wasteful decision to send him into that trench first. The role of artillery is also evolving. It remains essential for mass firepower, suppression, area targets, and operating under conditions where drones are restricted. However, single targets have long been handled by FPVs, heavy bomber drones, and mid-strike drones. Deep-strike systems and cheaper cruise missile analogs operate further behind enemy lines. So, drones haven't "replaced everything." They have taken over a huge share of reconnaissance, spotter adjustment, precision destruction, mining, logistics, and even assault roles. As a result, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation are used less frequently, more cautiously, and only when their impact justifies the cost and risk. Another argument from the couch experts: "Just turn on electronic warfare and the drones won't fly." Right, of course. Strange that the Ukrainians themselves haven't thought of pressing the magic "turn off drones" button over more than four years of war. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential, but it is not an invisible dome. We now have frequency hopping, relays, elements of autonomous control, machine vision systems, and fiber-optic-guided FPVs. Every line of defense triggers a countermeasure, and technological cycles at the front line sometimes change within weeks. While our consultant spends six months coordinating the final version of a PowerPoint presentation, his "latest" conclusion is already outdated twice over. We are not anti-tank. We are against using tanks according to the doctrine of yesterday's war. For a tank to make a proper comeback to the battlefield, it needs more than just a metal cage welded onto the roof. It requires a complete protection ecosystem: drone detection, electronic warfare, active and passive defense, interceptor drones, dedicated reconnaissance drones, reduced physical and electromagnetic visibility, and integration into a unified intelligence and fire-control network. The tank of the future will likely be unmanned or optionally manned. Because the issue isn't just armor thickness. The issue is sending human beings, along with the tank, into a zone under constant surveillance and targeted fire. This is what we have been talking about for years now. Except our conclusions weren't drawn from watching YouTube or dragging blue and red rectangles across a screen. They emerged from the trenches of the current war. We have seen how the kill zone is shifting, how drones evolved from an auxiliary tool into a primary means of destruction, and how outdated procedures began costing human lives. Yet in Lithuania, a strange qualification system still prevails: if you were at the front yourself, you are "too emotional." If you fought on Facebook for four years, you qualify as a military expert. If you saw the doctrine fail, you are a radical. If you rewrote it three times in PowerPoint, you are an advisor or consultant. So let me repeat this as simply as possible: Tanks haven't disappeared. What has disappeared is the ability to use them the way it was planned ten or twenty years ago. Aerial and ground robotic systems have already taken over a portion of the roles previously held by light armor, artillery, aviation, and infantry. Anyone who fails to grasp this isn't "defending classic warfare"—they are simply preparing for yesterday's war using tomorrow's budget. And if, after all these arguments, someone still only hears "veterans want to get rid of tanks," it's not an additional explanation they need. They lack the ability to read a text longer than the headline of a tank procurement contract.

• 
  Psycho Fella (@Psycho_Fella) reported 22 minutes ago

  THE TANK ERA IN UKRAINE IS OVER. JUST NOT THE WAY COUCH EXPERTS, ADVISORS, AND CONSULTANTS UNDERSTAND IT By Rimas Armaitis, Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) veteran—Lithuanian, sapper, instructor The New York Times reports that about half of the tank battalion soldiers from Ukraine’s 33rd Mechanized Brigade have already retrained as drone operators. Some recruits are no longer being trained to operate tanks at all. Leopard 2A4s are still maintained, repaired, and used for training, but they are rarely sent on combat missions—mostly during bad weather when drone activity decreases. This does not mean that all tanks will be scrapped tomorrow. It means something much more unpleasant for tank enthusiasts: the tank has lost its status as the primary strike platform. The platform remains, but its role, frequency of use, and cost-to-risk ratio have fundamentally changed. A tank costing millions cannot operate freely on the battlefield because it is under constant surveillance by reconnaissance drones. Once detected, a tank doesn’t even need to be destroyed in a single strike. The first FPV drone might damage a track or optics, the second hits the engine, and the third attacks the crew or the evacuation vehicle. Later, the job is finished off by a heavy bomber drone, artillery, or aerial mining. Even if the tank remains repairable, the combat mission is already ruined, the crew’s lives are at risk, and another expensive machine must be sent to evacuate the vehicle. This is where the economics of war begin—something our couch generals for some reason stubbornly refuse to understand. The key issue isn't whether a tank can theoretically be protected. What matters is how much its protection, logistics, repairs, and trained crew cost compared to how little it costs the enemy to detect, disable, and finish it off. When a chain of drones costing a few hundred or a few thousand euros disables a platform worth millions, we are not facing an emotional debate of "tanks vs. drones," but a catastrophically unfavorable cost-to-result ratio. Of course, some advisor-consultant will now pop up and solemnly declare: "But a drone doesn't hold ground!" Thank you for the breakthrough. An artillery shell doesn't hold ground either. A landmine doesn't control an intersection, and a fighter jet doesn't sit in a trench. Different tools perform different functions. The logic of modern assault is as follows: reconnaissance drones spot positions and movement; FPVs and bomber drones destroy or suppress targets; ground-based robotic systems transport explosives, lay mines, scout, provoke the enemy into revealing firing points, and provide fire support. Only then do the infantry clear, capture, and consolidate the territory—performing what is called "zakrep" on the front lines. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are already being deployed with machine-gun modules, grenade launchers, shaped charges, and fragmentation charges. They handle logistics, evacuation, engineering, and specific assault tasks. They haven't replaced all light armored vehicles yet, but they are already taking over functions where it is better to lose a machine than to lose a machine along with its driver, crew, and squad. Infantry aren't going anywhere. However, a pure infantry assault without aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, drones, combat engineering preparation, and fire support is nowadays more simply referred to as a "meat assault." The neat phrase "an infantryman will still have to clear the trench" does not justify the idiotically wasteful decision to send him into that trench first. The role of artillery is also evolving. It remains essential for mass firepower, suppression, area targets, and operating under conditions where drones are restricted. However, single targets have long been handled by FPVs, heavy bomber drones, and mid-strike drones. Deep-strike systems and cheaper cruise missile analogs operate further behind enemy lines. So, drones haven't "replaced everything." They have taken over a huge share of reconnaissance, spotter adjustment, precision destruction, mining, logistics, and even assault roles. As a result, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation are used less frequently, more cautiously, and only when their impact justifies the cost and risk. Another argument from the couch experts: "Just turn on electronic warfare and the drones won't fly." Right, of course. Strange that the Ukrainians themselves haven't thought of pressing the magic "turn off drones" button over more than four years of war. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential, but it is not an invisible dome. We now have frequency hopping, relays, elements of autonomous control, machine vision systems, and fiber-optic-guided FPVs. Every line of defense triggers a countermeasure, and technological cycles at the front line sometimes change within weeks. While our consultant spends six months coordinating the final version of a PowerPoint presentation, his "latest" conclusion is already outdated twice over. We are not anti-tank. We are against using tanks according to the doctrine of yesterday's war. For a tank to make a proper comeback to the battlefield, it needs more than just a metal cage welded onto the roof. It requires a complete protection ecosystem: drone detection, electronic warfare, active and passive defense, interceptor drones, dedicated reconnaissance drones, reduced physical and electromagnetic visibility, and integration into a unified intelligence and fire-control network. The tank of the future will likely be unmanned or optionally manned. Because the issue isn't just armor thickness. The issue is sending human beings, along with the tank, into a zone under constant surveillance and targeted fire. This is what we have been talking about for years now. Except our conclusions weren't drawn from watching YouTube or dragging blue and red rectangles across a screen. They emerged from the trenches of the current war. We have seen how the kill zone is shifting, how drones evolved from an auxiliary tool into a primary means of destruction, and how outdated procedures began costing human lives. Yet in Lithuania, a strange qualification system still prevails: if you were at the front yourself, you are "too emotional." If you fought on Facebook for four years, you qualify as a military expert. If you saw the doctrine fail, you are a radical. If you rewrote it three times in PowerPoint, you are an advisor or consultant. So let me repeat this as simply as possible: Tanks haven't disappeared. What has disappeared is the ability to use them the way it was planned ten or twenty years ago. Aerial and ground robotic systems have already taken over a portion of the roles previously held by light armor, artillery, aviation, and infantry. Anyone who fails to grasp this isn't "defending classic warfare"—they are simply preparing for yesterday's war using tomorrow's budget. And if, after all these arguments, someone still only hears "veterans want to get rid of tanks," it's not an additional explanation they need. They lack the ability to read a text longer than the headline of a tank procurement contract.

• 
  Scott Sapinkopf (@Sctty569) reported 23 minutes ago

  mw4 feels like a game for overcompetitive cracked meta **** the movement speed is way to fast and the sbmm needs to be removed !!! it feels like your literally cracked up u cant have ur settings high becuz everyone is trying to lower settings to maximize less input lag i hate it , im forced to pkay bots becuz i dont wanna pkay sweaty losers every single game and the ppl cheating need to be banned !! tht is another frustrating thing !! also whatever engine they are using sucks the delta force graphics look better then cod graphics !!! and i dont even rlly play delta force anymore it is very upsetting to be a cod fan right now but atleast battlefield slowed pace of play and is still fun amd gta will come out soon !!!

• 
  Hir3ling (@Hir3ling) reported 25 minutes ago

  @SCOHellFighters @Battlefield It's hopeless. Broken promises, and shady verbage when describing their intentions to deliver on their claims to be listening to the community. I wish it weren't the case, but it is 💔